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Woord vooraf
(Preface in Dutch)
Bij AEGON komen vele interessante onderwerpen aan de orde die nadere studie waard
zijn. Het schrijven van een proefschrift biedt de mogelijkheid ze diepgaand te bestuderen.
Reden waarom ik, met instemming van AEGON, contact heb opgenomen met de Erasmus
Universiteit Rotterdam en met name met Ton Vorst. Dit proefschrift heb ik onder zijn
gedegen begeleiding en gebruik makend van de faciliteiten van AEGON kunnen voltooien.
Bijzondere dank ben ik dan ook verschuldigd aan mijn promotor Ton Vorst. Hij
liet mij de betekenis van een vernieuwende probleemstelling, goede onderbouwing en
pakkende samenvatting zien. Door voortdurend polijsten kwamen deze aspecten in de
papers terug. Kortom: het is een voorrecht geweest onder zijn inspirerende begeleiding
dit werk te verrichten. Daarnaast heb ik geleerd van de plezierige samenwerking met
Patrick Houweling. Zijn gedrevenheid, programmeerkennis en precisie waren voorbeeldig.
Ook zijn ’laten-wij-dit-nog-even-proberen’ zal mij nog lang bijblijven. Deze samenwerking
heeft geresulteerd in de hoofdstukken drie en vijf. Hoofdstuk zes is tot stand gekomen
mede dankzij de specifieke kennis van Frank de Jong; dat heb ik zeer gewaardeerd. Naar de
kleine commissie gaat mijn dank uit voor hun deskundig oordeel. Het aanbod van Marno
Verbeek om dit proefschrift op te nemen in de Ph.D. Series Research in Management van
het Erasmus Institute of Management heb ik geapprecieerd. Het Tinbergen Institute wil
ik mijn waardering uiten voor de geboden studiefaciliteiten; Elli Hoek-van Dijke voor de
prettige samenwerking.
Henk Eggens heeft ervoor gezorgd dat ik optimaal gebruik kon maken van de
faciliteiten die AEGON te bieden heeft. Ik ben hem dan ook zeer erkentelijk voor de
mogelijkheid een dag per week te studeren, toegepast onderzoek te verrichten en papers
op conferenties te presenteren. Door toedoen van Jan Overmeer kreeg ik de kans de
seminars van Inquire Europe bij te wonen en een cursus van de Leland Stanford Junior
University te volgen. Moniek Janssen, Erik van Houwelingen en Edgar Koning hebben
het onderzoek altijd met interesse gevolgd; hiervoor mijn dank. Mijn naaste collega’s
xii Woord vooraf
Annemieke Coldeweijer, Rani Piputri, Tim Jansen, Tjeert Keijzer en Roy Kouwenberg
hebben de laatste versie van het proefschrift van commentaar voorzien; dit heb ik bijzonder
gewaardeerd. Evenzo heb ik de hulp die Herman Geertsema van Concerndocumentatie
mij bood bij het zoeken en opvragen van artikelen en boeken op prijs gesteld.
Mijn schoonouders hebben altijd met veel belangstelling en begrip de vorderingen van
het proefschrift gevolgd. Zus, Flor, Wouter, Sophie en Leonie hoop ik nu weer vaker in
’Stad’ te zien. Mijn ouders hebben van begin tot eind zeer meegeleefd. Mijn moeder
bleef, met Groningse koppigheid, steeds groot vertrouwen in mij stellen, mijn vader heeft
mij geleerd dat schrijven voornamelijk bestaat uit doorhalen en herschrijven - een prima
voorbereiding op het schrijven van een proefschrift.
De belangrijkste persoon bij het voltooien van dit proefschrift was Paula, mijn
betere helft. Zij accepteerde dat avonden, weekenden en vakanties studietijd betekenden.
Dankzij haar steun en toewijding is dit proefschrift afgerond.
Albert
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The introduction of the euro on January 1, 1999 created a large, single currency bond
market by merging eleven separate bond markets. The euro-denominated corporate bond
market has grown substantially ever since and has developed into a mature market. Now,
a full maturity spectrum of euro corporate bonds exists. Many different sectors and all
possible ratings are present and the secondary market is becoming more liquid as well.
Corporate bonds are subject to interest rate, credit, liquidity and tax risk. Traditionally,
most research in bond markets has been focused on interest rate risk and sometimes
tax risk as well. Over the last few years, credit risk models and their applications have
become increasingly important. More recently, modelling and estimating liquidity risk has
generated a lot of attention. In this thesis, we will focus on some of these aspects. Below,
we will give an introduction to several of the features mentioned above, concentrating
especially on the euro corporate bond market. At the same time, this will provide the
opportunity to place our chapters into this context. We will also give an overview of these
chapters.
1.1 Euro Corporate Bond Market
Broadly, the aggregate investment grade euro-denominated bond market can be decom-
posed into a government, credit and securitized bond market.1 Table 1.1 shows the
breakdown of this entire market as of May 31, 2004. Further, the credit market can be
split into corporate credit and non-corporate credit. From this table we see that the
aggregate market consists for the largest part of the government market and for a smaller
1We follow the decomposition of the Lehman Brothers Euro-Aggregate Bond Index.
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Table 1.1: Euro bond market structure
(May 31, 2004)a
Aggregate market 5053
Government market 3426 68%
Credit market 982 19%
Corporate credit market 807 16%
Non-corporate credit market 175 3%
Securitized market 644 13%
a in billions of euro
part of the credit and securitized markets. The euro corporate bond market represents
16% of the aggregate bond market.2
The aggregate euro bond market grew steadily during the period after the introduction
of the euro as displayed in Figure 1.1.3 Its constituents have also increased, with the
exception of the securitized market. The corporate bond market has risen the most
compared to the other markets, in absolute terms roughly 75%.
Over the past years, the euro corporate bond market has grown so rapidly for several
reasons (Admiraal and De Bondt (2004)):
• The introduction of the euro has removed currency risk for European investors and
has created a large, single currency market. This bigger market can more easily
absorb bonds with a large issued amount.
• The strong economic growth during a long period.
• The growing expertise of credit bonds and derivatives on the side of institutional
investors.
• The historically low nominal default-free interest rates have forced many investors
to seek higher yields and consequently they have accepted more credit risk.
• The issuance of bonds by telecom companies to finance the UMTS network licenses
and acquisitions.
Further, the institutional structure of the euro bond market, issuance pattern of
government bonds, composition of investor base and market regulation rules, have also
2An analysis of the euro non-corporate credit market is given by Kouwenberg and Mentink (2005).
3All markets have been normalized to 100, starting January 1999. The drops in the curves are caused
by adjusted index rules, for example: a rise in the minimum amount outstanding that produces a decline
in the number of bonds that classify for entry in an index.
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Figure 1.1: Euro bond market development (January 1999-May 2004)a
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a Markets are normalized to 100 in January 1999.
developed. Chapter 2 explains these developments with respect to the bond market in
the Netherlands.
Next, we give a snapshot of the maturity, rating and sector composition of the euro
corporate bond market as of May 31, 2004, as demonstrated in Table 1.2 .4 All maturities
up to ten years are well represented. Low investment grade ratings (A and BBB) dominate
and the financial and industrial sectors are most important in this market.5
The spectacular growth in the number bonds that are issued by the telecom sector
relative to the entire corporate credit bond market can be seen from Figure 1.2. Starting
in 2000, the sector’s credit worthiness deteriorated fast and equity prices collapsed. These
events triggered the introduction of a new type of bond in the euro corporate bond market:
the step-up coupon bond: a bond ”with embedded step-up covenants, i.e. provisions
linking the cash flow of the bond to the rating of the issuer by increasing the coupons as
the rating declines” (Lando and Mortensen (2004)). In Chapter 3, we describe and test
empirically several models for step-up bonds.
4The Lehman Brothers Euro-Aggregate Corporate Bond Index is a sub index of the Lehman Brothers
Euro-Aggregate Bond Index employed above.
5With regards to the securitized market: all maturities are well represented, around 80% of this
market is AAA rated and approximately 70% is backed by public sector or mortgage loans (May 31,
2004).
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Table 1.2: Euro corporate bond market
maturity, rating and sector distribution
(May 31, 2004)
Maturity Rating Sector
1-3 24% AAA 9% financial 45%
3-5 26% AA 17% industrial 45%
5-7 21% A 41% utility 10%
7-10 23% BBB 33%
10+ 6%
Figure 1.2: Euro corporate and telecommunications bond market development
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Another phenomenon of the credit security market in general and also of the euro
credit security market is the impressive growth of the credit derivatives market, most
notably: the credit default swap market. ”A credit default swap is a form of derivative
security that can be viewed as a default insurance on loans or bonds. Credit default
swaps pay the buyer of protection a given contingent (on default) amount at the time of
a default event” (Duffee and Singleton (2003)). Due to this market growth, euro credit
default swaps have often become more liquid than corresponding corporate bonds and
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they have developed into a standard reference for pricing issuer credit risk. Further,
hedging of exotic synthetic CDOs, N -th to default baskets and Dow Jones TRAC-X drive
corporate bond prices to a large extent (Duffee and Cunningham Yurday (2004a) and
Duffee and Cunningham Yurday (2004b)).
With the growth of both the (euro) bond market and the credit default swap
market, the method of trading these securities by institutional investors and banks has
transformed. Instead of over-the-counter trading, single trading platforms where lists of
banks quote securities are now employed. These trading platforms make bond markets
more transparent. Two examples of such single trading platforms are: Bloomberg L.P.
and TradeWebTMLtd. The introduction of these platforms make new data available for
research as these (single) platforms bring together bid and ask quotes from different
investment banks with respect to the same bond at the same time. In Chapter 6, we have
employed this new database in order to measure commonality in liquidity in euro security
markets.
1.2 Corporate Bond Risks
Among others, Elton, Gruber, Agrawal and Mann (2004) have distinguished the following
four factors that determine the return and risk of investment grade corporate bonds:
interest rate, credit, liquidity and tax risk. We will describe each of these factors below.
1.2.1 Interest Rate Risk
Litterman, Scheinkman and Weiss (1991) defines the source of interest rate risk as
the variation of (default-free) interest rates or the term structure of interest rates.
Traditionally, the measures duration and convexity quantify the exposure of a bond with
respect to interest rate risk. Interest rate risk of a portfolio of bonds can be computed
by averaging the duration (plus convexity) of each bond in the portfolio using market
weights.
In practice, the interest rate risk of a high investment grade sovereign bond portfolio
can be measured using for example the of-the-shelf BARRA Inc. Cosmos portfolio risk
model. This model computes the portfolio’s interest rate risk with the help of both the
usual duration and convexity, but also with the country specific level (shift), steepness
(twist) and curvature (butterfly) movements of a (government) yield curve.
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1.2.2 Credit Risk
Duffee and Singleton (2003) define credit risk as ”the risk of default or of the reduction
in market value caused by changes in the credit quality of issuers or counter parties”.
Credit risk can be measured using ratings from any one of the major, independent rating
agencies. Moody’s uses the ratings: AAA, AA, A, BBB, BB, B and CCC. Standard &
Poor’s (S&P) applies a comparable methodology and assigns: Aaa, Aa, A, Baa, Ba, B
and Caa. Both rating agencies modify these ratings by adding notches and so produce
intermediate ratings. Moody’s attaches ”+” or (”-”), while S&P appends ”1”, ”2” or
”3”. For each rating, a historical, average probability of default is calculated based on
companies with the same rating that have defaulted. Higher ratings, AAA, AA1, AA2,
. . . (Aaa, Aa+, Aa, . . . ) indicate a lower probability of default compared to lower ratings:
B2, B3, CCC (B, B-, Caa).
Transition matrices from rating agencies describe the probabilities that a given rating
will migrate to another rating over a given period, mostly one year, again based on
historical observations. In general, the pattern of these transition matrices indicates that
ratings in most cases either do not change or alter more than one notch within one year.
However, recently, there have been some exceptions to this pattern such as the defaults
of the companies Enron, Tyco International and WorldCom.
Another measure of credit risk is the risk-neutral probability of default. As Duffee
and Singleton (2003) explain: ”differences between historical and risk-neutral default
probabilities reflect the risk premia associated with default. In general, default-risk premia
reflect the aversion to both the risk of timing of default and to the severity of loss in the
event of default”.
Usually, risk-neutral default probabilities are derived from corporate bond and/or
credit default swap market prices under the assumption that investors only need to be
compensated for their expected pay offs, taken default into account, of the underlying.
Reduced form models are usually based on this risk-neutral default probability (or
its complement: the risk-neutral survival probability, one minus risk-neutral default
probability).
Rating agencies also provide the recovery rates based on historical observations. For
example, Moody’s measures the recovery rate of a defaulted bond by its price in the
secondary market one month after the default date (Hamilton, Cantor, West and Fowlie
(2002)). In theoretical models, these recovery rates are often assumed constant. Acharya,
Bharath and Srinivasan (2004) show in an extensive analysis of the recovery rates in the
United States during the period 1982-1999 that recovery rates are a function of seniority
and security (as expected), but also of industry conditions at the time of default.
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In order to measure the amount of credit risk of a corporate bond, typically the yield
difference (or credit spread) between a corporate bond and a comparable bond (priced
using the swap curve) is calculated. In general, a higher spread indicates more credit risk.
However, this spread can only be truly meaningful if the corporate and government bond
are comparable in every other respect: interest rate, liquidity and tax risk.
1.2.3 Liquidity Risk
Maltz (2003) defines (asset) liquidity as: ”an asset is said to be liquid if it is ”near” or a
good substitute for cash. When used to describe a market, liquidity refers to the ability
to maintain a position and unwind in an orderly fashion without excessive transaction
costs and without excessive price deterioration.”
Ideally, the liquidity risk of corporate bonds is quantified directly, with the help of
bid-ask spreads and/or trade flows. We will use bid-ask spreads of euro-denominated
corporate bonds in Chapter 6. Often however these data are not reliable or not available
(over long time periods) and consequently liquidity risk is approximated, for example
De Jong and Driessen (2004) use, among other data, credit spreads to this end. We
also quantify liquidity indirectly and use the difference between corporate bond yield and
synthetic yield, where the synthetic yield corrects the corporate bond yield for interest
rate, credit and tax risk. In Chapter 5, we will employ this indirect approach.
1.2.4 Tax Risk
According to Shiller and Modigliani (1979) the existence of tax risk can be explained
by the favorable tax treatment in U.S. tax law of capital gains in bonds in contrast to
coupon payments. However, this difference in treatment can change due to new tax laws.
In general, this type of risk is quantified with the help of the coupon of a bond versus
the (average) coupon of comparable bonds, where a higher coupon should indicate the
presence of tax risk.
1.3 Credit Risk Models
1.3.1 Structural Approach
Generally, credit risk models can be classified into two approaches: the structural approach
and the reduced form approach. Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1974) have
pioneered the structural approach. This type of model assumes that the total assets
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of a company are equal to the sum of the market value of equity and liabilities. A
lognormal diffusion process describes the dynamics of these total assets. If the value of
the assets is smaller than or equal to the debt book value at maturity, the company goes
into default. In this case, the equity holders receive nothing and the bondholders get the
residual firm value. Hence, the value of the equity can be seen as a call option on the
assets of the firm with strike price equal to the debt. So, the value of the company’s
equity can be obtained by applying the Black-Scholes call option formula, with the assets
as the underlying variable and the debt book value as strike. By put-call parity, we get
the alternative interpretation that the bond holder has written a put on the total assets
of the firm. Thus, the value of the company’s debt can be calculated by subtracting this
equity call option value from the total asset value.
The main advantage of this model is that it is conceptually very appealing. However,
the disadvantages are that the original model is not easy to implement in practice as
market value of assets and asset volatility are difficult to estimate and capital structures
are often not that simple. Further, this approach tends to underestimate default
probabilities and consequently adjustments have to be made (RiskMetrics Group (2002)).
Therefore, in applications of this approach many different modifications of the original
model’s parameters have been implemented. This type of model is most often employed
in risk management: generating corporate bond spreads, predicting rating migrations and
forecasting default.
An example of a popular, commercial structural model is Moody’s KMVTM model.
This model calculates the so-called Expected Default FrequencyTM (EDFTM): the
probability of default during the forthcoming year (Crosbie and Bohn (2003)). Another
example is the CreditGradesTM model supported by Deutsche Bank, Goldman Sachs and
J.P. Morgan. The primary objective of this model is to calculate a par credit default swap
spread (RiskMetrics Group (2002)).
1.3.2 Reduced Form Approach
Now, we turn to the reduced form approach. Instead of endogenously determined
default (based on company asset value), this class of models assumes that default occurs
exogenously at a historical default rate or at the first jump in a conditional (on no
previous default) stochastic process, usually a stochastic Poisson process driven by a
hazard rate (or intensity) process. This hazard rate can be interpreted as the conditional,
instantaneous probability of default. Assuming no arbitrage opportunities, the theoretical
price of corporate bonds can be derived under an equivalent martingale measure (Dai
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and Singleton (2003)). Litterman and Iben (1991) have pioneered this approach. Many
theoretical extensions and refinements of their approach have been made with respect to
the modelling of the hazard rate, the recovery rate and the correlation between default-free
interest rate and hazard rate; see for example Duffee and Singleton (2003).
The advantage of this type of model is the ease in calibrating the values of its
parameters with the help of market prices of liquid corporate bonds (and credit default
swap market prices). Yet, modelling of the recovery rate remains difficult in this type of
models. This type of model is often used for pricing and hedging of (portfolios of) credit
securities, for example: credit default swaps (Houweling and Vorst (2005)). We utilize
this approach in the valuation of euro step-up bonds that have been issued by telecom
companies, in Chapter 3.
The CreditMetricsTM model (CreditMetrics) (J.P. Morgan (1997)) is a popular,
commercial product based on reduced form models. This credit risk portfolio model
calculates changes in the value of bonds due to changes in their credit quality. These
changes are caused by possible default or rating upgrades or downgrades. Further, the
CreditMetrics model produces credit Value-at-Risk measures of portfolios using a Monte
Carlo simulation and computes expected loss. In Chapter 5, we have minimized the
Conditional Value-at-Risk of a credit bond portfolio employing the CreditMetrics model.
1.4 Overview
In the above, we have referred to the chapters (or papers) in this dissertation in relation to
the euro corporate bond market, credit risk models and corporate bond risks. Now, we will
summarize these chapters, starting with Chapter 2, the Bond Market in the Netherlands.
This chapter describes the institutional structure of the bond market in The Netherlands
as part of the larger euro bond market. The introduction of the euro on January 1, 1999
changed the shape of the small market for Dutch bonds. The Dutch government had to
find ways to improve the liquidity of their bonds as currency differences between countries
disappeared. The euro also influenced Dutch corporate bond issuers, which have become
part of the growing euro-denominated credit bond market. In this newly established bond
market, a company’s home country has become less important than it’s rating and sector.
The investor base of both Dutch government bonds and corporate bonds has also become
more international. So it is clear that both issuers and investors have been affected by
the introduction of the euro. One area of common ground for issuers and investors is
the EuroNext Amsterdam Stock Exchange, which has now merged with exchanges in
Europe, and, most important, the OTC bond markets. There have also been changes to
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the Dutch financial supervision regime since Dutch supervision has moved from a largely
sector-oriented regime, to one that is more cross-sectional based. Finally, ratings agencies
also have an impact through their assessment of Dutch government debt and corporate
bonds.
Part I describes credit risk of corporate bonds (Chapters 3 and 4). First, in Chapter 3,
we value rating-triggered step-up bonds using three different reduced form models: a risk-
neutral valuation framework; a similar framework based on historical probabilities; and as
plain vanilla bonds. The market seems to value single step-up bonds according to the first
model, while it values multiple step-up bonds as plain vanilla bonds. Further, step-up
feature market premiums are more volatile than risk-neutral or historical premiums, and
the risk-neutral model always approximates market premiums better than the historical
method. Finally, most step-up bonds offer a cushion against rating migrations via
dampened price movements.
Next, Chapter 4 examines the optimization of a corporate bond portfolio using
the CreditMetrics model. Optimal portfolios of credit bonds are less risky, while
having at least the same expected return. In this chapter, we investigate whether the
”optimal” bond portfolios are really an improvement by analyzing the characteristics of
the individual bonds in the optimal portfolio. We find that a portfolio manager should
be careful in carrying out the trades as suggested by the portfolio optimization routine
because only one or two bonds dominate optimal portfolios. Moreover, the composition of
such an optimal portfolio is very sensitive to small changes in the expected forward price
of its main constituents. However, portfolio optimization can be used in combination
with some common sense restrictions to produce portfolios that both have a lower risk
and higher return than a fully diversified portfolio. We also improve on the portfolio
by replacing the dominant bond in the optimal portfolio by similar bonds. As a risk
measure we use the Conditional Value-at-Risk (CVaR), which at a given percentile equals
the expected value of the losses that exceed the Value-at-Risk (VaR) at that percentile.
CVaR also provides information about the losses larger than the VaR. Furthermore, the
CVaR can be optimized using linear programming.
Part II studies liquidity risk of corporate bonds (Chapter 5 and 6). In Chapter 5,
we consider nine different proxies (issued amount, listed, euro, on-the-run, age, missing
prices, yield volatility, number of contributors and yield dispersion) to measure corporate
bond liquidity and use a four-variable model to control for interest rate risk, credit risk,
maturity and rating differences between bonds. The null hypothesis that liquidity risk
is not priced in our data set of euro corporate bonds is rejected for eight out of nine
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liquidity proxies. We find significant liquidity premia, ranging from 13 to 23 basis points.
A comparison test between liquidity proxies shows limited differences between the proxies.
In Chapter 6, we concentrate on the commonality in liquidity, return and volatility
of the euro-denominated corporate bond, government bond and equity markets. We
apply the Chordia, Sarkar and Subrahmanyam (2003) VAR approach using both daily
and weekly frequency. Based on our VAR model we run impulse response functions
and we find that commonality in liquidity between euro security markets indeed exists.
Furthermore, links between liquidity and return and volatility within and between euro
security markets can also be strong. Granger causality tests support these results. As we
introduce a new corporate bond data set we also compare the average characteristics of
frequently quoted and not frequently quoted corporate bonds. We find that the frequently
quoted part has a lower average age, higher coupon, larger issued amount, longer maturity,
lower rating and higher equity market value than its not frequently quoted counterpart
for the total period September 2002 to September 2003.
Finally, in Chapter 7 we review the summaries and conclusions of Chapter 2 and the
Parts I and II.

Chapter 2
Dutch Fixed Income Market1
2.1 Introduction
The introduction of the euro on January 1, 1999 changed the shape of the small market for
Dutch bonds. The guilder bond market disappeared and was absorbed by the large euro-
denominated bond market, with the guilder becoming one of the eleven legacy currencies.
Before the introduction of the euro, the government yields of the future Euro Member
States had already converged; the 10-year government yield spread between Germany and
the Netherlands for example was only nine basis points at December 31, 1998 (Bloomberg
L.P.) So, for medium-sized government bond issuers, such as the Dutch government, the
euro introduction meant that they had to find a way to improve the liquidity of their
bonds. The euro also influenced the Dutch corporate bond issuers, which have become
part of the growing euro-denominated corporate bond market. In this newly established
bond market, a company’s home country has become less important than it’s rating and
sector.
The investor base of both Dutch government bonds and corporate bonds has also
become more international. Large institutional investors, both European and non-
European, are also now investing in euro corporate bonds that are issued by Dutch
companies. So, it is clear that both issuers and investors have been affected by the
introduction of the euro. One area of common ground for issuers and investors is the
Amsterdam Stock Exchange (AEX), which has now merged with exchanges in Brussels,
Lisbon and Paris into Euronext, where Dutch government bonds, corporate bonds, issued
by both domestic and foreign companies, and other types of bonds are all listed. Small and
1This chapter is based on the chapter ”The Netherlands” by Mentink (2004) in the book ”European
Fixed Income Markets, Money, Bond and Interest Rate Derivatives”, published by John Wiley & Sons,
Ltd.
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irregular bond trades dominate Euronext Amsterdam, suggesting that retail investors are
the main participants in this part of the bond market. In contrast, institutional investors
mainly trade over-the-counter (OTC) with investment banks. These same institutions are
increasingly involved in web trading.
There have also been changes to the Dutch financial supervision regime. As Jonk,
Kremers and Schoenmaker (2001) explain, supervision has moved from a largely sector-
oriented regime to one that is more cross-sectional based. The driving force behind this
reform is the continuing financial market integration, with banks and insurance companies
increasingly involved in selling each other’s products. The Dutch supervisors want their
structure to reflect these market developments although there is still some debate between
the different European supervisors over the best way to implement a Europe-wide regime.
In addition to this changing national supervision, ratings agencies also have an impact
through their assessment of Dutch government debt and corporate bonds.
The content of this chapter consists of the following. First, in Section 2.2, the economic
background of the Netherlands is given by analyzing its main economic indicators. Next,
the tasks of De Nederlandsche Bank (Dutch Central Bank) and the Ministry of Finance
are reviewed. Section 2.3 discusses details of the Dutch government bonds. Both guilder
corporate bonds and euro corporate bonds that are issued by Dutch companies are
analyzed in Section 2.4. The investors in these Dutch government bonds and euro
corporate bonds are discussed in Section 2.5. Euronext Amsterdam and OTC trading
bring issuers and investors together as explained in Section 2.7. Dutch government
regulators and private rating agencies that are active in the Dutch fixed income market
are described in Section 2.7. Finally, Section 2.8 summarizes.
2.2 The Netherlands
2.2.1 Economic Background
During the period 1996-2000, the Dutch economy performed very well as the real gross
domestic product (GDP) growth averaged 3.7 percent per year. The breakdown of Dutch
GDP is presented in Table 2.1. This shows the national accounts of the Netherlands in
the year 2000 both in billions of euro and in percentage of GDP. The table demonstrates
that the Netherlands is an open economy, as imports and exports as a percentage of GDP
equal 62.4 and 67.2 respectively. Therefore, the downturn in the global economy that
started in 2001 also slowed economic growth in the Netherlands. Moreover, rising oil
prices, falling stock prices, stabilizing house prices and animal diseases that led to a fall
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Table 2.1: Dutch national accounts (2000)
(OECD (2002))a
Private consumption 199.9 49.8%
Public consumption 91.2 22.7%
Gross fixed investment 90.9 22.7%
Stock building -0.4 -0.1%
Exports 269.6 67.2%
Imports 250.1 62.4%
GDP 401.1
a in billions of euro
in exports all had a negative effect on economic growth (International Monetary Fund
(2002)). In 2003, economic growth did not return and became negative.
Table 2.2 shows the percentage changes in national accounts, prices, wages and
employment, personal sector, external trade and public sector accounts of the Netherlands
for the years 1997-2001, 2002 (estimation) and 2003 (projection) (International Monetary
Fund (2002)). All elements of GDP increased during the period 1997-2000, although
imports often grew faster than exports, except in 2000, and gross fixed investments grew
faster than both private and public consumption. In addition, employment rose and
unemployment fell from 5.5% in 1997 to 2.6% in 2000. Both the growth of real disposable
income and the savings ratio were lower in 1999 and 2000 compared to 1997 and 1998. The
current account balance showed a surplus during the whole period, despite the fact that
imports increased faster than exports. The general government gross debt fell dramatically
owing to surpluses starting in 1999 and GDP growth.
On the other hand, this strong economic growth caused the consumer price index
and GDP deflator to rise. Both were higher than those in other Euro-zone countries,
and hourly labor compensation and unit labor costs also rose in 2001, 2002 and 2003.
Consequently, in 2001 and 2002, GDP growth lowered compared to the preceding years
with negative growth in 2003. Government consumption growth remained high compared
to the other GDP elements; the employment rate lowered, the unemployment rate rose
and the general government surplus became smaller and again negative.
The prospects of the revival of economic growth in the short term remain gloomy as
industrial and consumer confidence are still at low levels. Important risk factors for the
Dutch economy (International Monetary Fund (2002)) are the appreciation of the euro
against other main currencies (damaging exports), rising oil prices producing inflation
and falling house prices causing lower consumption and distress in the financial sector.
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Table 2.2: Percentage changesa in the Dutch national accountsb, prices, wages and
employment, personal sector, external trade and public sector accounts for the years 1997,
1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002c and 2003c (IMF (2003))
National accounts 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
National accounts
Private consumption 3.0 4.8 4.7 3.6 1.2 0.9 1.2
Public consumption 3.2 3.6 2.5 1.9 3.1 3.7 1.1
Gross fixed investment 6.6 4.2 7.8 3.5 -0.8 -3.7 -4.0
Exports 8.8 7.4 5.1 10.9 1.7 -1.4 1.1
Imports 9.5 8.5 5.8 10.6 1.9 -2.1 3.1
GDP 3.9 4.3 4.0 3.4 1.2 0.2 -0.2
Prices, wages and employment
Consumer price index (year average) 1.9 1.8 2.0 2.3 5.1 3.9 2.6
GDP deflator 2.0 1.7 1.5 4.1 5.3 3.2 3.0
Hourly compensation (manufacturing) 3.0 3.2 2.9 3.7 4.2 3.8 3.3
Unit labor costs (manufacturing) -0.7 1.3 0.9 0.1 5.0 2.8 2.1
Employment 3.4 3.3 3.0 1.6 2.4 1.1 -0.4
Unemployment rate 5.5 4.2 3.2 2.6 2.0 2.3 3.8
Personal sector
Real disposable income 3.4 4.5 1.0 2.1 4.0 1.5 0.3
Household savings ratio 13.4 12.9 9.7 6.9 9.8 10.8 10.2
(Percentage of real disposable income)
External trade
Exports of goods (volume) 9.2 7.4 5.3 10.3 1.7 -0.7 0.8
Imports of goods (volume) 10.5 8.3 6.4 9.8 1.0 -2.6 2.8
Terms of trade 0.5 0.1 -1.5 0.0 1.0 0.2 0.4
Current account balance (percentage of GDP) 6.6 3.3 3.2 1.2 2.1 2.2 3.5
Public sector accounts (percentage of GDP)
Revenue 47.1 46.4 47.6 47.4 46.5 46.1 45.6
Expenditure 48.2 47.2 46.9 45.3 46.4 47.3 47.8
General government balance -1.1 -0.8 0.7 2.2 0.1 -1.2 -2.1
General government gross debt 70.0 66.8 63.1 55.8 52.8 52.6 52.5
a unless otherwise noted
b constant prices
c estimation
Nationally, the political situation was uncertain as the newly elected Dutch government
resigned after only three months in office, while usually elections are held every four years.
New elections were held in January 2003.2
2For a further explanation of the performance of the Dutch economy in an international perspective,
see Ministry of Economic Affairs (2002).
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2.2.2 Financial Sector
The Dutch financial sector can be typified by the following five main characteristics
(European Central Bank (2002)). Compared to other Euro-zone countries, this sector is
large as a percentage of GDP. The sector’s intermediary functions, such as bank lending,
are important. Much of the dealing in this area occurs between financial institutions.
The banking sector is very concentrated, with only four banks controlling 80% of the
Dutch lending market and the sector has an international focus with, for example, large
operations in the United States. Within the sector there is much cross-sector consolidation
such as banks selling insurance products and vice versa.
Institutional investors, both pension funds and the investment portfolios of insurance
companies, constitute a considerable segment of the Dutch financial sector. For
most employees, it is compulsory, not optional, to participate in a funded pension
scheme. Therefore, Dutch pension funds manage huge investment portfolios compared
to other countries in the Euro-zone, with ABP, the government employees’ pension fund,
controlling an investment portfolio of 150 billion euro in 2000 (European Central Bank
(2002)).
2.2.3 De Nederlandsche Bank (DNB, Dutch Central Bank)
On January 1, 1999, the independent monetary policy of De Nederlandsche Bank
disappeared. Seven months earlier, on June 1, 1998, DNB officially became part of the
European System of Central Banks (ESCB), where the Governor of DNB took a seat in
the Governing Council. Two of the tasks undertaken by DNB, numbered 1 and 2 below,
are also known as the ESCB tasks. Under the 1998 Bank Act, the full list of DNB tasks
reads as follows:
1. ”Within the framework of the ESCB, the Bank shall contribute to the definition and
implementation of monetary policy within the European Union (EU). The Bank’s
objective is to maintain price stability. Without prejudice to this objective, the
Bank shall support the general economic policy in the EU.
2. The Bank shall hold and manage the official foreign reserves and shall conduct
foreign-exchange operations.
3. The Bank shall collect statistical data and produce statistics.
4. The Bank shall promote the smooth operation of payment systems and take care of
the banknote circulation.
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5. The Bank shall supervise banks, investment institutions and exchange offices (see
also Section 2.7 below.)
The Bank may, subject to permission by Royal Decree, perform other tasks in the
public interest. The ECB may also ask the Bank to perform extra tasks” (Appendix 2.A,
DNB.)
Figure 2.1: DNB organizational structure (DNB (2002))
 
Subsector Monetary Affairs
Directorate Monetary affairs
Subsector Strategy, Policy and General Support
Subsector Internationally Active Banks
Subsector Banks, Investment Funds and Exchange Offices
Directorate Supervision
Subsector Cash
Subsector Non-cash
Subsector Internal Operations
Internal Auditing Department
Directorate Payments and Internal Operations
Governing Board
Figure 2.1 shows the organizational structure of DNB: three main directorates -
Monetary Affairs, Supervision and Payments and Internal Operations - each directorate
subdivided in sections and departments. ”The Monetary and Economic Policy department
plans the monetary policy to be pursued by DNB. Planning the positions to be taken
with regard to monetary and macro-economic matters in the (inter)national fora in which
DNB takes part. The Research department carries out pure research, model building
and maintenance, historical research and consultative activities. The Export and Import
Credit Guarantees department is involved in the reinsurance by the Dutch government of
foreign payment risks in respect of exports, imports and investment transactions and
any attending foreign exchange risks. The Financial Markets department plans and
implements the market-oriented policy conducted by DNB in respect of the money, foreign
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exchange and capital markets. Investing DNB’s gold and foreign exchange holdings, the
general reserve, DNB’s pension fund and the balances on staff accounts. The Statistical
Information and Reporting department compiles, processes and provides (standard) data
for monetary supervision, socio-economic policy and prudential supervision.”
”The directorate Supervision consists of eleven sections. The Policy section draws up
rules and regulations (including the reporting framework) relating to banking supervision,
prepares (inter)national policy consultations. The Strategy section makes long term
analyzes of supervisory issues. Internationally active banks section exercises supervision
on large banking institutions, which operate internationally. Payment systems and
information technology section exercises supervision on payment systems, payment
products and providers of payment services. The Banks section exercises supervision
on credit institutions subject to supervision. The Investment funds and exchange offices
section performs DNB’s tasks ensuing from the Act on the supervision of investment
institutions and the exchange offices Act and planning the policy to be pursued in these
areas” (Appendix 2.A, DNB).
2.2.4 Ministry of Finance (MoF)
The Dutch Minister of Finance is primarily responsible for financial policy, although the
Dutch Council of Ministers also has an input. This relationship applies between the
different ministries since the Dutch Ministry of Finance shapes financial and economic
policies in conjunction with other Government Ministries. Thus, MoF is responsible
for fiscal policy, i.e. overall financial policy and the management of government funds.
Therefore, MoF is involved in both government income and expenditure and looks
at how government spending can best be financed, i.e. via taxes or from issuing
government bonds. MoF is also responsible for both drafting and executing tax legislation.
Three quarters of government income is raised via taxation. The Tax and customs
administration, also part of this Ministry, is responsible for the actual collection of taxes
and duties (Appendix 2.A, MoF).
The organization structure of MoF appears in Figure 2.2, which shows the four
Directorates-General: Treasury, Budget, Tax & Customs Policy & Legislation and Tax
and Customs Administration, together with the Central Directorates and Departments
(Appendix 2.A, MoF).
”The financial and economic policy fall within the sphere of activity of the Treasury.
The Treasury is comprised of six policy Directorates. The responsibilities of the
Directorate-General are concerned with the coordination of fiscal policy. The Directorate-
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Figure 2.2: MoF organizational structure (MoF (2002))
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General is comprised of four Directorates. The Directorate-General for Tax and Customs
Policy and Legislation is responsible for drafting national and international tax policy and
for the incorporation of these in legislation and international agreements. Once legislation
has been published in the Bulletin of Acts, Orders and Decrees it enters the realm of
the Directorate-General for the Tax and Customs Administration. This Directorate is
responsible for the implementation of tax legislation and non-tax legislation charged to
the Administration. The Directorate-General draws up implementing regulations, which
are laid down in instructions and resolutions” (Appendix 2.A, MoF).
2.3 Government Bonds
2.3.1 Government Bond Market
In the run up to the introduction of the euro, the yield spread between government bonds
of the future EMU Member States gradually narrowed. In other words, these government
yields converged, because currency risk premiums faded and national monetary polices
merged into one (Galati and Tsatsaronis (2001)). Figure 2.3 provides the calculated
spreads of three EMU members, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain, for the period December
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31, 1996 to August 31, 2002, on a monthly basis.3 This figure demonstrates the yield
convergence as the spread between Italy and Spain versus Germany decreased. Of
particular note is the very small yield spread between the Netherlands and Germany.
Figure 2.3: 10-Year yield spread of Italy, the Netherlands and Spain, over the 10-year
German yield (December 31, 1996-August 31, 2002) (Bloomberg L.P. (2002))
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Although government yields have converged, small spreads still exist. In general, these
spreads can be explained by differences in fiscal policy, ratings and liquidity. Typically,
the Dutch government yields are only a few basis points higher than those in Germany,
for example: the 10-year spread was only 13 basis points as of the end of August 2002.
Rating differences are not a factor as their Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s ratings are the
same, i.e. Aaa/AAA. Moreover, the fiscal policy of each country is formally constrained
by the ”Stability Pact”; which leaves both countries little room to manoeuvre. So,
yield differences between these two government curves can best be explained by liquidity
differences.
From a Euro-zone perspective, the Dutch government is a medium-sized issuer of
debt in terms of total amount of debt outstanding. Table 2.3 presents the percentage
3Subtracting the 10-year yield of German government bonds from the 10-year yield of government
bonds from Italy, the Netherlands and Spain gives the yield spread against Germany. As the German
yield curve is the benchmark curve in the Euro-zone, this yield is used here as the reference yield.
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Table 2.3: Percentage distribution of
nominal euro-denominated government
debt by Euro-zone country (June 30,
2002) (ECB (2003))
Austria 2.9%
Belgium 6.5%
Finland 1.3%
France 19.2%
Germany 22.0%
Greece 3.0%
Ireland 0.6%
Italy 30.0%
Luxembourg 0.0%
the Netherlands 4.9%
Portugal 1.5%
Spain 8.1%
distribution of total nominal euro denominated debt, both short and long term, of each
Euro-zone member state at the end of June 2002. As this figure demonstrates, the Dutch
government is not a very large debt issuer compared to France, Germany and Italy. As a
result, it is important for the Dutch government to make its debt securities as liquid as the
debt of these larger countries. Section 2.3.2 below will describe how this goal of increasing
liquidity is implemented by the Dutch government. Like the Dutch government, many
governments attach high importance to the maintenance of liquid markets for their bonds
(Bank of International Settlements (2001)).
Dutch government 2-, 5- and 10-year yields are displayed in Figure 2.4 for the same
period December 31, 1996 to August 31, 2002, again on a monthly basis. During this
period, the slope of the Dutch government yield curve was always positive. During the
months June to October 2000, the yield curve was very flat as the 2-, 5- and 10-year
yields were very close to each other. From June 1997 to February 1999, the 10-year yields
decreased to around 3.75%, then rose again to a peak of approximately 5.7% in January
2000 before falling once more to 4.7% in August 2002.
2.3.2 Dutch State Treasury Agency (DSTA, Agentschap van het
Ministerie van Financie¨n)
The Dutch State Treasury Agency (DSTA), part of MoF, is the debt manager of the
central government of the Netherlands. It conducts the sale of both Dutch Treasury
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Figure 2.4: Dutch government 2-, 5- and 10-year bond yields (December 31, 1996-
August 31, 2002) (Bloomberg L.P. (2002))
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Certificates (DTCs) and Dutch State Loans (DSLs) to fund the central government
borrowing requirement and accounts for public debt principal and interest payment
(Appendix 2.A, DSTA). The following section outlines DTCs and DSLs, their auction
process, primary dealers, market conventions, debt restructuring program and other
government bond types.
DTCs and DSLs
DSTA manages the Dutch central government liquid funds. In the event of needing to
raise funds, DSTA can issue DTCs, which are discount or zero coupon bills with initial
maturity of 3, 6, or 12 months. DSTA started issuing DTCs in January 1997. During
2002, DTCs were issued twice a month, on the first and third Monday. Typically, two
maturities are auctioned during each issue.
DSLs are issued with three target maturities of 3-, 10- and 30-years and therefore do
not cover the whole range of maturities. These new issues are in bullet form. Typically,
issuance of DSLs takes place on a regular basis, on the second Tuesday of the month.
Each quarter, the maturity and targeted volume of the issues are announced. The
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issuance calendar includes all issue and settlement dates and is available on their web
site (Appendix 2.A, DSTA). At the end of October 2002, the benchmark DSLs for the
three maturity segments were as follows (DSTA):
• 3-year segment: 4.0% July 15, 2005
• 10-year segment: 5.0% July 15, 2012
• 30-year segment: 5.5% January 15, 2028
Auction Process
Since January 17, 2000, DTCs have been auctioned on a uniform price basis, the so-called
Dutch auction. Primary dealers (for a full list see below), as well as seven single market
specialists can subscribe between 11.00 and 12.00 a.m. Amsterdam time. After this
subscription has closed, DSTA will determine the uniform issuance yield. Subscriptions
lower than this issuance yield will get a full allocation, subscriptions tendered equal to
the issuance yield may get allocated in full or only in part. The issuance yield and total
assigned volume will be published by DSTA.
DSTA, with regard to DSLs issuance, works with the following procedure:
”In general, on Friday preceding the issuance of the first tranche of a new bond, the
coupon rate, which is relevant for the determination of the yield to maturity, is announced.
In addition, the terms and conditions of DSLs apply to the issue, as well as the various
ways of settlement. On the day of issue at 10:00 a.m. Amsterdam time, the initial issue
price will be announced. It may be revised at any time. Primary dealers and other
parties admitted by the DSTA can put buying orders. Individuals are advised to contact
a primary dealer, another bank, or a commissioner” (Appendix 2.A, DSTA).
Primary Dealers
The Dutch state has contracted the services of 13 financial institutions to constitute
its group of primary dealers for the year 2002. Each primary dealer commits to take,
distribute and promote DSLs (Appendix 2.A, DSTA). The list of those primary dealers
is: ABN AMRO Bank, BBVA, Credit Suisse First Boston, Deutsche Bank, Fortis Bank,
ING Barings/BBL, J.P. Morgan, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, NIB Capital, Rabobank
International, Schroder Salomon Smith Barney and Socie´te´ Ge´ne´rale.
Market Conventions
The market conventions of both DTCs (DSTA) and DSLs (Bennett, Brusadelli and Simons
(2001)) regarding market, accrued interest and settlement characteristics and trading
Section 2.3 · Government Bonds 25
Table 2.4: DTCs and DSLs market conventions
DTCs DSLs
Market characteristics
Longest maturity issued (years) 1 30
Typical denomination (local) 1 1
Typical outstanding per issue (local, millions) 3.000 - 5.000 10.000 - 20.000
Accrued interest characteristics
Coupon (date) discount annual
Accrual basis actual actual
Year basis 360 actual
Holidays target target
Settlement characteristics (time frame)
Domestic investors t+2 t+3
International investors t+2 t+3
Trading basis
Quotation yield price (clean)
Tick decimal decimal
Bid-ask spread 1–3 bp 0.03–0.20 cents
Commission (%) 0 0
Tax (non-resident, %) 0 0
Typical transaction size (local, millions) 10 - 100 10 - 50
Price/yield method ISMA discount basis ISMA
basis are listed in Table 2.4. In this table, TARGET, t, bp and ISMA stand for the
payment system consisting of the interlinked real-time gross settlement systems of the
EU Member States (Trans-European Automated Real-Time Gross Settlement Express
Transfer), trading day, basis points and International Securities Market Association
respectively. In terms of trading basis, the figures associated with the bid-ask spread,
commission and transaction size apply to the OTC market in Amsterdam and London.
As for the typical transaction size, it must be noted that in the OTC market often smaller
transactions are also executed. Tax in this table refers to withholding tax on interest
payments.
There are three methods for clearing and settlement of DSLs and DTCs (Appendix
2.A, DSTA):
1. ”Fully domestic, through Necigef, the Dutch clearing institute. The paying agent is
DNB.
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2. Directly through Euroclear, or via Necigef with ABN AMRO Bank as cash
correspondent and depository.
3. Directly through Cedel, or via Necigef with Rabobank as cash correspondent and
Kas Bank as depository for DSLs and ABN AMRO Bank as depository for DTCs.”
Debt Restructuring Programme
As indicated above, the Dutch central government wants to improve the liquidity of its
bonds by concentrating on large liquid issues.
”In order to accelerate the process of concentration of government debt into a
smaller number of large volume benchmark issues and to increase market liquidity, DSTA
developed a debt restructuring programme. The concentration process had already started
by limiting the issuance of DSLs to mainly two maturity segments, i.e. three- and ten-year
and by reducing the number of new issues to two per year. In addition, an exchange offer
was set up to enable conversion of smaller size issues. Hence, investors could benefit from
the resulting liquidity increase, thereby avoiding the transaction costs of illiquidity. The
restructuring programme made it possible to withdraw smaller bonds from the market
and to replace them for liquid ones. As a result a total amount of over 30 billion euro
has been added to liquid bonds and the Dutch government debt has been concentrated in
some 15 large liquid bonds, with an average outstanding size of 10 billion euro” (Appendix
2.A, DSTA).4
Other Government Bond Types
Apart from DTCs and DSLs, the Dutch state has also issued other types of bonds,
although these only represent a tiny portion of the total Dutch government debt. An
example is STRIPS, Separate Trading of Registered Interest and Principal of Securities.
This is a zero coupon bond. From February 15, 1993, onwards, MoF allowed trading in
STRIPS and DTSA makes a market in them by issuing STRIPS and buying back DSLs
or vice versa. This should ensure STRIPS (and DSLs) are priced efficiently. STRIPS are
also traded at Euronext Amsterdam. Table 2.5 shows three DSLs that are partly stripped
(Toorman (1997)). The liquidity of STRIPS remains low as can be inferred from the small
nominal amounts outstanding.
DSTA has also issued perpetual bonds, i.e. bonds without a maturity date. As with
STRIPS, the liquidity of perpetuals is low. As Wouters (2001) states, inflation indexed
4The results of these operations are also described at the DSTA website.
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Table 2.5: Three partly stripped DSLs
DSL maturity Stripped DSL nominal amounta Stripped DSLb
2028 0.40 4.50%
2023 1.75 21.20%
2004 1.06 11.40%
a in billions of euro
b percentage of total DSL nominal amount
bonds, such as issued recently by the French state, have not been issued by the Dutch
state.
Futures
The most liquid standardized bond futures in the Euro-zone are the Bund (10-year),
Bobl (5-year) and Schatz (2-year) future, traded at the exchange Eurex. These futures
have German government bonds as their underlying asset, not Dutch government bonds.
Because the German and Dutch government yields have converged and now move in
tandem, interest rate risk of Dutch government bonds can be hedged with Bund, Bobl
and/or Schatz futures, because the basis risk is small.
2.4 Corporate Bonds
2.4.1 Guilder Corporate Bond Market
After the introduction of the euro, the small Dutch guilder corporate bond market was
absorbed by the large euro-denominated bond market. Investors now usually judge
corporate bonds on sector and rating, the issuer’s country has become less important.
For example J.P. Morgan’s Telecom sector report by Levene, Marchakitus and Soderberg
(2002) is a clear example of this new approach. One exception to this sector-based
approach is the banking and insurance sector in the Euro-zone. Here the country of
residence is still important because of the persistent differences in national regulatory
environments and the dependency on home markets.
There has been little published research about the Dutch guilder corporate bond
market, one exception being Oorschot and Stork (1995). They analyzed the relationship
between credit spreads of Dutch corporate bonds and long term interest rates, economic
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Table 2.6: Guilder corporate bond market statistics
Rating Aaa Aa1 Aa2 Aa3 A1 A2 A3
58% 11% 15% 13% 1% 1% 1%
Maturity 1-3-year 3-5-year 5-7-year 7-10-year 10+-year
86% 12% 1% 1% 0%
Sector financial industrial utility supra-national asset-backed
86% 5% 0% 6% 3%
Country domestic non-domestic
82% 18%
growth and bond market volatility. They found that these credit spreads are negatively
related to long term interest rates and positively related to both economic growth and
bond market volatility. This research was based on pre-euro introduction data.
Analysis of the composition of the investment grade Dutch guilder corporate bond
market is available for December 31, 1998, i.e. one day before the introduction of the
euro. This bond market is proxied by the Lehman Brothers Euro-Aggregate Bond index
Netherlands Guilder.5 The structure of the umbrella index, the Euro-Aggregate Bond
index, consists of investment grade, plain vanilla euro-denominated and legacy bonds with
a minimum amount outstanding of 100 million euro (Lehman Brothers, Inc (1998)).6 As
of the end of December 1998, the market capitalization of the guilder corporate bond
market was 28.9 billion euro.
Table 2.6 displays the four main characteristics of this bond market, i.e. ratings,
maturities, sectors and domestic versus non-domestic bonds respectively. This table shows
that bonds with a high rating, with a short (remaining) maturity, from the financial sector
and from local issuers dominated the Dutch guilder corporate bond market.
5We thank Lehman Brothers, Inc. for providing these data.
6This minimum amount has been increased two times, first to 150 million euro and later to 300 million
euro.
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2.4.2 Dutch Euro Corporate Bond Market
Investment Grade Bond Market
As mentioned above, investors in euro-denominated corporate bonds typically analyze
the rating and sector of these bonds; where companies are located, whether in one of the
euro-area countries or elsewhere, is of less importance. This also applies for bonds of the
Dutch corporate issuers that dominated the guilder bond market as described in Section
2.4.1 above. These guilder bonds are now merged in the euro-denominated corporate
bond market. Again, the Lehman Brothers Euro-Aggregate Bond index represents the
investment grade euro corporate bond market. This index is often used as a benchmark
for investors who invest in this market. A subindex of this index contains the bonds that
are issued by Dutch companies only. Analyzing this subindex provides an understanding
of the development of this part of the investment grade euro-denominated market since
its inception, January 1, 1999 to August 31, 2002.
The development in the composition of two subindices, the Netherlands Credit and
Securitized subindex, of the Euro-Aggregate Bond index is displayed in Table 2.7. The
percentages of the comparable subindices for the total euro denominated bonds appear
in brackets to allow a comparison between Dutch euro issuers and all euro issuers.
All percentages in this table are market weighted. Analyzing this table, the following
observations can be made: during the sample period, the average maturity of the Dutch
issuers index lowers as maturity block 5-7 grows in importance at the expense of maturity
block 7-10. Secondly, the average rating decreases, most notably the percentage of Aaa-
rated issues goes down and the percentage of A-rated and Baa-rated bonds goes up as
a consequence of rating downgrades and issuance. Finally, the industrial sector grows in
importance at the expense of the financial sector.
Compared to all euro-denominated bonds, the bonds that are issued by Dutch
companies have a lower percentage in the 1-3-year and 3-5-year maturity buckets and
a higher percentage in the longer maturity buckets, 7-10-year and 10+-year. There is
also a difference in average rating, with Euro-zone bonds having more Aaa-rated, fewer
Aa-rated and A-rated bonds, except for the year 1999 and more Baa-rated bonds than
their Dutch counterpart, except for the year 2001. Finally, the distribution of sectors -
financial, industrial, utility, or other- is different. The presence of (Jumbo) Pfandbriefe in
the combined Euro-Aggregate Credit and Securitised index explains the large differences
in the financial sector and the other sectors. (Jumbo) Pfandbriefe alone constitute about
48% of the two combined sectors above. The other two sectors show that more Dutch
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Table 2.7: Dutch and Euro-zone bonds statistics
December 31, 1999 December 31, 2000 December 31, 2001 August 31, 2002
Maturity
1-3-year 22.2% (28.3%) 21.4% (27.1%) 22.9% (26.1%) 23.4% (28.3%)
3-5-year 25.9% (29.3%) 26.7% (27.8%) 26.9% (28.4%) 25.4% (28.1%)
5-7-year 15.5% (16.6%) 17.4% (16.8%) 22.7% (18.1%) 27.2% (20.8%)
7-10-year 32.7% (22.5%) 30.4% (25.0%) 24.6% (23.9%) 21.1% (19.2%)
10+-year 3.8% ( 3.3%) 4.1% ( 3.2%) 2.9% ( 3.4%) 3.0% ( 3.7%)
Rating
Aaa 53.6% (58.2%) 41.9% (56.6%) 33.7% (48.1%) 32.3% (44.2%)
Aa 38.7% (26.9%) 37.1% (24.9%) 33.7% (23.6%) 36.7% (24.5%)
A 7.4% (12.6%) 18.6% (14.4%) 17.9% (16.9%) 19.5% (18.3%)
Baa 0.2% ( 2.3%) 2.5% ( 4.2%) 14.7% (11.3%) 11.4% (13.0%)
Sector
Financial 88.9% (28.5%) 81.9% (24.8%) 69.2% (22.6%) 64.4% (22.9%)
Industrial 9.8% ( 8.2%) 15.5% (11.9%) 27.4% (20.9%) 23.8% (21.1%)
Utility 0.0% ( 2.2%) 0.0% ( 2.4%) 0.0% ( 3.2%) 7.8% ( 4.3%)
Other 1.3% (61.1%) 2.6% (60.9%) 3.4% (53.3%) 4.0% (51.7%)
issuers are present in the industrial sector and there are fewer in the utility sector, except
for the end of August 2002.
The amount of corporate bonds issued by Dutch companies increased after the euro
introduction. Figure 2.5 shows the growth of the amount outstanding in Dutch corporate
non-financial issuers and financial institutions (in billions of U.S. dollar) for the period
December 1996 to September 2002. Over the period, the amount outstanding has grown
in both sectors. The growth of non-financial debt shows a more volatile pattern than debt
issued by the financial sector as can be explained by for example: funding mergers and
acquisitions and finance third generation mobile phone licences.
In the Netherlands, special financial institutions issue a large amount of bonds. These
institutions are ”Netherlands-based companies which specialize in group financing and
whose shares are directly or indirectly held by nonresidents” (De Nederlandsche Bank
(2000)). For that reason, they are not part of the analysis above. So, they fund themselves
in a foreign country and invest almost entirely outside the Netherlands. The Netherlands
is attractive to these financial institutions mainly for tax reasons. At the end of 1999, the
total number of special financial institutions was over 9000. During 1999, their combined
issue size was about 70 billion euro, of which 42 billion in euro-denominated issues (De
Nederlandsche Bank (2000)).
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Figure 2.5: Amount outstanding of Dutch corporate non-financial and financial
institutionsa (December 1996-September 2002) (BIS (2002))
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Bank Nederlandse Gemeenten (BNG, Bank for the Dutch Municipalities) and
Nederlandse Waterschapsbank (NWB, Bank for the Dutch Water Control Boards)
The Bank Nederlandse Gemeenten is a public sector bank that was founded in 1914 on the
initiative of the Association of Dutch Municipalities. BNG is the principal banker for the
Dutch public sector and the largest public sector lender in the Netherlands with an overall
market share of 35% (Thomson, Cunningham and Theodore (2001)). At present, BNG
is ranked the fifth largest bank in the Netherlands in terms of total assets. Moody’s,
Standard & Poor’s and Fitch IBCA have assigned their highest rating to BNG, i.e.
Aaa/AAA/AAA. Most of BNG’s long term funding comes from bond issuance.
The Dutch central government owns 50% of BNG’s shares, while Dutch municipalities,
provinces and one water board institution own the other 50%. In spite of these owners,
BNG has no formal guarantee from the Dutch state; i.e., the principal behind all lending
continues to be the solvency of the borrower. BNG is supervised by DNB. The bank can
only lend to: local governments, entities guaranteed - either directly or indirectly - by
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local governments or central government and entities controlled by local government or
central government (Thomson et al. (2001)).
The Nederlandse Waterschapsbank is also a public sector bank. NWB was formed in
1954 in response to the severe floods in the Netherlands during the previous year. Now,
it is the seventh largest bank in the Netherlands by assets and holds AAA ratings from
both Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s. NWB issues debentures, MTNs and commercial
paper.
The bank’s shareholders are: the Central government (17%), water control boards
(Waterschappen) (81%) and provinces (2%) (Greenwood and Dutton (2000)). Since 1989,
NWB has no longer a state guarantee and is currently supervised by DNB. According to
the NWB’s articles of association, NWB can only lend to the public sector, including
central and local government authorities (including water control boards), entities under
state control, and all business transacted under state guarantee (including social housing).
Most lending is long term. In addition, NWB also acts as the treasurer of the water control
boards.
High Yield Bond Market
The number of Dutch companies that issue subinvestment grade or high yield bonds has
been very limited; only 13 euro-denominated high yield bonds are present in the euro-
denominated high yield market as represented by Lehman Brothers Pan-European High
Yield the Netherlands index in 1999 (22, 25 and 10 in 2000, 2001 and August 30, 2002
respectively). Most of these are linked to the industrial sector, with ratings that cover
the whole subinvestment grade spectrum. The maturity bucket 7-10-year dominates this
market.
Convertible Bond Market
Dutch companies have also issued convertible bonds, but this type of bond is rare in
the Dutch corporate bond market. As Grubben and Van Summeren (1999) show, Dutch
convertibles make up only 3.6% of the global convertible bond market as represented by
the Merrill Lynch Global Convertible Bond index.
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2.5 Investors
2.5.1 Investors in Dutch Government bonds
DTSA provides an overview of the investors in Dutch government bonds as displayed in
Table 2.8. This table presents the breakdown of the total Dutch government debt into two
categories: public debt and private placements. Investors in public debt are divided in
resident investors and non-resident investors. Resident investors in public debt are broken
down into investment funds7, private investors8, banks, insurance companies and pension
funds. This type of debt and type of investor is given in billions of euro and spans the
years 1996 to 2000 (as of year-end).
Investment funds, private investors and pension funds invested less in Dutch public
debt in the period 1996 to 2000. In contrast, insurance companies and banks invested
more and an equal amount respectively in the same period. Investments by non-residents
increased and this group held more than 40% of Dutch public debt in the year 2000.
During this period, there was a significant fall in private placements outstanding, due to
the central government’s debt restructuring programme combined with no new issuance
of this type of government debt. For a description of the Dutch private placement market
see De Haan (1991).
2.5.2 Investors in Euro Corporate bonds
The distribution of type of investors in large euro-denominated corporate bonds, with an
issued amount of 300 million euro or more, is shown here using a sample of large, recently
issued corporate bonds. On average, each corporate bond transaction in this sample
involved 192 investors.9 Table 2.9 and 2.10 display the distribution by investor type and
by geographical distribution of investors respectively. These tables show that banks and
investment funds are the dominant type of investors in this sample and investors from the
countries in the Euro-zone, most notably Germany and France, put their money in these
euro-denominated corporate bonds. However, in general banks do not invest in bonds,
but it is possible they have a temporary exposure to bonds they bring as new issues to
the market.
7Up to 1996, this category included social security funds. Since 1997, social security funds hold their
assets in account at the Dutch State.
8”It should be noted that the ’private investors’ category is not restricted exclusively to natural
persons, but also include legal entities (for example, companies, foundations And cooperatives), which
do not count financial services among their principal activities” (Appendix 2.A, DSTA).
9We thank J.P. Morgan for providing their estimates.
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Table 2.8: Breakdown of type of debt instruments and type of investors in Dutch
government bondsa with the corresponding percentages between brackets (1996-2000)
(DSTA (2002))
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Public debt
Residents:
Investment funds 5 ( 3%) 6 ( 4%) 7 ( 4%) 5 ( 3%) 2 ( 1%)
Private investors 16 ( 11%) 10 ( 6%) 13 ( 8%) 10 ( 6%) 2 ( 1%)
Banks 23 ( 15%) 27 ( 17%) 29 ( 18%) 28 ( 16%) 23 ( 14%)
Insurance companies 20 ( 13%) 24 ( 15%) 25 ( 15%) 38 ( 22%) 37 ( 22%)
Pension funds 50 ( 33%) 50 ( 32%) 46 ( 28%) 35 ( 20%) 34 ( 20%)
Non-residents 37 ( 25%) 39 ( 25%) 45 ( 27%) 58 ( 33%) 71 ( 42%)
Sum of public debt 151 (100%) 156 (100%) 164 (100%) 174 (100%) 169 (100%)
Private placements 33 22 18 11 5
Total debt 174 178 182 185 174
a in billions of euro
Table 2.9: Investors in euro-denominated
corporate bonds (J.P. Morgan (2002))
Banks 31%
Insurance companies 13%
Investment funds 50%
Retail customers 6%
2.6 Euronext Amsterdam and OTC Market
2.6.1 Euronext Amsterdam
All DSLs, corporate bonds from Dutch issuers, both investment grade and high yield, and
other bond types, such as convertible bonds, are listed at Euronext Amsterdam, where
irregular trading in small amounts of Dutch government bonds takes place. Both traded
amounts and their frequency suggest that mainly retail investors use this exchange to trade
bonds. Most Dutch government bond trading occurs in the OTC market in Amsterdam
or London, or via web-based trading platforms, as described below.
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Table 2.10: Geographical distribu-
tion of investors in euro-denominated
corporate bonds (J.P. Morgan (2002))
France 20%
Germany 21%
Iberia 4%
Italy 9%
Scandinavia 5%
United Kingdom 20%
Other 21%
Different types of corporate bonds are also traded at Euronext Amsterdam from time
to time. Again, their trading pattern is irregular and only small amounts are bought and
sold. Most trading of corporate bonds occurs in the OTC market.
2.6.2 OTC Market
In general, large Dutch institutional investors trade DSLs with investment banks and
brokers in the OTC market. Both banks and brokers make markets in these types of
bonds. Nowadays, this way of trading is disappearing as more and more sovereign debt
trading occurs via web-based trading systems, such as Bloomberg L.P., TradeWeb and
MTS SpA.
Dutch government securities are traded via an electronic trading platform that is
managed by MTS Amsterdam. The shareholders of MTS Amsterdam are the Dutch state
(5%), MTS SpA (30%) and the 13 primary dealers (5% each) designed by DSTA from
Section 2.3.2. Three types of eligible financial institutions participate in this market and
must satisfy the following requirements (Appendix 2.A, MTS Amsterdam):
• Market makers are primary dealers in the Dutch primary market designated by
DSTA that commit themselves to market-making obligations for both DSLs and
DTCs.
• Single market specialists are financial institutions in the Dutch primary market of
DTCs, designated by DSTA, that commit themselves to market-making obligations
for DTCs only.
• Market takers, financial institutions that traded at least 300 million euro in Dutch
secondary government bond market in the previous year.
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Table 2.11: Traded volumes in DTCs and DSLs at MTS Amsterdam (2001-2002)a
(MTS Amsterdam (2002))
2001 (214 days) 2002 (214 days)
Volume Daily average Volume Daily average YTD change in volume
DTCs 30686.0 143.39 43800.0 204.7 42.74%
DSLs 76586.0 357.88 77410.0 361.7 1.08%
Total 107272.0 501.27 121210.0 566.4 12.99%
a in billions of euro
The obligations of the market makers above are defined by MTS Amsterdam, which
insists that two-way quotes are available for no less than 5 hours each day on all Dutch
government bond benchmark issues and an assigned subset of non-benchmark bonds.
MTS Amsterdam reports the traded volumes of DTCs and DSLs in millions of euro in
2001 and 2002, as shown in Table 2.11. During this period, the traded amount in DTCs
(DSLs) rose 42.74% (1.08%), but the total volume of DSLs remained higher than DTCs.
However, these web-based trading systems that are used in the euro sovereign bond
market are not common practice for the euro corporate bond market yet. This is due to
the fact that the secondary market in euro-denominated corporate bonds is not as liquid
as expected when it was opened.
Trading hours of DSLs at the various markets, with Amsterdam time equalling GMT
+ 1 hour, are the following (Bennett et al. (2001)):
• Euronext Amsterdam: 08:00 a.m. to 06:00 p.m.
• MTS Amsterdam: 08:15 a.m. to 05:30 p.m.
• London (GMT): 08:00 a.m. to 05:00 p.m.
2.7 Regulators
The landscape of the Dutch supervision regime of financial companies is changing. Jonk
et al. (2001) explain,
”from being predominantly sector-oriented, the Dutch supervisory regime is becoming
more cross-sectional in nature. The driving force behind this reform is the continuing
financial market integration, for example banks selling insurance products and services
and vice versa. The Dutch supervisors want their structure to reflect these market
developments. This restructuring from sector to cross-sector supervision has been
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Table 2.12: New Dutch financial supervision structure (MoF (2002))
Conduct of business
Systemic Prudential Non-securities Securities
Stability Sectoral Cross-sector Sectoral Cross-sector
Banking/Investment DNB DNB DNB/PVK AFM AFM AFM
Securities DNB DNB DNB/PVK AFM AFM AFM
Insurance DNB PVK DNB/PVK AFM AFM AFM
implemented during 2002 and it will be followed by formal legislation” (Tweede Kamer
der Staten-Generaal (2002a) and Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal (2002b)).
Table 2.12 presents this new cross-sector oriented supervisory regime (Jonk et al.
(2001)). This new regime is built on the following two pillars. First, systemic stability
supervision is combined with prudential supervision. Systematic stability supervision
falls within the jurisdiction of DNB, as described earlier in Section 2.2. Prudential
supervision of the banking, investment funds and security firms sectors is also carried out
by DNB. ”Prudential supervision addresses the question of whether participants in the
financial markets can rely on their contracting parties to meet their financial obligations”
(Appendix 2.A, AFM). The insurance supervisor, the Pensions and Insurance Supervisory
Authority of the Netherlands (PVK, Pensioen- & Verzekeringskamer) performs the
prudential supervision of the insurance sector and pension funds. DNB and PVK join
forces through cross-board appointments and combined teams for prudential supervision
of financial conglomerates and will merge.
Secondly, the conduct of business supervision is placed under separate supervision
of the Netherlands Authority for the Financial Markets (AFM, Autoriteit Financie¨le
Markten), the legal successor of the Securities Board of the Netherlands (STE, Stichting
Toezicht Effectenverkeer). ”The supervision of market conduct focuses on the question of
whether the participants in the financial markets are treated properly and whether they
have accurate information” (Appendix 2.A, AFM).
Kremers, Schoenmaker and Wierts (2001) state that there is still disagreement
among supervisors throughout Europe of the preferred regime. Policy recommendations
regarding the organizational structure of financial supervision range from enhanced
cooperation to a centralized structure at a European level.
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2.7.1 DNB
As shown in Section 2.2, one of the main tasks of DNB is to supervise the banking
system, collective investment schemes and exchange offices. De Nederlandsche Bank
(2002) describes that its main two objectives within banking supervision are ”to protect
the interests of the public who have entrusted their money to banks” and ”to protect
the stability of the financial system. What this means in practice is that the financial
system must be ’sound’ enough to absorb the failure of an individual institution without
a knock-on effect that brings the whole system down.”
Before entering the Dutch market, banks must first get authorization by DNB. After
obtaining this authorization, DNB continues to monitor these banks. In order to carry out
its tasks, DNB collects detailed information from banks. ”DNB has also issued guidelines
for assessing the solvency and liquidity of banks” and further are banks required to ”keep
their administrative affairs in good order and to maintain adequate internal control” and
”DNB supervises the structure of cooperative links between banks and other businesses”.
As mentioned above, DNB also supervises ”companies whose business it is to invest
money on behalf of third parties” with the goal of ”the smooth operation of financial
markets and to protect investors in these markets”. Further exchange offices must be
registered with DNB in order to counter money laundering via these offices and in this
way protecting the integrity of the Dutch financial system. Finally, DNB contributes to
the supervision of institutions that provide loans to consumers.
2.7.2 PVK
”The Pensions and Insurance Board supervises the insurance companies and pension funds
that operate in the Netherlands with the aim of ensuring that these institutions are and
remain financially sound and that they are also able to meet their obligations in the future.
A further important task is the testing of the fitness and properness of new and existing
executive directors of insurance companies and pension funds” (Appendix 2.A, AFM).
The responsibilities and activities of PVK are carried out in accordance with a number
of Acts of Parliament. PVK describes their policy as having a dual character: on the one
hand, the PVK applies existing supervision legislation and on the other hand, PVK can
exercise its own authority by means of regulations, policy rules and recommendations,
each described below (Appendix 2.A, PVK).
”Regulations are the PVK’s most compelling powers. Institutions are obliged to
comply with the regulations, which are always directly related to statutory or ministerial
provisions. If an institution fails to do so, sanctions may be imposed. In issuing a policy
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rule, the PVK gives its own interpretation of statutory provisions. This is an indication of
how the PVK itself will approach the matters in question. In the first instance, these policy
rules are binding on the PVK. If, however, an institution deviates from an interpretation,
the PVK may impose a sanction or withhold a requested facility or service. The PVK
can also make recommendations. These are not obligatory and the PVK cannot enforce
compliance with its recommendations by imposing sanctions.”
PVK also works alongside other European bodies such as the insurance committee
set up by the EU Council, the conference of EU/EEA Insurance Supervisory Authorities
and the EU Council working papers to support MoF and pension supervision. This has
involved the Conference of Pension Supervisory Authorities, working with British, Irish
and German pension supervisory authorities, and work with the EU Council working
party in support of the Dutch Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment.
2.7.3 AFM
”The Netherlands Authority for the Financial Markets has been responsible for super-
vising the operation of the financial markets since 1 March 2002. This means that
AFM supervises the conduct of the entire financial market sector: savings, investment,
insurance and loans. By supervising the conduct of the financial markets, AFM aims to
make a contribution to the efficient operation of these markets. AFM is an autonomous
administrative authority (zelfstandig bestuursorgaan) that comes under the political
responsibility of the Minister of Finance. The minister appoints the board members
of AFM and also approves its budget and any amendments to its statutes.”
The three objectives of the supervision by AFM are the following:
1. ”To ensure that the financial markets operate in an efficient, fair and orderly manner.
2. To promote transparency between all of the participants in the financial markets
and in this connection.
3. To protect the consumer.”
AFM supervises:
1. ”All Dutch securities exchanges and institutions that offer securities services in or
from the Netherlands.
2. All Dutch credit institutions that offer consumer credit (as from 3 March 2002).
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3. The provision of Financial Information Leaflets by banks, investment institutions,
credit providers, insurance companies and securities institutions (as from 8 March
2002).”
”AFM carries out its supervisory role by checking, enforcing and transferring standards
and acts specifically on tip-offs from the market and the findings of its own control
organisation. If AFM ascertains that there has been a breach, it may impose penalties.
It may issue a reprimand or give a public warning, appoint a secret receiver, withdraw
a licence, cancel or refuse a registration, or report an offence to the Public Prosecutions
Department. It can also impose penalties and fines” (Appendix 2.A, AFM).
One of the areas that is subject to supervision by AFM is the operation of Euronext
Amsterdam. Because this securities exchange is a merger of the Amsterdam, Brussels,
Paris and Lisbon stock exchanges, AFM cooperates closely with the Belgian, French and
Portuguese securities supervisory authorities in relation to regulations and supervision of
Euronext. AFM also participates in the Committee of European Securities Regulators
(CESR).
2.7.4 Rating Agencies
In addition to the impact of the Dutch national regulators, foreign rating agencies, such
as Moody’s Investor Services, Standard & Poor’s and Fitch IBCA, also affect the Dutch
fixed Income market. These organizations often rate large euro-denominated corporate
bonds and/or their Dutch issuers. Most Dutch issuers from the Lehman Brothers index
the Netherlands at August 31, 2002 have a high rating as is displayed in Section 2.4. DSLs
receive the highest possible rating of Aaa/AAA/AAA from these three rating agencies.
2.8 Summary
The introduction of the euro on January 1, 1999 changed the shape of the small market
for Dutch bonds. The Dutch government had to find ways to improve the liquidity
of their bonds as national monetary policy and currency differences between countries
disappeared. The euro also influenced the Dutch corporate bond issuers, which have
become part of the growing euro-denominated corporate bond market. In this newly
established bond market, a company’s home country has become less important than it’s
rating and sector. The investor base of both Dutch government bonds and corporate
bonds has also become more international. So, it is clear that both issuers and investors
have been affected by the introduction of the euro. One area of common ground for
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issuers and investors is Euronext Amsterdam, which has now merged with other exchanges
in Europe, and the OTC bond markets. There have also been changes to the Dutch
financial supervision regime since Dutch supervision has moved from a largely sector-
oriented regime, to one that is more cross-sectional based. Finally, rating agencies also
have an impact through their assessment of Dutch government debt and corporate bonds.
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Appendix
2.A Websites
Table 2.13: Websites
2.2 the Netherlands
Bank for International Settlements http://www.bis.org
De Nederlandsche Bank http://www.dnb.nl
European Central Bank http://www.ecb.int
Eurostat http://www.eurostat.com
International Monetary Fund http://www.imf.org
Ministry of Economic Affairs http://www.ez.nl
Ministry of Finance http://www.minfin.nl
Organisation of Economic http://www.oecd.org
Cooperation and Development
2.3 Dutch Government Bonds
Dutch State Treasury Agency http://www.dutchstate.nl
2.4 Corporate Bonds
Bank Nederlandse Gemeenten N.V. http://www.bng.com
Nederlandse Waterschapsbank N.V. http://www.nwb.nl
2.6 Euronext Amsterdam and OTC Markets
Bloomberg L.P. http://www.bloomberg.com
MTS Amsterdam N.V. http://www.mtsamsterdam.com
Euronext N.V. http://www.euronext.com
TradeWeb, Ltd. http://www.tradeweb.com
2.7 Regulators
Fitch IBCA Inc. http://www.fitchibca.com
Moody’s Investors Service http://www.moodys.com
Netherlands Authority for the Financial Markets http://www.autoriteit-fm.nl
Pensions and Insurance http://www.pvk.nl
Supervisory Authority of the Netherlands
Standard & Poor’s Rating Group http://www.standardandpoors.com
Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal http://www.tweede-kamer.nl
(House of Representatives
of the States General in the Netherlands)
Part I
Credit Risk of Corporate Bonds

Chapter 3
Pricing Step-up Bonds1
3.1 Introduction
European telecom companies have issued rating-triggered step-up coupon bonds in order
to compensate bond investors for losses in the event of rating downgrades. McAdie, Martin
and O’Kane (2000), Fumagalli and Taure´n (2001) and Sirinathsingh (2001) have analyzed
step-up bonds. These authors largely use historical and subjective rating transition
probabilities in their valuation, and show the results of their model for only one day.
Our approach is to apply the risk-neutral valuation framework of (Jarrow, Lando and
Turnbull, 1997, hereafter JLT) to value step-up bonds, and we demonstrate the model’s
results over a long time period. For comparison, we also value step-up bonds using
historical transition probabilities and as equivalent plain vanilla bonds, i.e., similar bonds
except for the step-up feature. We analyze the protection the step-up feature offers to
investors in two ways. First, we compare the volatility of a step-up bond to the equivalent
plain vanilla bond. Second, we determine whether the step-up bond offers better returns
than the equivalent plain vanilla bond in case of rating downgrades and negative outlooks.
Our results indicate that the market seems to use the JLT model to value step-up
bonds that make a single step-up after the rating trigger. Step-up bonds that make
multiple step-ups seem to be treated as plain vanilla bonds. Also, the JLT model always
approximates the step-up feature premium better than the historical method. We further
find that the step-up feature reduces bond price volatility for most of the step-up bonds
considered. Finally, for all bonds in our sample, the step-up feature does not offer investors
positive excess returns in case of a rating downgrade or a trend toward to negative outlook.
1This chapter is based on an article by Houweling, Mentink and Vorst (2004), which has been
published in the Journal of Derivatives. It was also presented at the sixteenth annual conference of
the Financial Options Research Center (FORC) in Warwick on September 25, 2003.
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Step-up bonds are a relatively new phenomenon in the euro-denominated corporate
bond market. The coupon of the step-up bond depends on its issuer’s rating or the rating
of the issuer’s long term debt. If the rating deteriorates and hits a predefined level, the
step-up feature is triggered, and the coupon rises with a predefined amount. Depending
on the exact specification, the coupon can rise even more if the rating deteriorates further.
For most step-up bonds, the reverse also applies; the coupon is reduced if the rating is
raised.
Both issuers and investors benefit from the step-up feature; as McAdie et al. (2000)
indicate. Issuers have placed more debt at lower yields than would otherwise have
occurred. Investors have profited too, because they will be compensated in case of rating
downgrades, and because issuers should be more committed to preserve their ratings, as
a downgrade will penalize them directly with higher coupons.
We analyze five step-up bonds issued by three companies: Deutsche Telecom, France
Telecom and KPN. These are the only three companies in our data set that have issued
both step-up bonds and enough euro-denominated plain vanilla bonds that we can reliably
estimate issuer-specific interest rate curves. Despite this limited number of step-up bonds,
our study is worthwhile because it provides one of the first empirical tests of the JLT model
on rating-sensitive instruments and because the behavior of step-up bonds has not been
documented in the academic literature.
J.P. Morgan uses historical transition and default probabilities in its valuation; see
(Sirinathsingh, 2001). Lehman Brothers estimates the probabilities subjectively according
to analysts’ opinions; see (McAdie et al., 2000). Schroder Salomon Smith Barney applies
both subjective and historical transition probabilities; see (Fumagalli and Taure´n, 2001).
Socie´te´ General implements a JLT model form and uses risk-neutral probabilities; see
(Turc, 2001).
These studies all show the results of their analysis for only one day. We instead price
step-up bonds for a longer period (March 2001-February 2002), and implement three
pricing methods.
Despite considerable interest from practitioners, only one article has appeared about
the valuation of the euro step-up bonds, as far as we know ((Conroy, 2000)). Conroy values
step-up bonds using historical rating transition probabilities. Risk-neutral valuation
models that can be used to price rating-triggered instruments have appeared elsewhere
in the academic literature. The basis for most of these models is the JLT Markov chain
model, which uses a firm’s ratings as an indicator of the likelihood of default. Kijima
and Komoribayashi (1998) adjust the JLT model to make it numerically more stable
by replacing default probabilities with survival probabilities in the calculation of risk
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premiums. We would expect the JLT model to generate step-up bond valuations that
are more in line with corresponding market prices than the historical valuation method,
because the JLT model takes the market risk premium into account, while the historical
method does not.
Das and Tufano (1996) generalize the JLT model to incorporate stochastic recovery
rates. Lando (1998) and Arvanitis, Gregory and Laurent (1999) extend it to make
transition and default intensities stochastic and possibly dependent on state variables.
Scho¨nbucher (1999), Bielecki and Rutkowski (2000) and Acharya, Das and Sundaram
(2002) embed the Markov chain in the Heath, Jarrow and Morton (1992) framework with
stochastic forward rates. Acharya et al. (2002) also illustrate their model for a sample
step-up bond.
In independent work, Lando and Mortensen (2004) also analyze step-up bonds in the
JLT framework. Although their work is similar to ours, they focus on refining the JLT
model, while we compare three different valuation methods. Further, we analyze the
protection that the step-up feature offers to investors.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. First, we explain the
characteristics of step-up bonds in Section 3.2. Next, in Section 3.3, the JLT model is
briefly summarized and the risk-neutral valuation of step-up bonds is explained. Further,
we describe the valuation methods using historical probabilities and as equivalent plain
vanilla bonds. Section 3.4 describes our data set. The results of applying the three
valuation methods to the data are given in Section 3.5. We also test whether including
step-up features offers the investor sufficient protection using both volatility tests and we
conduct an event study on rating and outlook changes. Finally, Section 3.6 summarizes
the chapter.
3.2 Step-up Bonds
The coupon of a step-up bond depends on the issuer’s rating or the rating of its long term
debt. If the rating deteriorates and hits a predefined level, the step-up feature is triggered
and the coupon rises with a predefined number of basis points. Depending on the type of
step-up coupon, the coupon can rise even more if the rating deteriorates further. For most
step-up bonds, the reverse also applies; the coupon is reduced if the rating improves-this is
called a step-down feature. The coupon can never go below the original level at issuance,
though.
Step-up conditions can differ among bonds. The most important discriminating
conditions of the step-up bonds are the following: whether the coupon can step up
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Table 3.1: Step-up bond types
Type Step-upa Step-downb One-offc And/ord Accruale
A   or next
B    and next
C   or immediately
a Coupon increases if the rating decreases and hits the rating-trigger.
b Coupon decreases if the rating increases again.
c Coupon increases only once, even if the rating falls further below the rating-trigger;
for bonds that are not one-off, each further decrease in the rating, causes a further
increase in the coupon.
d Determines whether the coupon is adjusted if Moody’s and S&P adjust their ratings,
or if Moody’s or S&P adjusts its rating.
e Determines the date at which the adjusted coupon starts accruing: immediately
following a rating action, or on the next coupon date after the rating action.
and down or only step up, whether both Moody’s and S&P or only one of them must
downgrade an issuer before the step-up trigger is hit; the timing of the coupon adjustment;
the rating-trigger level; and the number of basis points of the step-up.
Based on McAdie et al. (2000) and Marchakitus, Soderberg and Bramley (2001),
Table 3.1 defines three types of step-up bonds.
3.3 Model
We first describe the JLT model and then explain the risk-neutral valuation of step-up
bonds.
3.3.1 Rating Transitions
The value of a bond equals the sum of the discounted expected cash flows. Unlike a plain
vanilla bond, a step-up bond’s coupons are a function of the issuer’s rating. We thus have
to model the issuer’s rating transition process under the equivalent martingale measure.
The JLT model provides a suitable framework for this purpose, since it uses a company’s
rating as an indicator of creditworthiness.
Following the JLT framework, we assume a unique equivalent martingale measure
Q˜ exists that makes all default-free and defaultable bond prices martingales, after
normalization by the default-free money market account. Finally, the recovery rate δ
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is constant; we follow Jarrow and Turnbull (2000) and Scho¨nbucher (2000) by assuming
that δ applies to the principal only, not to the coupons.
The company’s rating Rt at day t is modelled as a Markov chain on a finite state space
S = {1, . . . , K} under the historical probability measure. Under Q˜, default-free interest
rates and ratings are assumed to be independent. The state space S includes all possible
ratings, including the intermediate ratings. State 1 represents the Aaa rating, state 2
Aa1, state 3 Aa2, . . . , state K − 1 Caa, and the last state, K, default. It is assumed that
default is an absorbing state.
Under the Markov property, it holds for all i, j ∈ S, t ≥ s ≥ 0 and ru ∈ S, 0 ≤ u < s
that
qij(s, t) = P(Rt = j|Rs = i, Ru = ru, 0 ≤ u < s)
= P(Rt = j|Rs = i),
that is, the probability of going from rating i to rating j in the period from s to t depends
only on the rating Rs at time s and not on the history Ru, 0 ≤ u < s, of reaching that
rating. We are aware of the limitations of this assumption, as past rating movements do
seem to affect future rating transitions, as shown by Nagpal and Bahar (2000), but this
is an assumption common to most theoretical models.
To value step-up bonds, we need the rating transition process under the risk-neutral
measure Q˜. JLT start with the observed historical transition probabilities, such as from a
rating transition matrix of Moody’s or S&P, and apply risk premiums to transform these
into risk-neutral probabilities. We choose to adjust the (T − t)-year transition matrix
Q(t, T ) to get the risk-neutral transition matrix Q˜(t, T ) as follows2
q˜ij(t, T ) =
⎧⎨
⎩π(t, T )qij(t, T ) for j = K1− π(t, T )(1− qiK(t, T )) for j = K (3.1)
for some risk premium π(t, T ). It follows that the risk premium can be calculated as
π(t, T ) =
1− q˜Rt,K(t, T )
1− qRt,K(t, T )
. (3.2)
2Moody’s and S&P usually report (multiples of) one year transition matrices, but the time between
the valuation day and coupon and redemption dates almost never exactly equals (multiples of) one year.
We adjust the historical transition matrix and make it maturity-dependent using a generator matrix, as
described by Israel, Rosenthal and Wei (2001).
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The risk premium for time T is the ratio of the risk-neutral survival probability to the
historical survival probability, so that we retain the numerical stability of (Kijima and
Komoribayashi, 1998, hereafter KK). Note that we use ‘cumulative’ probabilities q˜ij(t, T )
instead of JLT’s and KK’s ‘forward’ probabilities q˜ij(t, t+ 1), i.e.
q˜ij(t, t+ 1) = πi(t, t+ 1)qij(t, t+ 1).
The advantage of our risk premium approach is that the calculation is easier, because
risk premiums do not require matrix inversion; cf. JLT’s Equation (16) and KK’s
Equation (19). Both approaches, ‘forward’ and ‘cumulative’, though generate the same
results. Note also that we use only one risk premium for all rating categories. Ideally,
we would like to use a separate risk premium for each rating, but each euro-denominated
telecom issuer does not cover the full rating spectrum, so we derive one risk premium
from the issuer’s current rating, and apply that to all ratings.
For each day, we estimate the issuer-specific survival probability curve of each telecom
company. Following (Houweling and Vorst, 2005, Section 4), we specify a linear hazard
function, assume a recovery rate of 50%, and use the euro zero-coupon swap curve as
a proxy for the default-free term structure. The parameters of the hazard function are
estimated from the market prices of the issuer’s plain vanilla bonds using non-linear least
squares. Given the estimated survival probability curve for a company on a particular
day, we calculate its risk premium (3.2) and risk-neutral transition matrices (3.1) for all
required maturities. These risk-neutral matrices are used to calculate theoretical values
for step-up bonds. We also calculate 95% confidence bounds for the survival probability
curve, and repeat this series of calculations for the upper and lower bound, hence obtaining
upper and lower bounds for the step-up bond values as well.
3.3.2 Step-Up Valuation
To determine the theoretical value of a defaultable step-up and step-down bond, we add
another assumption on the set of JLT assumptions: Both Moody’s and S&P alter their
ratings of an issuer at the same time.3 In our analysis, we apply the Moody’s rating
actions.
We use three methods to value step-up bonds of types A and B in Table 3.1, starting
with the JLT model. The path-dependent step-up bonds, Type C, are not covered by
these methods.
3Fumagalli and Taure´n (2001) assume that a rating action of one agency is followed by the other
agency within six months.
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Consider a step-up and step-down bond with n remaining coupon payments and a
face value of 1. The bond issuer makes the jth coupon payment at day tj, j = 1, 2, . . . , n,
but only if the firm has not gone into default before tj. If the rating at tj−1 is equal
to r, the coupon payment at tj is equal to cr, r = 1, . . . , K. The coupon payment at t1
depends on the rating at t0, which we define as the previous coupon date, or, if there is no
previous coupon, the issue date. The step-up bond’s principal amount is paid at maturity
tn, again only if the issuer has not defaulted before tn. If the issuer does default before
the bond matures, the constant recovery rate δ of the notional is paid at the default time.
Applying the risk-neutral valuation principle to these coupon, principal and recovery cash
flows, yields:
BJLT (t, t, c) =
n∑
j=1
p(t, tj)E˜t
[
1{τ>tj}cRtj−1
]
+
p(t, tn)E˜t
[
1{τ>tn}
]
+ E˜t
[
p(t, τ)1{τ≤tn}δ
]
,
(3.3)
where t is an n-vector with the coupon payment dates; c is a K-vector with the coupon
percentages per rating category; p(t, T ) denotes the time-t default-free discount factor for
time T , E˜t [X] denotes the Q˜ -expected value of X given the information at day t and 1{A}
is the indicator function of event A. τ denotes the first date on which a default occurs,
and τ > tn indicates no default before maturity.
The first line of Equation (3.3) expresses the coupon payments, the second line the
principal payment and the potential recovery payment.
For j > 1, the first risk-neutral expectation in Equation (3.3) can be evaluated as:4
E˜t
[
1{τ>tj}cRtj−1
]
=
K∑
k=1
P˜t(τ > tj ∧Rtj−1 = k)ck
=
K∑
k=1
P˜t(τ > tj|Rtj−1 = k)P˜t(Rtj−1 = k)ck
=
K∑
k=1
q˜Rt,k(t, tj−1)(1− q˜k,K(tj−1, tj))ck,
where ∧ is the logical “and” operator and P˜t(A) is the risk-neutral probability of event A,
given the information at day t; for j = 1, the coupon amount is already known (because
4Note that the summation may be reduced from K terms to K− 1 terms, since the Kth term is zero:
P˜t(τ > tj ∧Rtj−1 = K) = 0.
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Rt0 is already known), so
E˜t
[
1{τ>t1}cRt0
]
= P˜t(τ > t1)cRt0 = (1− q˜Rt,K(t, t1))cRt0 .
After evaluating the second and third risk-neutral expectations in Equation (3.3), the JLT
value of our rating-triggered step-up and step-down bond equals
BJLT (t, t, c) = p(t, t1)(1− q˜Rt,K(t, t1))cRt0 +
n∑
j=2
[
p(t, tj)
K∑
k=1
q˜Rt,k(t, tj−1)(1− q˜k,K(tj−1, tj))ck
]
+
p(t, tn)(1− q˜Rt,K(t, tn)) +
n∑
j=1
p(t, tj)(q˜Rt,K(t, tj)− q˜Rt,K(t, tj−1))δ,
(3.4)
where we follow (Houweling and Vorst, 2005, Section 4) by replacing the integral that
results from the recovery payment with a numerical approximation with potential default
dates equal to the coupon payment dates. Note that the only difference between
Equation (3.4) and the value of a plain vanilla (PV) bond,
BPV (t, t,c) =
n∑
j=1
p(t, tj)(1− q˜Rt,K(t, tj))c +
p(t, tn)(1− q˜Rt,K(t, tn)) +
n∑
j=1
p(t, tj)(q˜Rt,K(t, tj)− q˜Rt,K(t, tj−1))δ,
(3.5)
is the part relating to the specific coupon structure of the step-up bond. If we set ck = c
for all k, the expected value of the jth coupon payment reduces to that of a plain vanilla
bond
K∑
k=1
q˜Rt,k(t, tj−1)(1− q˜k,K(tj−1, tj))c = c
(
K∑
k=1
q˜Rt,k(t, tj−1)−
K∑
k=1
q˜Rt,k(t, tj−1)q˜k,K(tj−1, tj)
)
= c(1− P˜t(Rtj = K))
= c(1− q˜Rt,K(t, tj)).
As a second valuation method, we treat the step-up bond as a bond that is identical
except for the step-up feature. We refer to this bond as the equivalent plain vanilla bond
(EPV). As in the step-up bond, the first coupon of this bond also depends on the rating
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at t0, but the remaining coupons are assumed to follow from the current rating; i.e. they
are all equal to cRt . The value of the equivalent plain vanilla bond thus equals
BEPV (t, t, c) = p(t, t1)(1− q˜Rt,K(t, t1))cRt0 +
n∑
j=2
p(t, tj)(1− q˜Rt,K(t, tj))cRt +
p(t, tn)(1− q˜Rt,K(t, tn)) +
n∑
j=1
p(t, tj)(q˜Rt,K(t, tj)− q˜Rt,K(t, tj−1))δ.
The difference from the JLT formula ((3.4)) is the second line, which no longer includes
a summation over possible future ratings, but instead assumes the current rating Rt will
prevail. The EPV formula also strongly resembles the PV formula (3.5), except that the
first coupon may differ from the other coupons.
The third method we consider to value step-up bonds, the historical valuation method,
is based on the methods that investment banks often apply, e.g. McAdie et al. (2000)
and Fumagalli and Taure´n (2001). This method uses the telecom company’s zero-coupon
curve to discount expected coupons, where the expectation is calculated using historical
transition probabilities rather than risk-neutral probabilities; again, the first coupon is
known. This gives:
BH(t, t, c) = v(t, t1)cRt0 +
n∑
j=2
[
v(t, tj)
K∑
k=1
qRt,k(t, tj−1)ck
]
+ v(t, tn),
where v(t, T ) denotes the issuer’s time-t discount factor for time T .
3.4 Data
Most euro-denominated step-up bonds have been issued by telecom companies. Analyzing
these rating-triggered step-up corporate bonds thus automatically means we focus on the
telecom sector. Step-up bonds are an important source of financing for telecom companies.
As of the end of March 2001, step-up bonds accounted for 42% of the market capitalization
of the telecom bond market; see Fumagalli and Taure´n (2001). We analyze the euro-
denominated step-up coupon telecom bonds as listed by both Lehman Brothers and J.P.
Morgan (see (McAdie et al., 2000) (Marchakitus et al., 2001)). For these European telecom
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Table 3.2: Total number of euro-(re)denominated, quoted plain vanilla and
step-up bonds for all telecom companies
All bonds Quoted, plain vanilla bonds Step-up bonds
British Telecom Group 5 0 3
Deutsche Telecom 29 14 2
France Telecom 37 7 2
KPN 10 5 2
Olivetti SPA/Tecnost 12 0 4
Telecom Italia 7 2 2
companies, we download their main characteristics and the price time series for all their
bonds from Bloomberg L.P. on a daily basis for the period from January 4, 1999 through
February 13, 2002. We use the Bloomberg Generic (BGN) price. The BGN price is an
average of prices quoted by many banks and brokers, and reflects the bid side of London
closing. BGN prices are also used to price the Bloomberg/EFFAS government bond
indices; see Brown (1994).
We make sure that the bonds used in the curve estimation are plain vanilla. We
classify a bond as a plain vanilla bond if the bond has no step-up language and no
embedded options, and if it is not floating or convertible. From the downloaded prices, we
remove quotes that equal the quote of the preceding day(s) and quote spikes. We seldom
have to remove quotes, though. Table 3.2 shows the number of all euro-(re)denominated
bonds, plain vanilla bonds and euro-denominated step-up coupon bonds for the telecom
companies that have issued step-up bonds. Three issuers, Deutsche Telecom, France
Telecom and KPN, have more quoted, plain vanilla bonds compared to the other telecom
companies, British Telecom, Olivetti/Tecnost and Telecom Italia. Our analysis focuses
on these step-up bonds of the first three issuers only, because we need to estimate issuer-
specific survival probability curves, which requires a certain number of plain vanilla bonds.
These three companies are large corporate bond issuers as together they represent 6.5%
of the Lehman Brothers Euro-Aggregate Corporate Bond Index on May 31, 2002.
Table 3.3 displays the characteristics of the step-up bonds we use in our analysis: the
step-up type, as defined in Table 3.1, the number of basis points step-up and the rating-
trigger level. We restrict ourselves to step-up bonds with step-up and step-down coupons,
because among our three telecom issuers just one KPN bond has step-up only language.
A step-up only bond, type C in Table 3.1, differs from a bond with step-up and step-down
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Table 3.3: Characteristics of the step-up bonds
Typea Step-upb Triggerc
Deutsche Telecom 2005 B 50.0 Baa1/BBB+
2010 B 50.0 Baa1/BBB+
France Telecom 2004 A 25.0 Baa1/BBB+
2008 A 25.0 Baa1/BBB+
KPN 2006 A 37.5 Baa3/BBB−
a type of step-up bond; see Table 3.1
b number of basis points the coupon steps up
c rating-trigger level (Moody’s/S&P)
features, types A and B, because the coupon of a step-up only bond is path-dependent.
This means that if the rating is below the trigger-level at any time before the coupon
date, the coupon payment includes the step-up, even after the issuer is upgraded to or
even above the pre step-up rating again; this path-dependence characteristic necessitates
an other valuation procedure than Equation (3.4). In short, once triggered, a step-up only
bond becomes a plain vanilla bond. This is exactly what happened to the KPN step-up
only bond seven months after its issuance. Therefore, from the first coupon date after
this rating event, we treat it as a plain vanilla bond and use it in our estimation of the
KPN curve.
We download the Moody’s and S&P rating and outlook history of Deutsche Telecom,
France Telecom and KPN from Bloomberg L.P. as well. From Moody’s, we use the issuer’s
rating and from S&P the rating of long term debt in local currency. Figure 3.1 shows the
rating and outlook migrations of Deutsche Telecom, France Telecom and KPN by both
Moody’s and S&P’s for the sample period. A positive (negative) outlook is denoted by a
+ (−) sign. The plots show that the rating dynamics of both agencies are very similar. At
the end of our period, the two agencies assign identical ratings to each telecom company.
We believe that these figures justify our additional modelling assumption in Section 3.3.2.
For a historical transition matrix, we use Moody’s average one year senior rating
transition matrix for corporate bond issuers, estimated from 1983 through 2001; see
Cantor, Hamilton and Ou (2002).
Finally, euro swap rates are downloaded from Bloomberg L.P. We apply a standard
bootstrapping procedure to extract zero-coupon rates and interpolate linearly between
the available maturities to get a curve for all required maturities.
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Figure 3.1: Credit ratings history
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3.5 Results
We present general results and results for each company and elements of the analysis. We
examine the protection that step-up procedures offer bond holders.
3.5.1 Step-Up Bond Values and Step-Up Premiums
We define the pricing error of a step-up bond as its market price minus its theoretical
value. Specifically, PEibt is the pricing error of bond b at day t, if method i is used to
calculate the theoretical value, i ∈ {EPV, JLT,H}. EPV is the equivalent plain vanilla
bond; JLT is the Jarrow et al. (1997) model and H is the historical model.
APEibt denotes the absolute pricing error for the three methods. The sample means
of these six statistics are denoted by MPEib and MAPE
i
b. A negative (positive) sign of an
MPE statistic indicates that theoretical values are, on average, too high (low). To test
whether this over- or underestimation of step-up bond prices is significant for method i,
we apply a one-sample Z-test (see e.g. Arnold, 1990, Chapter 11)
Zib =
√
Nb
MPEib
Sib
,
where Sib is the sample standard deviation of the PE
i
bt series and Nb is the sample size
for bond b. Asymptotically, Zib has a standard normal distribution. Similarly, in order
to determine if there are significant performance differences among the three methods,
we also use a paired Z-test ; see (Arnold, 1990, Chapter 11). This test tells us whether
two time series have the same mean, while allowing for non-zero correlation and unequal
variances. The test statistic to compare measures i and j is defined as
Zijb =
√
Nb
M ijb
Sijb
,
where M ijb and S
ij
b are the sample mean and sample standard deviation, respectively, of
Dijbt := APE
i
bt − APEjbt, i, j ∈ {EPV, JLT,H}, i = j, t = 1, . . . , Nb. Asymptotically, Zijb
also has a standard normal distribution.
Table 3.4 shows the MPE and MAPE statistics for the telecom step-up bond values
generated by the three valuation methods and, for comparison, the MAPE values for the
plain vanilla bonds used in the estimation of the issuer-specific survival probability curves.5
5Note that per definition MPE for the plain vanilla bonds is zero, since the pricing error for a plain
vanilla bond is simply its residual from the least squares estimation of the survival probability curve.
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Table 3.4: Pricing errorsa
Plain Step-ups
vanillas EPV JLT Historical
MAPE MPE MAPE MPE MAPE MPE MAPE
Deutsche Telecom
Plain vanilla 0.29
2005 0.15∗ 0.24∗ -0.09∗ 0.25∗ -0.29∗ 0.36∗
2010 1.05∗ 1.15∗ 0.20∗ 0.82∗ -0.34∗ 0.89∗
France Telecom
Plain vanilla 0.64
2004 -0.26∗ 0.33∗ -0.41∗ 0.46∗ -0.56∗ 0.57∗
2008 -0.87∗ 0.94∗ -1.99∗ 1.99∗ -2.57∗ 2.57∗
KPN
Plain vanilla 1.09
2006 -0.44∗ 1.13∗ -0.95∗ 1.42∗ -2.28∗ 2.29∗
a mean absolute pricing errors (MAPE) of the plain vanilla bonds and both mean pricing
errors (MPE) and MAPEs of the step-up bonds for the equivalent plain vanilla (EPV),
(Jarrow, Lando and Turnbull, 1997, JLT) and historical valuation methods
∗ Indicates significance of the one-sample Z-test at a 95% confidence level.
The paired Z-tests are presented in Table 3.5 for all combinations of the three valuation
methods. In alternative test of the performance of the three methods, we calculate in
Table 3.6 the percentage of days that the market price of a step-up bond lies between the
95% confidence bounds of the calculated theoretical values. This tells us how uncertainty
in the estimated survival probability curves translates into uncertainty in the calculated
theoretical step-up bond values.
We also zoom in on the value of the step-up feature. We define the market premium of
the step-up feature as the step-up bond’s market price minus the value of the equivalent
plain vanilla bond. Similarly, we calculate the JLT premium (or the historical premium)
of the step-up feature as the JLT (or the historical) value of the step-up bond minus the
value of the equivalent plain vanilla bond. By subtracting the value of the equivalent plain
vanilla bond, we ‘correct’ the market, JLT and historical values for all bond characteristics
except for the step-up feature. We thus assume that the step-up feature fully determines
the remainder of the performance and no other factors are of importance. We calculate the
95% confidence interval around the premium using the confidence bounds of the equivalent
plain vanilla bond. As in the pricing errors introduced for the step-up bond prices, we
look at the differences between the market step-up premium and the JLT and historical
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Table 3.5: Paired Z-testsa
EPV – JLT EPV – Historical JLT – Historical
Deutsche Telecom 2005 0.00 -0.12∗ -0.12∗
2010 0.33∗ 0.26∗ -0.07∗
France Telecom 2004 -0.13∗ -0.24∗ -0.11∗
2008 -1.04∗ -1.63∗ -0.58∗
KPN 2006 -0.30∗ -1.16∗ -0.86∗
a pairwise differences between mean absolute pricing errors of the equivalent plain
vanilla (EPV), (Jarrow, Lando and Turnbull, 1997, JLT) and historical values
for the step-up bonds
∗ Indicates significance of the paired-sample Z-test at a 95% confidence level.
Table 3.6: Confidence interval coverage percentagesa
EPV JLT Historical
Deutsche Telecom 2005 73% 85% 62%
2010 33% 68% 50%
France Telecom 2004 90% 85% 72%
2008 48% 0% 6%
KPN 2006 82% 76% 33%
a Percentages of market step-up bond prices that lie
between the 95% upper and lower bounds of the equivalent
plain vanilla (EPV), (Jarrow, Lando and Turnbull, 1997,
JLT), and historical values.
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premiums. As all three figures incorporate the value of the equivalent plain vanilla bond
as a correction term, the last four columns in Table 3.4 and the last column in Table 3.5
also apply to the step-up premium. Table 3.6 does not pertain to the step-up premium;
the coverage percentages for step-up premiums are very similar to those for the step-up
bond prices, and are therefore omitted.
Deutsche Telecom
The MPE values in Table 3.4 tell that the EPV method typically undervalues and the
JLT and historical methods usually overvalue the 2005-bond. The JLT model has the
smallest bias to the market price, since both MPEEPV and MPEH differ more from zero
than MPEJLT , even though all three MPEs are statistically different from zero. The
percentages in Table 3.6 also show that the JLT model better approximates the step-up
market price than the EPV and historical methods. Although the bond values vary across
methods, the paired Z-test in Table 3.5 shows that these differences are small, and in case
of the difference between the EPV and JLT methods not even statistically significant.
Figure 3.2a shows the market, JLT and historical step-up premiums and the 95%
confidence bounds around the market premium for the 2005-Deutsche Telecom bond.6
Both the JLT and historical premiums are positive and more or less constant, except
for a small increase caused by Moody’s downgrade of the company on June 13, 2001;
the historical premiums are greater than the JLT premiums. In contrast, the market
premiums are much more volatile and sometimes even negative.7 A negative market
premium for the step-up feature is counterintuitive: as long as the step-up has not been
triggered yet, the coupon cannot be reduced and hence the step-up feature must have
a positive value. Even though the negative market premiums may suggest inefficient
market pricing, in practice, it is very hard or even impossible to exploit this imperfection,
as there are no bonds available that are comparable to the step-up bonds except for the
step-up feature. Even if there were such comparable bonds, it would be either impossible
or very expensive to take a short position in these bonds. From the confidence bounds
of the market premiums, however, if follows that the negative market premiums are not
statistically significant. The market premium fluctuates mostly between 0 and 1, except
in August 2001, where it is above 1, and in November and December 2001, where it is
below 0.
6Because there were no plain vanilla Deutsche Telecom bonds before May 14, 2001, Deutsche Telecom
figures start well after the step-up bond’s issue date of July 6, 2000.
7Lehman Brothers (McAdie et al., 2000) also found a negative value in their analysis of euro step-up
bonds on July 13, 2000.
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Figure 3.2: Deutsche Telecom step-up premiumsa
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a The market, JLT and historical step-up premium of the (a) 2005- and (b) 2010-Deutsche
Telecom step-up bonds. The dotted lines are the 95% confidence bounds of the market
premium. The vertical line indicates a rating downgrade by Moody’s.
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For the 2010-bond, the MPE values in Table 3.4 for the JLT and historical methods
are very low, while for the EPV method the MPE value is much higher. Further, all
three valuation methods give statistically significant different values at a confidence level
of 95%, according to Table 3.5. Table 3.6 also shows that the JLT model generates the
highest coverage percentages.
The market step-up premium of the 2010-bond displays an even more volatile pattern
than of the premium of the 2005-bond; see Figure 3.2b. This makes sense, because with
its longer maturity, more coupons are affected by the step-up language. During the first
half of the period, until October 2001, the market premium is higher than the JLT and
historical premiums, later this pattern is reversed. The market step-up premium becomes
negative in December 2001 and January 2002, but again the value is not significant. Both
JLT and historical premiums remain roughly constant over the entire period.
France Telecom
For the 2004-bond, the MPE and MAPE values for the EPV method in Table 3.4
approximate the market prices better than the JLT and historical methods. Apparently,
the market values this bond as a plain vanilla bond. In Table 3.6, we observe that the 95%
confidence bounds of the EPV values enclose the market prices in 90% of the days, and
the JLT and historical methods only 85% and 72%, respectively. Again, Table 3.5 shows
that the approximations produced by the three valuation methods differ significantly.
Figure 3.3a displays the market step-up premium with its 95% confidence bounds and
the JLT and historical premiums. The same pattern as for Deutsche Telecom emerges,
with volatile, although insignificant, market premiums and steady JLT and historical
premiums. Also, there is a large drop in both theoretical premiums on September 26, 2001
after the downgrade by Moody’s from A3 to Baa1. This downgrade triggered the step-up
feature (see Table 3.3), so that there are fewer remaining step-ups than the number of
step-ups at issuance and the coupon can also step down as the rating improves again. The
consequence is a decline in the theoretical step-up premiums, as observed in Figure 3.3a.
For the 2008-France Telecom bond, the MPE value is (in absolute value) equal to the
MAPE value for both the JLT and historical methods; see Table 3.4. This means that both
methods always overestimate the market price. The MPE value for the EPV method is the
lowest, but there is still a large bias. The confidence bounds statistics in Table 3.6 reveal
that in 48% of the days the market price and EPV value are statistically indistinguishable,
while the confidence bounds of the JLT and historical methods almost never include the
market price. The paired Z-tests also indicate that the JLT and historical values do not
vary much, but that they both differ to a great extent from the EPV values.
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Figure 3.3: France Telecom step-up premiumsa
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a The market, JLT and historical step-up premium of the (a) 2004- and (b) 2008-France
Telecom step-up bonds. The dotted lines are the 95% confidence bounds of the market
premium. The vertical line indicates a rating downgrade by Moody’s.
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As Figure 3.3b shows, the market premium of the step-up feature of the 2008-bond is
again volatile and even significantly negative during the first few months and also after the
downgrade. Both the JLT and historical premiums remain positive during the full period,
including after the downgrade, where their values drop as well. As above, we observe
that the JLT and historical premiums are typically higher than the market premium and
this difference is quite large, because they virtually never lie within the market premium’s
confidence bounds.
KPN
For the 2006-KPN step-up bond, again the MPE value of the EPV method is closest to
zero, although it is significantly below zero; see Table 3.4. The JLT model also typically
overvalues the market price, and the historical method even more, as evidenced by their
negative MPE values. The same ranking of the three methods emerges from Table 3.6,
as in 82% of the cases the market price lies within the EPV confidence bounds, for the
JLT and historical methods this is 76% and 33%. Therefore, the market seems to value
this bond as a plain vanilla bond.
Figure 3.4 plots the market, JLT and historical step-up premiums. As in the two
France Telecom bonds, the JLT and historical premiums are less volatile and higher
than the market premium, but the premiums of the JLT model often lie within the 95%
confidence bounds. The drops in all premiums on September 6, 2001 follow from Moody’s
rating downgrade from Baa2 to Baa3. The market premium first shows a dramatic fall but
then an impressive recovery in the subsequent months to become significantly positive,
before it then falls for the second time and becomes negative. Also the JLT premium
drops after the downgrade and becomes virtually equal to zero. A similar pattern can
be observed for the historical method, since it drops following the downgrade too; unlike
the JLT premium, however, it stays positive. Again, the historical premium is always
higher than the market premium, something we also noticed for the Deutsche Telecom
and France Telecom step-up bonds.
Implications
What is the value of the step-up features at bond issuance? Figure 3.3 shows that the
values of both France Telecom bonds do not differ significantly from zero at their issue
date, while Figure 3.4 shows that the same applies to the 2006-KPN step-up bond.8
8For Deutsche Telecom, we cannot value the step-up features at the bond issue date.
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Figure 3.4: KPN step-up premiumsa
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a The market, JLT and historical step-up premium of the 2006-KPN step-up bonds. The
dotted lines are the 95% confidence bounds of the market premium. The vertical line
indicates a rating downgrade by Moody’s.
In theory, these step-up features should have a positive value. Thus, we conclude these
three step-up bonds are undervalued at their issue date. Consequently, the issuer could
have issued bonds with a lower (expected) coupon, hereby saving interest payments. This
implies that issuing step-up bonds has increased the costs of capital of France Telecom
and KPN; see also Lando and Mortensen (2004).
Recovery Rate
The step-up bond values constructed by the EPV, JLT and historical methods all use
a recovery rate of 50%. We should note that the ‘true’ recovery rates for these three
Telecom issuers are not known exactly. Of course, this is the case for all corporate issuers
that have not experienced default. We thus analyze here how sensitive the mean absolute
pricing errors (MAPEs) are to variations in the recovery rate ranging from 30% to 70%.9
9All other things equal, a higher recovery rate should increase the theoretical value of a step-up bond.
Here, however, the recovery rate is first used in the estimation of the survival probabilities, where higher
recovery rates result in lower survival probabilities and vice versa. Next, both the recovery rate and the
survival probabilities are used in the valuation of the step-up bonds. How the changing recovery rate
(and thus the changing survival probabilities) affect the step-up valuation ultimately is therefore not at
all straightforward.
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Figure 3.5 shows that, for the 2005-Deutsche Telecom bond, the MAPE values
produced by the historical and EPV valuation methods always increase, while the MAPEs
of the JLT valuation method always declines as the recovery rate increases. For the
2010-Deutsche Telecom bond, both MAPEs and recovery rate always move in the same
direction. The same applies for the 2004-France Telecom bond. The MAPEs generated
by the historical valuation method rise as the recovery rate increases for both the 2008-
France Telecom and the 2006-KPN bond. The opposite pattern can be observed for the
MAPEs of the JLT and EPV valuation methods, with the exception of the MAPE of the
2006-KPN bond which rises again at the 70% recovery rate.
We can see that for three of the five step-up bonds - the 2010-Deutsche Telecom and
both France Telecom bonds - the order of the valuation methods is always the same,
whatever the recovery rate. For the other two bonds, the 2005-Deutsche Telecom bond
and the 2006-KPN bond, the historical method always performs most poorly, but the JLT
and EPV methods cross at a recovery rate of 50% and 70%, respectively; at lower values,
the EPV method is better, while for higher values the JLT method produces smaller
errors.
3.5.2 Step-Up Protection
We analyze the protection of a step-up from two perspectives: volatility and excess
returns.
Volatility Analysis
We hypothesize that step-up bond prices are less volatile than an equivalent plain vanilla
bond price, because the step-up feature compensates for a lower rating with a higher
coupon, and for a higher rating with a lower coupon; see also McAdie et al. (2000).10 The
step-up feature should work as a cushion against rating migrations on bond prices.
We compare the variance of a step-up bond’s market prices, σ2step−up, with the variance
of its equivalent plain vanilla bond’s values, σ2EPV . The null hypothesis
H0 :
σ2step−up
σ2EPV
= 1,
10Olivetti/Tecnost’s Chief Financial Officer, after linking the coupons of its bonds to its rating, stated:
”we think having these sort of volatility protection measures associated with our bonds should result in
a lower capital cost” (Bloomberg L.P. Equity News, June 16, 2000, quoted in (Acharya et al., 2002,
footnote 9)).
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Figure 3.5: Recovery rate sensitivity analysisa
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a The graphs depict the mean absolute pricing errors for various recovery rates, for the equivalent
plain vanilla bond, JLT and historical method respectively, for all step-up bonds: (a) 2005-Deutsche
Telecom, (b) 2010-Deutsche Telecom, (c) 2004-France Telecom, (d) 2008-France Telecom, and
(e) 2006-KPN.
is tested using the test statistic
V =
S2step−up
S2EPV
,
where S2step−up and S
2
EPV are the sample variances of the step-up bond market prices
and equivalent plain vanilla bond values, respectively. V follows an F -distribution with
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Table 3.7: Volatility analysisa
Test statistic p-value
Deutsche Telecom 2005 0.72 0.025
2010 0.56 0.000
France Telecom 2004 1.04 0.768
2008 0.75 0.031
KPN 2006 1.00 1.000
a F-statistics and p-values for the test that the step-
up bonds and their equivalent plain vanilla bonds
have equal variances.
nstep−up−1 and nEPV −1 degrees of freedom, where ni equals the number of i-observations,
with i ∈ {step-up, EPV}; see e.g. Madsen and Moeschberger (1986).
Table 3.7 shows mixed outcomes. The null hypothesis is easily rejected at the 95%
confidence level for both Deutsche Telecom bonds and the 2008-France Telecom bond. So,
for these three bonds, the step-up bond price variance is lower than the variance of the
equivalent plain vanilla bond.11 For the 2004-France Telecom and the 2006-KPN bonds,
the two variances are statistically indistinguishable.
Event Analysis
As long as the timing or extent of a rating downgrade or negative outlook change is not
fully anticipated by the market, plain vanilla bonds should have a negative return on a
downgrade or negative information release event date; see, e.g., Hand, Holthausen and
Leftwich (1992). Since a step-up bond compensates investors for poorer creditworthiness
via a higher coupon, we hypothesize that it has a higher return than its equivalent plain
vanilla bond.
To test this hypothesis, we define the excess step-up return as the step-up bond market
return minus the return of its equivalent plain vanilla bond, so the step-up bond return is
fully corrected for all bond characteristics except for the step-up. We first calculate the
excess return ERit for bond i for the event day, t = 0, and the three succeeding trading
days, t = 1, 2, 3. Then, we calculate the average ERt of these excess returns for each day
11If the step-up bonds were less liquid than the plain vanilla bonds, then this outcome could be
explained by the occurrence of stale prices. In fact, step-up bonds are probably more liquid than plain
vanilla bonds, because they are younger and have higher notional amounts, see, e.g. Houweling, Mentink
and Vorst (2005).
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Table 3.8: Event analysisa
Returns Cumulative returns
Day Step-up EPV Excess t-value Step-up EPV Excess t-value
0 -1.89% -0.77% -1.12% -1.14
1 0.36% -0.14% 0.50% 0.65 -1.53% -0.90% -0.63% -0.97
2 -0.11% -0.61% 0.50% 1.72 -1.64% -1.51% -0.13% -0.20
3 0.16% 0.18% -0.02% -0.15 -1.47% -1.32% -0.15% -0.23
a Average (cumulative) returns for the step-up bonds and their equivalent plain vanilla (EPV)
bonds, as well as the excess returns of the former over the latter and their t-values, after rating
downgrades and negative outlook changes, for the event date and the three succeeding days.
for the five step-up bonds. We also consider cumulative excess returns, defined as
CERit =
t∑
s=0
ERis,
and their averages CERt. We test the significance of the average excess returns and the
cumulative average excess returns using simple t-tests as described in Ritter (1991). If
both Moody’s and S&P’s change their ratings of (or outlooks) for the same company at
the same time, we treat this as a single event.
Table 3.8 shows the results of this event analysis. On the event date, the return on the
EPV bond is indeed negative, as expected. The return on the step-up bond, however, is
even more negative, so that the excess step-up return is negative. Although this negative
excess return is not significant, it is not consistent with our expectations. During the
post event period, the average excess return becomes positive, but stays statistically
insignificant. The cumulative excess returns are always negative and insignificant for the
entire post event period.
It is counter to our expectations that the step-up feature does not offer investors
positive excess returns in the case of a rating downgrade or a negative outlook, but rather
statistically identical returns as the EPV bond.
3.6 Summary
In this chapter, we empirically compared several pricing methods for rating-triggered
step-up coupon bonds. European telecom companies have issued these bonds in order to
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compensate bond investors for losses in the event of rating downgrades. The coupon of
a step-up bond depends on its issuer rating or the rating of the issuer’s long term debt.
If this rating deteriorates and hits a predefined level, the step-up coupon is triggered,
and the coupon rises with a predefined number of basis points. We applied risk-neutral
transition probabilities using the (Jarrow, Lando and Turnbull, 1997, JLT) framework
to value these rating-triggered step-up bonds. For comparison purposes, we also valued
step-up bonds using historical probabilities and as plain vanilla bonds comparable to
step-up bonds except for the step-up feature. Further, we demonstrated our results over
a long time period. Next, we tested the volatility of a step-up bond versus the equivalent
plain vanilla bond and we performed a rating and outlook change event analysis of excess
step-up bond returns.
We found that the market seems to value the Deutsche Telecom step-up bonds, whose
coupons make a single step-up after the rating hits the trigger level, according to the
JLT model. On the other hand, for the France Telecom and KPN step-up bonds, whose
coupons step up every time a rating hits a trigger level, the market seems to resort to
valuation as plain vanilla bonds. Market premiums for step-ups are much more volatile
than the JLT and historical premiums. These theoretical premiums are stable, except for
changes caused by downgrades. Further, as expected, the JLT model approximates the
market premiums always better than the historical valuation method.
From the five step-up bonds, the two Deutsche Telecom bonds and the 2008-France
Telecom bond have a significantly lower price volatility than their equivalent plain vanilla
bonds at a 95% confidence level. So, these three step-up bonds offer protection in terms
of a lower price volatility. The volatilities of the 2004-France Telecom and the KPN
step-up bond are statistically indistinguishable from their equivalent plain vanilla bonds.
Therefore, these step-up bonds do not offer a cushion against rating migrations in the
form of dampened price movements. The results from the event analysis, another way of
looking at the step-up protection, demonstrates that step-up bonds did not offer superior
returns to an investor in case of rating downgrades or negative outlooks.
Chapter 4
Optimizing Credit Bond Portfolios1
4.1 Introduction
In recent years both academics and practitioners have put a lot of effort in the development
of credit risk models. The CreditMetrics model is the most influential credit portfolio risk
model. This model simulates credit bond portfolio distributions and calculates credit
bond portfolio risks. Some research has been published (Andersson and Uryasev (1999),
Mausser and Rosen (1999b) and Andersson, Mausser, Rosen and Uryasev (2001)) in
which this model is used to determine optimal portfolios of credit bonds. This research
focuses on aggregate portfolio risk measures and shows that the optimization procedure
can find portfolios that are less risky, while having at least the same expected return.
In this chapter, we will investigate whether the ”optimal” bond portfolios are really an
improvement by analyzing the characteristics of the bonds in the optimal portfolio.
We find that a portfolio manager should be careful in carrying out the trades as
suggested by the optimal portfolio. Optimal portfolios are dominated by only one or two
bonds. Even after introducing transaction costs this remains the case. Moreover, the
composition of such an optimal portfolio is very sensitive to small changes in the mean
forward price of its main constituents. However, the portfolio optimization can be used
in combination with some common sense restrictions, such as maximal bond holdings and
categorization of bonds using their main characteristics, to produce portfolios that both
have a lower risk and higher return than a fully diversified portfolio. We also diversify
the optimal portfolio by replacing the dominant bond by similar bonds.
1This chapter is based on an article by Mentink (2005), which has been published in the ICFAI
Journal of Financial Risk Management. It was also presented at the fourth National Convention of the
Associazione Italiana Financial Risk Management (AIFIRM) in Milan on October 9, 2003.
72 Optimizing Credit Bond Portfolios · Chapter 4
Following Andersson et al. (2001) we use as a risk measure the Conditional Value-
at-Risk, which at a given percentile equals the expected value of the losses that exceed
the Value-at-Risk at that percentile. Other names for Conditional Value-at-Risk are
mean excess loss, mean shortfall, and tail VaR. Conditional Value-at-Risk also provides
information about the losses larger than the Value-at-Risk. Moreover, the Conditional
Value-at-Risk is sub-additive, convex and can be optimized using linear programming.
Value-at-Risk is always lower than or equal to the Conditional Value-at-Risk. Therefore,
a low Conditional Value-at-Risk implies a low Value-at-Risk (Andersson et al. (2001)).
In this chapter, we use a CreditMetrics Monte Carlo simulation to generate a bond
universe portfolio distribution and optimize its Conditional Value-at-Risk. All bonds in
this universe portfolio are U.S. dollar denominated, investment grade or non-investment
grade and cover many different countries, maturities, ratings and sectors.
The content of this chapter is the following. Section 4.2 gives a short overview of
the credit portfolio optimization literature. In Section 4.3 we define the β-Conditional
Value-at-Risk and describe the optimization constraints. The CreditMetrics model is
briefly summarized and the J.P. Morgan Active U.S. dollar index and the credit universe
portfolio are described in Section 4.4. In Section 4.5 we discuss the results of the β-
Conditional Value-at-Risk minimization with and without transaction costs using the
simulated CreditMetrics distribution. Sensitivity analyzes with respect to the bond’s
mean forward price and CreditMetrics simulation are calculated. Finally, Section 4.6
summarizes.
4.2 Literature
The CreditMetrics model by J.P. Morgan/RiskMetrics Group (J.P. Morgan (1997)) is the
most influential credit risk portfolio model that has been developed. Related models are:
CreditRisk+ of Credit Suisse Financial Products (1997), the McKinsey & Co.-Wilson
model (Wilson (1997a) and Wilson (1997b)) and the KMV model (Kealhofer (1998)).
CreditMetrics simulates a credit portfolio distribution and it makes a credit portfolio
optimization possible.
A credit portfolio distribution is typically skewed and has a long fat tail. This
asymmetric shape is a result from the characteristics of a credit bond. In general, the
probability of a loss on a credit bond is low, especially for investment grade credit bonds.
However, if a credit bond defaults the resulting loss is large. Moreover, the probability of
a profit on a credit bond is higher but only limited and related to its credit spread.
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The mean-variance equity portfolio optimization introduced by Markovitz (1952)
has also been applied in credit portfolio optimizations. Gollinger and Morgan (1993),
Stevenson and Fadil (1996), Kealhofer (1998) and Ramaswamy (2002) all calculate a
mean-variance optimization of credit bond portfolios. However, the asymmetric credit
portfolio distribution makes a symmetric portfolio risk measure, such as variance, not
very useful.
Value-at-Risk (VaR) is an often-used risk measure to account for portfolio distribution
asymmetry. It measures the maximum loss at a given confidence level, for example 95%.
However, it has both economic and non-economic limitations. By definition, it does not
give any information about the portfolio losses larger than the VaR. Furthermore, this
risk measure lacks sub-additivity (Artzner, Delbaen, Eber and Heath (1999)). Moreover,
as Vorst (2000) demonstrates portfolio return maximization under a VaR restriction
generates gambling portfolios. Last, using simulated credit portfolio distributions VaR
is a non-smooth, non-convex and multi-extreme function of the portfolio bond amounts
(Andersson et al. (2001)). These results make a credit portfolio optimization based on
VaR and a simulated distribution difficult to interpret and impossible to implement. To
overcome the non-smoothness problem, Arvanitis, Browne, Gregory and Martin (1999)
optimize the VaR of their credit portfolio by randomly altering the portfolio amounts of
the bonds. This approach generates many portfolios, but does not result in a smooth
expected return-VaR efficient frontier.
Expected regret of a credit portfolio gives the expected value of losses that exceed
a pre-specified threshold. This measure does take into account the losses that exceed
the given threshold. Furthermore, it can be optimized by solving a linear programming
model (Mausser and Rosen (1999a) and Mausser and Rosen (1999b)). But it is not clear
what the value of the pre-specified threshold should be. In contrast, Conditional Value-
at-Risk (CVaR) does not require a pre-specified threshold and can still be calculated
using a linear programming model. Testuri and Uryasev (2000) explain the relationship
between expected regret and Conditional Value-at-Risk. Rockafellar and Uryasev (2000),
Krokhmal, Palmquist and Uryasev (2001) and Jobst and Zenios (2002) use CVaR to
optimize their asset allocation, credit, equity and option portfolios. Further, Alexander
and Baptista (2003) analyze the implications for portfolio selection using CVaR and VaR
constraints, but they employ a mean-variance model in their analysis.
These papers minimize CVaR and analyze optimal, aggregate risk measures. In
practice, a portfolio manager is not only interested in the risk of the optimal portfolio, but
also in its composition. We focus on the individual credit bonds in the optimal portfolios
and analyze their characteristics and sensitivities.
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4.3 Conditional Value-at-Risk
We analyze both the β-Value-at-Risk (β-VaR) and the β-Conditional Value-at-Risk (β-
CVaR) of a credit portfolio using simulated credit portfolio distributions, as described in
the next section. A distribution is defined as the portfolio’s mean future value minus the
simulated distribution (both according to CreditMetrics). So a (very) positive value in
this distribution represents a (much) lower value than the mean portfolio value, i.e. a
(large) loss. We want to minimize the (1-β%) largest portfolio losses.
The β-VaR of this simulated distribution equals the lowest amount α such that with
probability β the portfolio loss will not exceed α. Typical values for β are 90%, 95% and
99%. The β-CVaR is defined as the conditional expected value of those portfolio losses
that are larger than α. So β-CVaR equals the expectation of (1-β)% portfolio losses larger
than α. β-CVaR and β-VaR are both functions of the credit portfolio composition.
Define the matrix d = dji by dji = bi−vji with bi the probability-weighted mean of the
forward prices across all rating categories, including default (mean forward price) of bond
i and vji the forward price in simulation j of bond i, with m the number of simulations
and n the number of bonds. Let x = (x1, . . . , xn), where xi are the holdings of bond i in
the credit portfolio. The β-VaR of the simulated portfolio is denoted by α(x, β) and the
β-CVaR of the portfolio by θ(x, β). Now it easily follows that
θ(x, β) = α(x, β) +
(
1
1− β
)(
1
m
) m∑
j=1
[
n∑
i=1
djixi − α(x, β)
]+
(4.1)
with the [t]+ = max(0,t).
We will minimize this expression under three constraints that are described below.
First, the optimal bond portfolio with a minimal β-CVaR has to generate an expected
return of at least R. The sum of the product of the expected bond return ri, its spot price
qi, and amount xi, is required to be greater than or equal to R times the spot value of
the universe portfolio. Initially we assume that we have an amount equal to one of each
bond in the universe in our portfolio, xi = 1, ∀ i. So the return constraint reads
n∑
i=1
qirixi ≥ R
n∑
i=1
qi (4.2)
Secondly, the spot value of the optimal bond portfolio has to maintain the spot value of
the universe portfolio. Therefore, the value constraint equals
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n∑
i=1
qixi =
n∑
i=1
qi (4.3)
Third, the optimal amount of each bond has a lower limit l and an upper limit u. Here,
both limits have the same value for all bonds. These limits restrict the multiples of the
bond’s amounts in the optimal portfolio. An optimal bond amount of one means that the
amount has not changed compared to its universe amount. The limit constraints look like
l ≤ xi ≤ u i = 1, . . . , n (4.4)
We want to minimize the β-CVaR subject to return, value and holding constraints.
This optimization can be solved using linear programming (lp) techniques as shown in
Rockafellar and Uryasev (2000) and Andersson et al. (2001). This lp problem is also
displayed in Appendix 4.B.
4.4 CreditMetrics and Data
CreditMetrics simulates future bond prices and portfolio values. In fact, CreditMetrics
simulates a rating for each individual bond. In our application we use a future horizon of
one year. Next, the horizon price for the bond is calculated based on the forward yield
curve corresponding to the simulated rating (Benson and Zangari (1997) and J.P. Morgan
(1997)). Correlations between rating changes are incorporated via the correlation between
equity returns. In this way, for each simulation run a portfolio value can be calculated.
By plotting the results of a large number of simulations a distribution of future portfolio
values is derived. In the optimization procedure as described in the previous section we
not only need the distributions of forward prices of individual bonds, but also for each
simulation run the simulated price of each individual bond.
We download the J.P. Morgan Active U.S. dollar index available in CreditMetrics.
The members of this index are all straight bullet bonds with a fixed rate coupon and a
minimal amount outstanding of 100 million U.S. dollar. All members must be reasonably
liquid according to J.P. Morgan criteria before they enter this index. The number of
credit bonds equals 680, issued by 232 different issuers. These index data are downloaded
from September 20, 2001.
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The CreditMetrics characteristics of the issuers are: name, transition matrices
(Moody’s or S&P), rating (including minor ratings), issuer-specific risk (40% for all
issuers), country, country weight, sector and sector weight. J.P. Morgan assigns each
issuer to one country and one sector only. (CreditMetrics allows for three different
countries and three different industries though.) By selecting just one country and one
sector our analyzes of the optimization results are easier to interpret (RiskMetrics Group
(1999b)). The credit bonds in this index are characterized by name, issuer name, asset
type (for example bond or loan), portfolio name, currency (all bonds are denominated in
U.S. dollar), recovery rate (47.7% for all bonds), standard deviation of the recovery rate
(26.6% for all bonds), issued amount, maturity date, coupon, coupon frequency, seniority
and rate type (for example government or swap curve). All characteristics are the same
for each bond except for issuer, issuer name, maturity date, coupon and coupon frequency.
”CreditMetrics calculates the spot price and the mean forward price for each bond and
it produces the expected return and the one year forward price corresponding to each
possible rating for each bond.”
A bond’s return is calculated by taking the difference between the one year forward
and the spot price and dividing this difference by the spot price. Obviously, this is a
forward looking return measure, in contrast to, for example, backward looking equity
returns. Using this return measure, it is easy to make it a function of rating opinions
of the portfolio manager, for example: if the portfolio manager thinks that the assigned
rating is too low, he can raise the expected return to the level that corresponds to his
higher rating level (leaving the rating transition probabilities unchanged though).
We construct a credit universe portfolio by imposing restrictions on this J.P. Morgan
Active U.S. dollar index. This means that the nominal amount of each bond in our
universe is a function of its issued amount. Thus the nominal amounts between bonds
can differ. In order to further simplify the interpretation of the results, we randomly
select just one bond with each issuer. Additionally, our universe does not contain bonds
with a maturity shorter than one year to avoid reinvestment problems. Both restrictions
do not limit the universe’s variety in countries, maturities, ratings and sectors compared
to the original index. Now our bond universe consists of 231 issue(r)s. The spot market
value of this bond universe portfolio equals 240840.
We assign to the selected bonds the appropriate credit spread curves. Each bond is
mapped to a credit-spread curve according to the issuer’s sector and rating. For example:
if a bond is issued by a bank with an A1 rating the bond is mapped to the A1 bank
spread curve. These credit spread curves are an approximation of the issuer specific
credit spread curves. Therefore, we will do sensitivity analyzes of the optimal portfolio
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composition with respect to changes in the mean forward price and thus the expected
returns later in this chapter. These credit spread curves are quoted versus the U.S. dollar
government zero curve. Using the sum of this zero coupon curve and the relevant credit
spread curve, CreditMetrics calculates the spot and one year (mean) forward prices. The
RiskMetrics Group supplies the zero coupon U.S. dollar government interest rate curve,
credit spread curves, equity time series and two transition matrices, both Moody’s and
S&P, as each issuer is mapped to one of these two matrices.
Figure 4.1 shows the bond universe portfolio loss distribution. The simulated
distribution is displayed relative to the mean future credit bond universe value. The
positive distribution values at the right hand side represent the possible, largest losses in
one year: t = 1. This distribution is generated with 20000 scenarios (RiskMetrics Group
(1999a)). As a consequence of this large number of scenarios the distribution’s shape is
smooth.
Figure 4.1: Bond universe portfolio loss distribution
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As mentioned earlier, the universe portfolio holds one in each bond issue in the universe
of bonds considered. If we run the lp optimization from Appendix 4.B with l = 1 and u
= 1, the portfolio composition remains of course equal to the universe portfolio. However,
the optimization program gives us the marginal CVAR for each individual bond. A
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Table 4.1: Bond universe portfolio statistics
β-CVaR β-VaR
β=90% 4532 2556
β=95% 5913 3812
β=99% 9552 7023
positive marginal CVaR means that the β-CVaR will increase for small increases in xi.
Bond characteristics such as the mean forward price, expected return, country, rating and
sector determine this marginal CVaR. But, as with β-VaR and β-CVaR, the marginal
CVaR also depends on the, arbitrarily chosen, portfolio Monte Carlo simulation, despite
the fact that the VaR has converged using 20000 simulations, see Appendix 4.A. Table
4.1 shows the β-VaR and β-CVaR of the universe portfolio for three different confidence
levels.
From the universe portfolio, five bonds with the highest and lowest marginal CVaR
for confidence level β = 95% are given in Table 4.2 and Table 4.3 respectively. All bonds
in Table 4.2 have a very low rating. Since we will minimize the objective function, a high
marginal CVaR indicates that we would like to reduce the holdings of these bonds in our
portfolio. This low rating means a high probability of default and thus a high β-CVaR
contribution of such a bond. Furthermore, a higher (lower) (mean) forward price of a
bond also means a higher (lower) marginal CVaR.
We now look at each bond in Table 4.2 in more detail. The Russian (RU) government
(SVN) bonds both have a relatively high mean forward price and have the second lowest
rating in the universe portfolio. The Argentine (AR) bond has the highest mean forward
price of the two lowest rated bonds. There is only one bond in the universe portfolio with
a B+ rating. But this bond has a low mean forward price. The Brazilian (BR) bond has
the highest mean forward price of the BB-rated bonds. The two other BB-rated bonds
have a low mean forward price. The Lucent bond has a high mean forward price.
In contrast, all bonds in Table 4.3 have the highest rating AAA and a very short
maturity. Their one year default probability equals zero according to the two used
transition matrices. So their marginal CVaR is very low as well.
The five bonds with the highest marginal CVaR in the universe portfolio with
confidence levels β = 90% and 99% are comparable to those in the universe portfolio
with β = 95%. The same applies for the five bonds with the lowest marginal CVaR.
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Table 4.2: Five universe portfolio members with the highest marginal
CVaR (MC) and their main characteristics: name (N), rating (R),
maturity date (M), country (C), sector (S), expected return (ER), with
Russian Federation (RU), Argentina (AR), Brazil (BR), United States
(US), Sovereign (SVN) and General (GNL)
N MC R M C S ER
(mm-dd-yyyy)
Russian Federation 1199.4 B 07-24-2005 RU SVN 8.88
Russia Minfin Bonds 556.1 B 06-10-2003 RU SVN 8.75
Argentina 442.3 B− 12-20-2003 AR SVN 8.94
Brazil 360.3 BB− 04-15-2004 BR SVN 6.17
Lucent Technologies 173.2 BB+ 03-15-2029 US GNL 5.38
Table 4.3: Five universe portfolio members with the lowest marginal CVaR (MC)
and their main characteristics: name (N), rating (R), maturity date (M), country
(C), sector (S), expected return (ER), with Supra National (SN), United States (US),
Germany (DE), France (FR), Banks (BNK), Financial (FIN) and Railroads (RAI)
N MC R M C S ER
(mm-dd-yyyy)
World Bank 0.004 AAA 12-04-2002 SN BNK 3.61
General Electric 0.007 AAA 10-01-2002 US FIN 3.72
Baden-Wuerttemberg 0.009 AAA 10-01-2002 DE BNK 3.60
Asian Development Bank 0.022 AAA 10-21-2002 SN BNK 3.61
Soc Nationale Chemins Fer Francais 0.027 AAA 01-30-2003 FR RAI 3.68
4.5 Results
As stated in Section 4.3, we calculate an optimal portfolio by minimizing the β-CVaR of
the universe portfolio. Figure 4.2 displays the expected return 95%-β-(C)VaR efficient
frontier, the efficient frontier of the investment grade only universe portfolio and the
95%-CVaR of the universe portfolio.
The optimal portfolio with the same expected return as the universe portfolio, i.e.
4.15%, has a 95%-CVaR of 0.629, which is substantially lower than the universe portfolio
CVaR of 5913. We also see that the 95%-VaR of this optimal portfolio is much lower,
being 0.154 versus 3812 of the universe portfolio. The optimal 95%-CVaR portfolio with
80 Optimizing Credit Bond Portfolios · Chapter 4
R = 3.75% has a CVaR that is virtually equal to zero. This optimal portfolio almost fully
consists of one AAA-rated General Electric bond, i.e. 94% of the portfolio’s spot market
value. Andersson et al. (2001) find the same large reductions in their optimal CVaR and
they also mention this extreme result in their portfolio optimization. From Figure 4.2 we
observe that restricting our optimization to the investment grade universe bonds limits
the maximum expected portfolio return to 4.50% and increases the associated 95%-CVaR
compared to an unrestricted optimal portfolio with the same return.
Figure 4.2: Expected return 95%-CVaR and 95%-VaR efficient frontiers
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Next we analyze the composition of the 95%-CVaR optimal portfolio with R = 4.50%,
i.e. one particular portfolio on the efficient frontier. This portfolio has both a higher
expected return and a lower 95%-CVaR than the universe portfolio. Table 4.4 shows the
name (N), amount (X), rating (R), maturity (M), country (C), sector (S) and expected
return (ER) of each bond. This optimal portfolio almost totally consists of the General
Motors (GM) bond, i.e. 87% of the portfolios spot market value. It is ranked 87 according
to the ascending marginal CVaR of the universe bonds.2 Thus in terms of CVaR this bond
2All bonds in our 95% optimal portfolio are also present in the optimal portfolio with the same
required return and confidence levels of 90% and 99%. Moreover, the GM bond gets by far the largest
amount in these two optimal portfolios.
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Table 4.4: Bonds in the optimal portfolio and their main
characteristics: name (N), amount (X), rating (R), maturity (M),
country (C), sector (S), expected return (ER), with United States
(US), Lebanon (LB), Mexico (MX), Philippines (PH), Malaysia
(MY), Colombia (CO), Venezuela (VE), Brazil (BR), Turkey (TR),
Financials (FIN), Sovereign (SVN), Banking (BNK), Utilities (UTI)
and Food (FOD)
N X R M C S ER
(mm-dd-yyyy)
General Motors 163.8 A 01-22-2003 US FIN 4.24
Lebanon 5.9 B+ 12-14-2004 LB SVN 8.71
Bancomext 4.1 BB+ 02-02-2004 MX FIN 5.86
Philippines 3.6 BB 03-16-2010 PH BNK 6.22
Philippines 3.4 BB+ 04-15-2008 PH SVN 6.02
Tenaga Nasional 3.3 BBB− 06-15-2004 MY UTI 4.25
Colombia 3.3 BB 02-15-2007 CO SVN 6.21
Mexico 3.2 BB+ 04-06-2005 MX SVN 6.01
Venezuela 2.9 B 08-15-2018 VE SVN 8.84
Escelsa 2.4 BB− 07-15-2007 BR FIN 6.03
Kellogg Co 2.2 BBB 04-01-2003 US FOD 4.34
Turkey 1.1 B− 11-05-2004 TR SVN 8.79
Brazil 0.6 BB− 04-15-2004 BR SVN 6.17
does not contribute a high risk to the universe portfolio.3 The GM bond is mapped to
the largest country United States (36% of the universe portfolio market value) and the
largest sector Financials (20%).
Other portfolios on our 95%-CVaR efficient frontier show the same composition; only
one or two bonds dominate the optimal portfolio. In practice a portfolio manager would
be very hesitant to put all his money in only one or two bonds. Hence, next follows some
more analysis on this ”optimal” portfolio.
In order to study the sensitivity of the optimal portfolio composition to the implicit
assumption on the expected return of the GM bond, we alter its mean forward price and
thus also its expected return. Figure 4.3 displays the huge impact on both the 95%-
(C)VaR and the GM bond holding after the mean forward price changes of -0.25% to
0.25% with steps of 0.10% point. After increasing this mean forward price, the optimal
(C)VaR drops sharply, for example: an 0.25% increase in price, lowers the CVaR from
3Rerunning the simulation with a higher number of simulations, 25000 in stead of 20000, does not
alter the ranking of the bonds significantly.
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3409 to 1257. At the same time, the GM holding increases from 163.8 (in Table 4.4) to
177. After lowering the mean forward price with only 0.15% or 0.25%, the GM bond is
fully replaced by a comparable Ford Motor Credit bond from Table 4.7 below.
Figure 4.3: Sensitivity analysis of the optimal portfolio
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Given the strong concentration in one particular bond in the optimal portfolio and
the sensitivity to its return assumption, we have to further diversify our portfolio. To this
end we introduce a maximum percentage of each bond in the optimal portfolio. So, we
add Equation (4.B.7) to our lp optimization as described in Appendix 4.B. In practice,
it is common to impose a maximum amount of a certain issue(r). Table 4.5 shows that
95%-VaR, 95%-CVaR and the number of bonds increase as the maximum percentage
decreases. The amount in the GM bond always equals the allowed maximum percentage.
If we consider the portfolio with at most 5% of each bond from the universe portfolio,
the 95% CVaR is considerably higher than the 95% CVaR of the ”optimal” portfolio: 5004
versus 3409. However, this new optimal portfolio is definitely more diversified. Compared
with the universe portfolio it has a lower 95% CVaR, 5004 versus 5913, and a higher
expected return: 4.50% versus 4.15%. Hence, the full optimization gives portfolios that
would not be very much appreciated by investors since it is too concentrated. However,
with restrictions on the amounts of bonds in the portfolio, the optimization procedure
creates a portfolio that is definitely better than the universe portfolio.
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Table 4.5: Maximum amount percentages, optimal 95%-CVaR, 95%-VaR,
GM bond amount and number of bonds
Maximum percentage 95%-CVaR 95%-VaR GM bond Number of bonds
5% 5004 3055 9.4 41
10% 4562 2467 18.7 30
20% 4128 2412 37.4 26
No maximum 3409 2159 163.8 13
Another method of diversifying the optimal portfolio can be implemented via
categorization all bonds using their main characteristics: country (44 countries), maturity
(1-5, 5-10 and 10+), rating (including notches) or sector (21 sectors).4 The model in
Section 4.3 now alters somewhat: the decision variable, xi, changes into all bonds with
the same characteristic, for example: all bonds with a maturity of more than ten year or
all bonds with an A1 rating, instead of one single bond. The advantage of this approach
is that an optimal amount represents a group of bonds instead of only one bond and thus
we avoid extreme results as described above.
Table 4.6 shows that portfolio categorization using country, maturity and sector results
in a lower 95%-(C)VaR, whereas using rating generates a higher 95%-(C)VaR than the
universe 95%-(C)VaR. In case of the higher expected return of 4.50%, bucketing by
country and maturity gives the lowest and highest 95%-(C)VaR respectively. It seems
that categorization by means of country and sector is less restrictive than categorization
by maturity and rating.
A third approach to derive a better diversified optimal portfolio goes as follows. We
have eight bonds in our universe portfolio with comparable characteristics to the GM
bond. In Table 4.7 their main characteristics are summarized and ordered according to
the ascending marginal CVaR. However, these bonds are not members of the optimal
portfolio, partly because their individual marginal CVaR is higher than that of the GM
bond in the Monte Carlo simulation. With the purpose of further diversifying our optimal
portfolio we divide the invested amount in GM equally across this bond and the eight
comparable bonds. Now we again calculate the 95%-CVaR by keeping the holdings of
these nine bonds fixed. The optimal 95%-CVaR increases to 4527 and the expected
return decreases to 4.43% compared to the ”optimal” portfolio. Again, this portfolio has
a better risk-return profile than the universe portfolio.
4We thank the RiskMetrics Group for this suggestion.
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Table 4.6: Optimal portfolio statistics using country,
maturity, rating or sector categorization
R= 4.15% R= 4.50%
Country
95% CVaR 3955 6985
95% VaR 2492 4513
N 16 18
Maturity
95% CVaR 5588 22038
95% VaR 3790 13820
N 231 61
Rating
95% CVaR 14981 17406
95% VaR 4616 8912
N 9 12
Sector
95% CVaR 3555 8962
95% VaR 1683 6309
N 95 54
Now we extend our lp optimization problem by incorporating transaction costs as
a portfolio manager who trades credit bonds is generally confronted with large bid-ask
spreads (Krokhmal et al. (2001)). Here, the transaction costs, c, are a fixed percentage
of the sum of the sold and bought bond amounts. This percentage is the same for all
bonds in the universe portfolio and equals c = 0.5%.5 In Appendix 4.B we show this lp
extension.
Table 4.8 compares the 95%-CVaR and 95%-VaR of the optimal portfolio without
transaction costs (OP) and the optimal portfolio with transaction costs (OPTC). The
optimal portfolio without transaction costs equals the ”optimal portfolio” from the
efficient frontier in Figure 4.2 with R = 4.50%. The percentages between parentheses
in Table 4.8 denote the changes in 95%-CVaR and 95%-VaR compared to OP.
The bonds in the optimal portfolio with transaction costs are shown in Table 4.9.
Many bonds in the universe portfolio are still sold despite the introduction of transaction
costs and they get a holding equal to zero. The optimal amount of the GM bond is lower
than its amount in the optimal portfolio without transaction costs but this bond still
dominates the new optimal portfolio.
5It also possible to make these costs different across bonds.
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Table 4.7: Eight bonds that are comparable to the GM bond and
their main characteristics: name (N), marginal ranking (MR), rating (R),
maturity (M), country (C), sector (S) and expected return (ER), with
United States (US) and Financials (FIN).
N MR R M C S ER
(mm-dd-yyyy)
American Express Travel 107 A+ 01-22-2004 US FIN 4.18
Ford Motor Credit Co 113 A 01-14-2003 US FIN 4.24
Cit Group Holdings Inc 120 A+ 03-15-2003 US FIN 4.20
Avco Financial Services Inc 126 A 12-09-2004 US FIN 4.23
Countrywide Home Loan 130 A 06-15-2004 US FIN 4.23
Heller Financial Inc 147 A− 05-15-2003 US FIN 4.27
Team Fleet Finance Corp 189 A 09-15-2005 US FIN 4.25
Ford Capital BV 207 A 07-16-2004 US FIN 4.24
Table 4.8: 95%-CVaR and 95%-VaR of
the optimal portfolio (OP), the optimal
portfolio with transaction costs (OPTC)
and the optimal portfolio using a second
simulation (OPS), with R= 4.50%
95%-CVaR 95%-VaR
OP 3409 2159
OPTC 3841 2488
(12.7%) (15.2%)
OPS 3912 2098
(14.7%) (−2.8%)
As discussed in Section 4.4 the marginal CVaR of bonds in the universe portfolio partly
depends on the Monte Carlo simulation. In order to see the effect of this simulation on the
95%-CVaR optimization results, we again optimize the 95%-CVaR but now use a second
simulation. In the lp optimization we set the upper and lower limits equal to the amounts
of the optimal portfolio. In this way the composition of the optimal portfolio does not
change. As Table 4.8 displays both 95%-CVaR and 95%-VaR of the new optimal portfolio
(OPS) are not invariant with respect to the simulation.
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Table 4.9: Members of the optimal portfolio subject to transaction
costs and their characteristics: name (N), amount (X), rating (R),
maturity (M), country (C), sector (S) and expected return (ER), with
United States (US), Lebanon (LB), Mexico (MX), Philippines (PH),
Colombia (CO), Malaysia (MY), Venezuela (VE), Brazil (BR), Turkey
(TR), Financials (FIN), Sovereign (SVN), Banking (BNK), Utilities
(UTI) and Food (FOD)
N X R M C S ER
(mm-dd-yyyy)
General Motors 157.60 A 01-22-2003 US FIN 4.24
Lebanon 6.80 B+ 12-14-2004 LB SVN 8.71
Bancomext 4.70 BB+ 02-02-2004 MX FIN 5.86
Philippines 4.10 BB 03-16-2010 PH BNK 6.22
Philippines 3.90 BB+ 04-15-2008 PH SVN 6.02
Colombia 3.80 BB 02-15-2007 CO SVN 6.21
Mexico 3.70 BB+ 04-06-2005 MX SVN 6.01
Tenaga Nasional 3.50 BBB− 06-15-2004 MY UTI 4.25
Venezuela 3.40 B 08-15-2018 VE SVN 8.84
Escelsa 2.60 BB 07-15-2007 BR FIN 6.03
Kellogg Co 2.40 BBB 04-01-2003 US FOD 4.34
Turkey 1.20 B− 11-05-2004 TR SVN 8.79
Thus, as the analyzes above demonstrate, a portfolio manager can use 95%-CVaR
optimization after deciding the bonds he wants to trade, determining their transaction
costs, adjusting their expected returns, making categories of comparable bonds and
imposing maximum constraints.
4.6 Summary
In recent years, some research has been published (Andersson and Uryasev (1999),
Mausser and Rosen (1999b) and Andersson et al. (2001)) in which the CreditMetrics
model has been used to determine optimal portfolios of credit bonds. This model simulates
credit bond portfolio distributions and calculates credit bond portfolio risks. This research
demonstrates that the optimization procedure can find portfolios that are less risky, while
having at least the same expected return as a fully diversified portfolio. In this chapter,
we investigated whether the ”optimal” bond portfolios are really an improvement by
analyzing the characteristics of the optimal portfolio.
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We find that a portfolio manager should be careful in carrying out the trades as
suggested by the optimal portfolio. Optimal portfolios are dominated by only one or two
bonds. Even after introducing transaction costs this remains the case. Moreover, the
composition of such an optimal portfolio is very sensitive to small changes in the mean
forward price of its main constituents. However, the portfolio optimization can be used
in combination with some common sense restrictions, like maximal bond holdings and
categorization of bonds using their main characteristics, to produce portfolios that both
have a lower risk and higher return than a fully diversified portfolio. We also improve on
the portfolio by replacing the dominant bond in the optimal portfolio by similar bonds.
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Table 4.10: Bond universe 95%-
VaR with its upper (UC) and lower
confidence bounds (LC)
95%-LC β-VaR 95%-UC
β=90% 248172 248308 248422
β=95% 246747 247045 247898
β=99% 243152 243878 244621
Appendix
4.A Simulation Convergence
The bond universe distribution is generated by a CreditMetrics simulation of 20000
scenarios. Convergence of this simulation is measured by the distance between the β-
VaR and the 95% upper and lower percentile confidence bounds (J.P. Morgan (1997),
RiskMetrics Group (1999a) and RiskMetrics Group (1999c)). Table 4.10 shows that
these upper and lower confidence bounds lie very close to β-VaR. Thus this simulation
generates β-VaR convergence.
β-VaR in Table 4.10 and Table 4.1 are related. Subtracting the β-VaR in Table 4.1 from
the mean future value of the bond universe portfolio, 250857, gives the β-VaR in Table
4.10. Small differences between these values do occur due to CreditMetrics rounding.
4.B Linear Programming Model
The β-CVaR of the universe portfolio subject to the return, value and amount constraints
can be minimized using the lp model below. Solving this lp problem, we find the optimal
amounts, the corresponding VaR and the optimal CVaR (Andersson et al. (2001).
Minimize
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θ(x, β) = α +
(
1
1− β
)
1
m
m∑
j=1
yj (4.B.1)
subject to
yj =
n∑
i=1
((bi − vji)xi)− α (4.B.2)
yj ≥ 0 (4.B.3)
n∑
i=1
qirixi ≥ R
n∑
i=1
qi (4.B.4)
n∑
i=1
qixi =
n∑
i=1
qi (4.B.5)
l ≤ xi ≤ u i = 1, . . . , n (4.B.6)
qixi ≤ P
n∑
i=1
qi P = 5%, 10%, 20% (4.B.7)
Incorporating transaction costs into this β-CVaR optimization problem replaces
constraint (4.B.6) with the four constraints below. The goal function and the other
constraints remain the same. The maximum amount sold of a bond in the universe
portfolio, δsi , equals one, because its universe portfolio amount equals one and no short
positions are allowed. The maximum amount bought of a bond in the universe portfolio,
δbi , equals the upper limit u.
n∑
i=1
qixi + c
n∑
i=1
qi(δ
s
i + δ
b
i ) =
n∑
i=1
qi (4.B.8)
1− δsi + δbi = xi (4.B.9)
0 ≤ δsi ≤ 1 (4.B.10)
0 ≤ δbi ≤ u (4.B.11)

Part II
Liquidity Risk of Corporate Bonds

Chapter 5
Measuring Corporate Bond Liquidity1
5.1 Introduction
The effect of liquidity on bond yields has been frequently studied in the recent finance
literature. Since liquidity is a rather subjective concept, a lot of measures have been
proposed to approximate the extent to which a bond is liquid or illiquid. For corporate
bonds, where most transactions occur on the over-the-counter market, direct liquidity
measures (based on transaction data) are often not reliable and difficult to obtain.
Therefore, researchers resorted to indirect measures (‘proxies’) that are based on bond
characteristics and/or end-of-day prices. This paper makes a number of contributions to
this literature on measuring corporate bond liquidity. First, we pay great attention to
control for other sources of risk than liquidity to properly identify the premium that is
associated with liquidity risk. As far as we know, this is the first study in this strand of
the literature to use the well-known Fama and French (1993) two-factor bond-market
model to control for interest rate and credit risk and to augment it with individual
bond characteristics, rating and maturity, as recommended by Gebhardt, Hvidkjaer and
Swaminathan (2001). Second, we do not make a subjective choice of which liquidity
proxies to work with, but implement as much of the proxies proposed in the literature as
possible on our data set. We evaluate the relative performance of all proxies, employing a
method recently applied by Goldreich, Hanke and Nath (2002) on Treasury bonds. Third,
the vast majority of empirical papers on sovereign and corporate bond liquidity studied
data from the United States and relatively little is known about the extent to which these
results apply to the euro market. Although euro corporate bond data were also studied
by other authors, including Annaert and De Ceuster (1999), McGinty (2001) and Dı´az
1This chapter is based on an article by Houweling, Mentink and Vorst (2005), which has been
published in the Journal of Banking & Finance.
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and Navarro (2002), none of them analyzed the euro corporate bond market using data
on individual bonds over a substantial time period.
We use the Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996) methodology of liquidity-sorted
portfolios to test whether liquidity is priced in the euro denominated corporate bond
market. We use nine proxies of bond liquidity: issued amount, listed, on-the-run, euro,
age, missing prices, yield volatility, number of contributors and yield dispersion; see
Section 5.3.4 for a detailed description. For each liquidity proxy, we construct P , mutually
exclusive portfolios by sorting all bonds on their value of the liquidity proxy and assigning
the first 100/P % of the bonds to portfolio 1, the next 100/P % to portfolio 2, and so
on, until the last 100/P % of the bonds are assigned to portfolio P . The P time series of
portfolio yields are subsequently used in two regression models. In the first model, each
portfolio has a constant liquidity premium. In the second model, the liquidity premium
is time-varying and a function of the size of liquidity proxy. In both models, the null
hypothesis states that the portfolios’ liquidity premiums are jointly equal to zero. We
use a detailed data set consisting of daily yields of individual corporate bonds which
are denominated in euro or in one of the currencies of the euro-participating countries
(’legacy’ currencies). The results for the first regression model indicate that the null
hypothesis of no liquidity premium is rejected for eight out of nine liquidity proxies. So,
we find strong evidence of priced liquidity. For the second model, the null hypothesis of
no liquidity effects is even always rejected. To determine the relative effectiveness of the
different liquidity proxies, we run a series of regressions with pairwise combinations of
the liquidity proxies, as proposed by Goldreich et al. (2002). This allows us to rank the
different liquidity proxies we consider. The results of the tests point out that no proxy
stands out from the rest.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 5.2 gives an overview of
the methodologies and results of the empirical liquidity literature. Section 5.3 describes
how we control for other sources of risk than liquidity risk and how we estimate
the liquidity premium. This section also describes the portfolio construction and our
nine liquidity proxies. Next, Section 5.4 describes the data that are used to test the
hypotheses of corporate bond liquidity. Section 5.5 presents the results from the model
implementation. Finally, Section 5.6 summarizes the paper.
5.2 Literature
Both theoretical and empirical evidence demonstrate that liquidity risk is priced in
security markets. The market microstructure models of Amihud and Mendelson (1986),
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Boudoukh and Whitelaw (1993) and Vayanos (1998) show that transaction costs cause
liquidity differences between securities, and that illiquid securities have higher expected
rates of return than liquid securities.
For equity markets, empirical evidence on priced liquidity risk is provided by, e.g.,
Amihud and Mendelson (1986), Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996), Haugen and Baker
(1996), Brennan, Chordia and Subrahmanyam (1998), Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyam
(2001) and Chordia, Subrahmanyam and Anshuman (2001). For bond markets, a
substantial part of empirical studies analyzed data from the U.S. Treasury market, where
bonds are issued on a regular basis and price data are easily available. Also, controlling
for other sources of risk than liquidity risk is relatively easy in this market, because credit
risk is not an issue. To control for interest rate risk, authors have used several approaches.
The first approach is to create pairs of zero-coupon bonds with exactly the same maturity
date; this fully eliminates interest rate risk. Amihud and Mendelson (1991), Kamara
(1994) and Strebulaev (2002) used this method to test for liquidity differences between
U.S. Treasury notes and bills; Fleming (2002) compared U.S. Treasury bonds with small
and large outstanding amounts. The second approach is to form triplets of coupon bonds,
which, with suitable bond weights, also eliminate interest rate risk. Elton and Green
(1998) used this method to examine yield differences between bonds with high and low
trading volume. Another frequently used approach is to analyze the yield difference
between the on-the-run (most recently issued) bond and off-the-run (older) bonds; this
will, however, leave a small maturity gap between the bonds. Warga (1992), Goldreich
et al. (2002) and Krishnamurthy (2002) used this method on U.S. Treasury data and
(Boudoukh and Whitelaw, 1991, 1993) on Japanese data. All papers mentioned above,
except Strebulaev (2002), found statistically significant liquidity premiums.
Research on corporate bond liquidity is substantially more difficult, because of the
presence of credit risk and the smaller number of bonds per issuer. A strategy of matching
bonds by maturity and issuer, similar to the Treasury studies above, will typically generate
too few observations. As far as we know, there is only one study that successfully applied
this approach: Crabbe and Turner (1995) analyzed pairs of new issues, issued by the
same borrower, with identical issue and maturity dates, but with different issue sizes. The
most popular approach is to regress yields (and occasionally bid-ask spreads or trading
volumes) of individual corporate bonds on a range of proxies for interest rate, credit and
liquidity risk. Examples of studies that used this method include Gehr and Martell (1992),
Shulman, Bayless and Price (1993), Chakravarty and Sarkar (1999), Alexander, Edwards
and Ferri (2000), Hong and Warga (2000), Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein and Martin (2001),
Ericsson and Renault (2002), Schultz (2001), Dı´az and Navarro (2002), Elton et al. (2004)
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and Mullineaux and Roten (2002). Remarkably, all papers studied U.S. data, except Dı´az
and Navarro (2002) who studied Spanish corporate bonds. Cornell (1992), Fridson and
Jo´nsson (1995) and Annaert and De Ceuster (1999) used similar regression approaches,
but on indices of U.S. mutual funds, U.S. high yield bonds and euro investment grade
bonds, respectively. Finally, McGinty (2001) analyzed one month of euro corporate bond
data using scatter plots and tables. All papers mentioned above, except for Gehr and
Martell (1992) and Crabbe and Turner (1995), found evidence of significant liquidity
premiums for at least one liquidity proxy.
To summarize, almost all empirical papers on bond liquidity found significant liquidity
effects for government and corporate bonds. However, none of the studies used the
portfolio-based testing methodology often employed in the literature on equity liquidity.
Moreover, although there is ample research on the U.S. market, the evidence for euro-
denominated bonds is limited to papers that study index data (Annaert and De Ceuster,
1999), a small sample period (McGinty, 2001) or data from one country (Dı´az and Navarro,
2002).
5.3 Methodology
This section describes the methodology used to test whether liquidity risk is priced in
the euro-denominated corporate bond market. First, we explain how we control for other
sources of risk than liquidity risk using Fama and French (1993) and Gebhardt et al.
(2001). Next, we describe the implementation of our models and the Goldreich et al.
(2002) method to compare different liquidity proxies. Finally, we present our liquidity
proxies.
5.3.1 Controlling for Other Sources of Risk
In measuring a security’s liquidity premium, it is important to realize that the security’s
expected return is not only affected by liquidity risk but also by other sources of risk.
Theory (like the reduced form credit risk models following Jarrow and Turnbull (1995))
nominates two risk factors: (i) interest rate risk and (ii) credit risk. We use the Fama and
French (1993) bond-market model as a starting point to proxy for interest rate and credit
risk. They found two risk factors that explained over 90% of the variation in realized
excess returns on corporate bond portfolios; the excess return was defined as the portfolio
return minus the one-month Treasury rate. The first risk factor was calculated as the
long-term Treasury bond return minus the one-month Treasury rate at the end of the
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previous period. Thus, this slope factor should explain variations in excess bond returns
by changes in the slope of the Treasury yield curve. The second factor was defined as the
return on a market portfolio of long-term corporate bonds minus the long-term Treasury
bond return. This credit factor was therefore related to the likelihood of credit events in
the corporate bond portfolio.
Unlike Fama and French (1993), we do not us a bond’s realized return as proxy for its
expected return, but, following the bond liquidity literature, we use the bond’s yield-to-
maturity.2 The advantage of yields is that they are forward-looking, while realized returns
are backward looking. In all regressions, we thus replace the excess realized return by the
excess yield, which is defined as the yield minus the short-term default-free rate.
A second modification to the Fama-French model concerns the choice of the default-
free interest rate curve, which is required to calculate the excess yields and the two risk
factors. Instead of using the government curve, we use the swap curve. Our motivation
is that since the end of the 1990s, fixed-income investors have moved away from using
government securities to extract default-free interest rates and started using interest rate
swap rates instead; see also Golub and Tilman (2000) and Kocic´, Quintos and Yared
(2000). In Section 5.5.1, we test both proxies for default-free rates.
Gebhardt et al. (2001) looked at the validity of the Fama-French bond-market model
by analyzing whether individual bond characteristics could rival the two Fama-French
factors. Three characteristics were considered: rating, duration and Altman (1968) Z-
scores. They concluded that both Fama-French factors and bond characteristics were
important in explaining bond yields and recommended a model containing four variables:
the Fama-French slope and credit factors, rating and duration. In Section 5.5.2, we show
that for our data set these four characteristics are also relevant.3 Therefore, our null
model to control for other sources of risk consists of four variables: two Fama-French
factors and two characteristics; the model is described formally in Section 5.3.2. Clearly,
all our conclusions about the relation between liquidity and bond yields are based on the
assumption that our four-variable pricing model correctly and fully controls for interest
rate and credit risk; see also Dimson and Hanke (2002).4
To the best of our knowledge, no other paper in the liquidity literature has employed
both the Fama-French factors and individual bond characteristics to control for other
2Changing the return measure from realized return into yield makes our return measure sensitive to
time-to-maturity. Therefore, we incorporate time-to-maturity in our regression models as control variable;
see also the discussion of the Gebhardt et al. (2001) paper below.
3We have replaced duration by maturity, but this should not affect our results as both variables are
highly correlated.
4We further assume that taxes do not affect bond yields.
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sources of risk. One paper, Ericsson and Renault (2002), used the Fama-French
factors, but not the characteristics; several papers made use of the rating and maturity
characteristics, including Alexander et al. (2000), Hong and Warga (2000) and Mullineaux
and Roten (2002), but not of the Fama-French factors; most papers used a list of ad-hoc
proxies.
5.3.2 Models
Unlike prior papers on bond liquidity, we do not estimate our models on individual bonds,
but on constructed portfolios, like in the equity literature; see e.g. Amihud and Mendelson
(1986), Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996) and Haugen and Baker (1996). Specifically,
we follow Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996) by creating liquidity-sorted portfolios
and testing whether the constructed portfolios have significantly different yields, while
controlling for other sources of risk as described above. From the literature, we collect
nine liquidity proxies, which are detailed in Section 5.3.4. For each proxy i, we create P
mutually exclusive portfolios as follows (the choice for P will be discussed at the end of
this section).
Every two weeks, we order all bonds in the sample by their value of liquidity proxy i;
only bonds that have already been issued and have not yet matured on that date are
used in the ordering. Then, we assign the first 100/P % of the bonds to portfolio 1, the
next 100/P % to portfolio 2, and so on, until the last 100/P % of the bonds are assigned
to portfolio P . The sort order is chosen such that portfolio 1 contains the bonds that
proxy i hypothesizes to be the most liquid and portfolio P the most illiquid. Every day
we calculate the yield of each portfolio as the unweighted average of the yields of the
bonds that make up the portfolio. A bond’s yield is determined as follows: if the bond is
not quoted, we disregard it for that day; if it is quoted by one pricing source, we use that
yield; if it is quoted by more than one pricing source, we use the average quote. For each
proxy i, we have now created P time series of portfolio yields.
As in Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996), the time series are used in two regression
models. In the first model, each portfolio has a constant liquidity premium. Formally,
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model 1 is as follows5
Y ipt = α
i
p +
2∑
j=1
βijpFjt +
2∑
j=1
γijC
i
jpt + ε
i
pt,
E[εipt] = 0
E[εiptε
i
qs] = σ
i
pq, ift = s, and 0 otherwise,
where superscripts i refer to liquidity proxy i, Y ipt is the excess yield of the p
th proxy-i
portfolio on day t, F1t and F2t are the two Fama-French factors and C
i
1pt and C
i
2pt are the
two portfolio characteristics. The coefficients are interpreted as follows: αip is the portfolio-
specific liquidity premium, βijp is the portfolio-specific factor loading for Fama-French
factor j and γij is the marginal effect of portfolio characteristic j. The model controls the
portfolio excess yields for the two Fama-French factors and the two bond characteristics.
Thus, it gives the effect of a particular liquidity proxy after correcting for the four features.
Note that the Fama-French factors have portfolio-specific coefficients and common variable
values, while the characteristics have common coefficients and portfolio-specific variable
values.
The disturbance terms are allowed to be heteroscedastically distributed and cross-
sectionally correlated, but we do assume that they are uncorrelated across time. To
correct for possible autocorrelations in the disturbances, we apply the Newey and West
(1987) estimator for the covariance matrix. For proxy i, we estimate all 3P +2 coefficients
(αi1, . . . , α
i
P , β
i
11, . . . , β
i
1P , β
i
21, . . . , β
i
2P , γ
i
1, γ
i
2) for all P portfolios simultaneously with
Feasible Generalized Least Squares (FGLS) as a system of seemingly unrelated regressions
(SUR); see e.g. (Greene, 2000, Chapter 15).
To test the null hypothesis that proxy i has no liquidity premium, or in other words,
that the two Fama-French factors and the two portfolio characteristics fully explain the
bond yields, we use a Wald test to determine the joint significance of the intercepts: H0:
5As suggested by an anonymous referee, we have extended model 1 and 2 with quadratic terms of
the two portfolio characteristics, rating and maturity. The results showed to be robust with respect to
this extension of both models.
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αi1 = 0 ∧ . . . ∧ αiP = 0. The test statistic is asymptotically χ2-distributed with P degrees
of freedom.6
In the second model, we change the functional form of the liquidity premium: all
portfolios share a common intercept and a portfolio-specific liquidity variable is added to
the regression equation. Formally, regression model 2 reads
Y ipt = α
i +
2∑
j=1
βijpFjt +
2∑
j=1
γijC
i
jpt + δ
iLipt + ε
i
pt,
where the definitions of the Fama-French factors, the portfolio characteristics and the
assumptions on the disturbances are equal to those in Equation (5.3.2) and Lipt is the
value of the liquidity proxy of the pth proxy-i portfolio on day t in deviation from its daily
average; so, if lipt denotes the value of the liquidity proxy, and l¯
i
t is its daily average, i.e.
l¯it =
1
P
P∑
p=1
lipt,
then Lipt is calculated as L
i
pt = l
i
pt− l¯it. We have chosen this normalization of the liquidity
proxy to correct for a possible change in the mean during our sample period. For example,
the average amount outstanding has risen from 353 million on the first day of our sample
to 434 million on the last day.
In Equation (5.3.2), the portfolio-specific intercepts of Equation (5.3.2) have been
replaced by a single intercept and an additional regressor has been introduced that
contains a proxy for portfolio p’s liquidity. This changes the functional form of the
liquidity premium: the constant liquidity premium of αip in model 1 has been replaced by
a time-varying premium αi + δiLipt that is linear in the value of the liquidity proxy (in
deviation from its mean). Here, the null hypothesis of no liquidity effect is tested with a
Wald test on the joint significance of αi and δi: H0: α
i = 0 ∧ δi = 0. The test statistic
is asymptotically χ2-distributed with 2 degrees of freedom. The joint hypothesis problem
discussed in footnote 6 also applies here.
6There is caveat in the interpretation of the test results: if we want to test whether proxy i is a good
liquidity proxy, we are actually testing a joint hypothesis: illiquidity leads to yield increases and proxy i
is a proxy for liquidity; see also Kempf and Uhrig-Homburg (2000) and Jankowitsch, Mo¨senbacher and
Pichler (2002). If we reject this joint hypothesis, then either illiquidity does not lead to yield increases or
i is not a good liquidity proxy (or both). Given the strong empirical evidence mentioned in Section 5.2,
we feel confident that a rejection of the joint hypothesis can in fact be traced to i being an inadequate
liquidity proxy.
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We now discuss the choice for the number of portfolios P for both models. For model 1,
we create two portfolios for each liquidity proxy. This gives an intuitive interpretation of
portfolio 1 as the ‘liquid portfolio’ and portfolio 2 as the ‘illiquid portfolio’. Moreover,
the difference αi2−αi1 between the two intercepts can be interpreted as the yield premium
investors get for bearing liquidity risk caused by proxy i. In model 2, we have to estimate
the slope coefficient δi, i.e. the relation between a portfolio’s value for liquidity proxy i
and its excess yield. Clearly, two portfolios would be insufficient to estimate a slope.
However, using ‘too much’ portfolios diminishes the power of the Wald test; see Lys and
Sabino (1992). From their Figure 1, it follows that if the portfolios contain approximately
25% of the bonds, the power of the test of no relation between the liquidity proxy and
the excess yield is maximized. Therefore, we use 4 portfolios for model 2.
5.3.3 Comparison
Given the large number of liquidity proxies that has been proposed in the literature, a
natural question to ask is whether all proxies are equally suited to proxy bond liquidity or if
some proxies work better than others. We follow Goldreich et al. (2002) by running a series
of regressions with pairwise combinations of the liquidity proxies. For each combination
(i, k) of proxies, we estimate a regression like Equation (5.3.2) for proxy i, augmented
with proxy k
Y ipt = α
i +
2∑
j=1
βijpFjt +
2∑
j=1
γijC
i
jpt + δ
iLipt + δ
ikLikpt + ε
ik
pt,
where Likpt is the value of liquidity proxy k for the p
th proxy-i portfolio in deviation
of its daily average. Further, the coefficients are defined and disturbances behave as in
Equation (5.3.2).
In this regression equation7, we test for the significance of δik. If it is significant, we
say that ‘k adds explanatory power to i’, and otherwise we say that ‘k is subsumed by
i’ (this follows the terminology in Goldreich et al. (2002)). By repeating this procedure
for all possible combinations, we can count the number of times a proxy adds power to
another proxy, and the number of times a proxy subsumes another proxy. This allows us
to rank the different liquidity proxies we consider.
7Goldreich et al. (2002) first orthogonalized the values of proxy k relative to proxy i and used the
orthogonalized values in Equation (5.3.3) instead of Likpt. This is not necessary, since, by the Frisch-Waugh
theorem (see e.g. Greene, 2000, Section 6.4.3)), the regression already ‘automatically’ does this for us.
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5.3.4 Liquidity Proxies
Empirical papers that examined liquidity in bond or equity markets used both direct
measures (based on transaction data) and indirect measures (based on bond characteristics
and/or end-of-day prices). Examples of direct liquidity measures are quoted bid-
ask spreads, effective bid-ask spreads, quote sizes, trade sizes, quote frequencies, trade
frequencies and trading volume. For corporate bonds, where most transactions occur on
the over-the-counter market, these direct measures are often not reliable and difficult to
obtain. Therefore, we use indirect liquidity proxies instead. By searching the theoretical
and empirical liquidity literature, we found nine liquidity proxies that can be implemented
on our data set.8 Table 5.1 shows which papers used which proxies and the effects they
found; three proxies, euro, missing prices and yield dispersion, are not mentioned in this
table, because they were not used in previous studies. We will now discuss each proxy in
more detail, elaborating on their interpretation, their expected effect on bond yields and
theoretical and/or empirical evidence.
Issued Amount
The issued amount of a bond is often assumed to give an indication of its liquidity.
Most investment banks use it as liquidity criterion in building their bond indices; for
example, Lehman Brothers uses this criterion for their Euro-Aggregate Corporate Bond
index. Its use was first proposed by Fisher (1959), who claimed that large issues should
trade more often, so that the proxy issued amount is actually a proxy for the direct
liquidity measure trading volume. Since Fisher, several alternative hypotheses have been
put forward that also predict a positive effect of issued amount on liquidity (and thus on
bond prices). In market microstructure models, like Smidt (1971) and Garman (1976),
transaction costs arise, because dealers hold inventories. Further, dealers’ inventory costs
are higher if it is more difficult to obtain information about a security and if the expected
holding time is longer. Crabbe and Turner (1995) subsequently reasoned that large issues
may have lower information costs, since more investors own them or have analyzed its
features; similarly, information about small issues may be less broadly disseminated among
investors. Therefore, small issues will have a higher yield due to an illiquidity premium.
Another frequently heard argument, for instance in Sarig and Warga (1989) and Amihud
and Mendelson (1991), is that bonds with smaller issued amounts tend to get locked in
8We would like to stress that by selecting liquidity proxies from theoretical research and from empirical
research on other data bases, the effects of data-snooping on portfolio-based tests, as described by Lo
and MacKinlay (1990), are probably limited.
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Table 5.1: Overview of liquidity proxies from the empirical bond liquidity literaturea
Liquidity proxies
Authorsa Datab
Issued
amount
Listed On-the-run Age
Yield
volatility
Number of
contributors
Corporate bonds
AEF00 US −∗ +∗ +∗ −∗
CT95 US 
EGAM04 US  +∗
ER02 US +∗
GM92 US + − −
HW00 US −∗ +∗ +∗
M01 EMU  
MR02 US + −
S01 US +
SBP93 US  +∗
Treasury bonds
AM91 US
EG98 US +∗ +∗
F02 US  +∗
JMP02 EMUc −∗ +∗ −∗
K02 US −∗
KU00d Germany −∗
SW89 US − +∗
W92 US − +∗
Corporate & treasury bonds
DN02 Spain +∗ −∗ +∗
Corporate, municipal & treasury bonds
CS99 US +∗
 legend: − negative; + positive; ∗ significant;  insignificant
a AEF00=Alexander, Edwards and Ferri (2000), AM91=Amihud and Mendelson (1991),
CS99=Chakravarty and Sarkar (1999), CT95=Crabbe and Turner (1995), DN02=Dı´az and
Navarro (2002), EG98=Elton and Green (1998), EGAM04=Elton, Gruber, Agrawal and Mann
(2004), ER02=Ericsson and Renault (2002), F02=Fleming (2002), GM92=Gehr and Martell
(1992), HW00=Hong and Warga (2000), JMP02=Jankowitsch, Mo¨senbacher and Pichler (2002),
K02=Krishnamurthy (2002), KU00=Kempf and Uhrig-Homburg (2000), M01=McGinty (2001),
MR02=Mullineaux and Roten (2002), S01=Schultz (2001), SBP93=Shulman, Bayless and Price
(1993), SW89=Sarig and Warga (1989), W92=Warga (1992)
b EMU=European Monetary Union, US=United States.
c JMP02 considers six countries: Austria, France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the Netherlands.
d We use the price discounts in KU00’s Table 2 to calculate the impact of maturity on yields.
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buy-and-hold portfolios more easily, reducing the tradable amount and thus their liquidity.
To summarize the above, we hypothesize a negative effect of issued amount on yields.
Table 5.1 shows that many empirical papers considered issued amount as liquidity
proxy. The papers on Treasury bonds found negative and mostly significant effects, so
that larger Treasury issues have lower yields, as expected. Research on corporate bonds
is inconclusive, though: both negative and positive coefficients are observed. McGinty
(2001) confirmed this by showing that even though most large issues in his corporate bond
sample were liquid, some large issues were illiquid and some small issues were liquid.
Listed
Alexander et al. (2000) reasoned that companies whose equity is listed on a stock exchange
must disclose more information than privately held companies. According to the market
microstructure models mentioned above, the costs of making a market in bonds of listed
firms should thus be smaller. Therefore, we hypothesize that the proxy listed is associated
with higher liquidity and lower yields.
Since Alexander et al. (2000) were the only authors to use the liquidity proxy listed,
the empirical evidence is limited to their results. Contrary to their expectations, they
found that issues of private firms trade more actively and thus are more liquid than issues
of listed firms. Their explanation of this result was that for private firms debt is the only
investment vehicle, while for public firms both debt and equity are traded; therefore, debt
of private firms might trade more and have higher liquidity.
Euro
The next liquidity proxy is whether a corporate bond is denominated in euro or in one
of the legacy currencies. The market generally sees legacy bonds (i.e. denominated in
one of the currencies of the euro-participating countries) as the less liquid ones, because
these bonds are relatively old, not well known to the bond investors and more difficult
to trade. The predicted sign of the proxy euro is thus higher liquidity and lower yields.
This bond characteristic splits the corporate bond sample into two excluding groups: euro
bonds and legacy bonds. To our best knowledge, no other papers have implemented this
liquidity proxy.
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On-the-Run9
In general, on-the-run, or most recently issued, bonds are considered to be the most liquid
bonds, in contrast to off-the-run or older bonds, as market participants often focus their
attention on younger bonds. For each issuer, we define the bonds that are issued most
recently as on-the-run bonds and the remaining, older bonds as off-the-run bonds. In case
an issuer has issued only one bond, we define this bond as an on-the-run bond.10 We test
the hypothesis that on-the-run bonds have a higher liquidity, and consequently a lower
yield, than the off-the run bonds.
This liquidity proxy has been implemented in the empirical literature, as Table 5.1
displays, but only for Treasury bonds. All papers found a positive and statistically
significant effect of on-the-run. As far as we know, no prior papers implemented this
proxy on corporate bonds.
Age
The age of a bond is a popular proxy of its liquidity. Sarig and Warga (1989) observed
that as a bond gets older, an increasing percentage of its issued amount is absorbed in
investors’ buy-and-hold portfolios. Thus, the older a bond gets, the less trading takes
place, and the less liquid it becomes. Moreover, once a bond becomes illiquid, its stays
illiquid until it matures. McGinty (2001) and Schultz (2001) also noted that new issues
trade more than old issues. McGinty mentioned lead managers’ commitment to making
market in the newly issued bond. Schultz pointed out that new issues are typically under
priced, so that traders buy bonds after the offering and sell them shortly thereafter.
Following these arguments, we hypothesize a positive relation between age and yield.
Empirical research strongly confirms the positive effect of age on yields; see Table 5.1.
This finding holds for corporate and sovereign bonds and for U.S. and European data sets.
Moreover, Schultz (2001) found evidence for the argument by Sarig and Warga (1989),
since in his sample most bonds were bought and not sold; in other words, the bonds were
put in buy-and-hold portfolios.
Market practitioners often use a threshold value to determine if a bond is ‘old’ or
‘young’: for some T , they mark all bonds with an age smaller than T as ‘young’ and an
9We thank an anonymous referee for this valuable suggestion.
10By definition, the distinction between on-the-run and off-the-run bonds is related to age. Yet,
portfolios that are constructed with the help of each proxy do differ. Using the liquidity proxy on-the-
run, only bonds possessing this feature, thus both old and young, end up in the liquid portfolio, whereas
applying the liquidity proxy age the liquid portfolio is only composed of young bonds, both on-the-run
and off-the-run.
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Figure 5.1: Liquidity premiums for different age thresholds, solid () and empty () squares
denote significance and insignificance, respectively, of the Wald test on the joint significance
of the two intercepts (p-value < 0.05).
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age larger than T as ‘old’. Some academic papers also use such a dichotomous approach
for the liquidity proxy age. For instance, Alexander et al. (2000) set T = 2 years, Ericsson
and Renault (2002) used T = 3 months, and Elton et al. (2004) employed a threshold
value of one year. To determine which threshold values give a useful division of bonds, we
estimate model 1 from two portfolios, where portfolio 1 contains all bonds younger than T
months and portfolio 2 older than T months, for T = 2, 4, . . . , 30. The difference α2 − α1
between the portfolio intercepts, i.e. the liquidity premium between old and young bonds,
and the significance of the Wald test on H0: α2 − α1 = 0 are displayed in Figure 5.1.
Thresholds from 4 to 24 months give rise to a significant liquidity premium, while the
2-month threshold and thresholds larger than 24 months do not. The division between
young and old bonds seems to be the strongest for a threshold of 14 months, where the
premium equals 36 bps. For the remainder of this study, we arbitrarily use a threshold of
one year for the proxy age, although any other value between four months and two years
could also be used.
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Missing Prices
The occurrence of ‘price runs’ and missing values is our first liquidity proxy that uses
market information. Sarig and Warga (1989) argued that if the liquidity of a bond is
sufficiently low, it may happen that on some business days there is virtually no trading
in that bond. In their data set, this was recorded as a ‘price run’: two consecutive prices
for a bond were identical. We extend their notion of illiquidity by considering not only
the occurrence of a price run, but also the occurrence of a missing value, since in both
cases there is no activity in that bond on that day. We will jointly refer to these events
as the proxy missing prices. We hypothesize a positive relation between missing prices
and yield.
Yield Volatility
The proxy yield volatility is a measure of yield uncertainty. In the market microstructure
models discussed above, dealers’ inventory costs are higher if information uncertainty is
higher. An important source of uncertainty is related to the predictability of future yield
movements. Therefore, we hypothesize that a higher yield volatility leads to larger bid-ask
spreads, and thus to lower liquidity and higher yields.
The empirical evidence for yield uncertainty as liquidity proxy is mixed; see Table 5.1.
Shulman et al. (1993) used price volatility as proxy for price uncertainty and found a
significantly positive effect on bond spreads. Hong and Warga (2000) proxied uncertainty
with squared price return and estimated a positive and significant coefficient in a regression
using bid-ask spread as dependent variable; this also implies a positive effect of uncertainty
on bond yields. Alexander et al. (2000) approximated uncertainty as the average of
absolute price returns; in their regressions, they found a significant, positive effect on
trading volume, implying a negative relation between uncertainty and yields.
Number of Contributors
The number of contributors is our following proxy of a bond’s liquidity, and the first that
uses quote composition information. In Ericsson and Renault (2002), a larger number
of active traders competing for the same bond leads to a smaller price discount for
illiquidity and thus a smaller yield premium. Alternatively, Gehr and Martell (1992)
and Jankowitsch et al. (2002) argued that a larger number of market participants makes
it easier to trade a bond, because it is easier to find a counter party for a transaction and
large orders can be split up into smaller parts without affecting the market price. Either
108 Measuring Corporate Bond Liquidity · Chapter 5
way, we hypothesize a positive relation between the proxy number of contributors and
liquidity and therefore expect a negative effect of this proxy on bond yields.
Direct empirical evidence on the number of contributors liquidity proxy is limited.
Jankowitsch et al. (2002) found that bonds with more contributors have lower yields for
all but one of the six European countries they analyzed. Indirect evidence is provided
by Schultz (2001), who showed that there was a positive relation between the number of
trades in a bond and the number of dealers as counter parties. Further, the results of
Gehr and Martell (1992) showed a negative, though insignificant effect of the number of
dealers on the bid-ask spread.
Yield Dispersion
Our final liquidity proxy, yield dispersion, reflects the extent to which market participants
agree on the value of a bond. Tychon and Vannetelbosch (2002) derived a model that
predicts that if investors have more heterogeneous beliefs, the liquidity premium is larger.
The inventory costs argument, mentioned above, applies here as well, since dealers face
more uncertainty if prices show a larger diffusion among contributors. Either way, we
hypothesize a positive relation between dispersion and bond yields.
We proxy this notion of liquidity with a yield dispersion statistic, which has not been
used before in the literature, as far as we know. We define the yield dispersion of bond b
on day t as the standard deviation of percentage yield differences relative to the mean
Dispersionbt =
√√√√ 1
nbt − 1
nbt∑
s=1
(
ybts − y¯bt
y¯bt
)2
,
where ybts is the yield quoted by pricing source s, y¯bt is the average yield and nbt is the
number of contributors. This proxy can only be calculated if we have at least two quotes
for a bond on a particular day, i.e. if nbt > 1.
Application
Table 5.2 gives details on the calculation of each liquidity proxy. It also shows the expected
sign of the proxy. To get the lipt variable of Section 5.3.2, we multiply proxies with a
negative expected sign by −1. After this transformation, the δi coefficient of model 2 is
hypothesized to be positive for all proxies; this facilitates checking the results with the
hypotheses. Finally, the table shows the order in which bonds are put in the portfolios:
the first portfolio always contains the bonds that are hypothesized to be most liquid, the
last portfolio contains bonds that we expect to be most illiquid.
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As described in Section 5.3.2, every two weeks the portfolios for each liquidity proxy
are rebalanced according to each bond’s value for that proxy. For the proxies issued
amount, listed, euro (which are fixed characteristics of a bond), for on-the-run (which
alters due to new issuance) and for age (which changes only gradually over time), we use
the value of the liquidity proxy on the rebalancing date. For the proxies missing prices,
number of contributors and yield dispersion (which depend on daily market information),
we use the average value over the two weeks prior the rebalancing date. For the proxy yield
volatility (which also depends on daily information), we calculate the standard deviation
of the observed yields over the two weeks prior to the rebalancing date. If for a particular
bond it is not possible to calculate the value of a liquidity proxy on the rebalancing date,
that bond is ignored for that proxy until the next rebalancing date.
5.4 Data
The data are downloaded from three different sources. Lehman Brothers provides the
International Securities Identification Numbers (ISINs) of the members of their Euro-
Aggregate Corporate Bond index. The required characteristics of these corporate bonds
are downloaded from Bloomberg L.P. Reuters 3000 EXtra provides daily bid yields of
each bond quoted by different pricing sources. The download period starts on January
1, 1999 and ends on May 31, 2001. The ISINs are obtained for May 31, 2000. The total
number of bonds on this date equaled 1190. All bonds that are issued in euro directly
after the currency’s introduction are included in this analysis. Moreover, the yield time
series of each corporate bond has at least twelve months history.
5.4.1 Lehman Brothers
Lehman Brothers provides the ISINs of the corporate bonds in their Euro-Aggregate
Corporate Bond index. This index serves as a proxy for the investment-grade euro-
denominated, corporate bond market. Lehman Brothers imposes a number of criteria
before the corporate bonds can enter its index. All bonds must be denominated in euro or
in one of the legacy currencies. Further, all bonds are investment grade, have a fixed-rate
coupon, at least one year to maturity and an issued amount of at least 150 million euro.
The country of issuance and the country of the issuer are no index criteria. The ratings
of all corporate bonds are also provided by Lehman Brothers. All ratings are downloaded
for May 31, 2000. Due to data limitations, we have kept these ratings unchanged during
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the whole sample period. Finally, their Euro-Aggregate Corporate Bond BBB sub index
is used to construct the Fama-French credit factor.
5.4.2 Bloomberg L.P.
Bloomberg L.P. provides the required bond characteristics. Using the ISINs that are
given by Lehman Brothers these characteristics are downloaded. In case an ISIN code is
not recognized by Bloomberg L.P., the bond data are obtained from Lehman Brothers.
From the initial 1190 ISINs, three are not available in the Bloomberg L.P. data base. The
downloaded corporate bond characteristics are: issued amount, issue date, maturity date,
currency, call dates, put dates and sinking fund dates. Euro-denominated par swap data,
which are used to calculate the two Fama-French factors and the portfolio excess yields,
are also downloaded from Bloomberg L.P.
5.4.3 Reuters
Reuters 3000 EXtra provides the bid yields of the selected corporate bonds. Most
corporate bond yields in the Lehman Brothers Euro-Aggregate index are bid yields; only
newly issued corporate bonds have ask yields during their first month in the index; see
Lehman Brothers, Inc (1998). Therefore, we download bid yields from Reuters. For each
corporate bond, all pricing sources (also called contributors) are downloaded. We exclude
two Reuters pricing sources, the clearing agency ISMA and two anonymous pricing sources
from the list of contributors, since they are averages of other pricing sources. The total
number of different pricing sources thus obtained equals 74.
From the original 1190 ISINs in the Lehman Brothers Euro-Aggregate Corporate Bond
index, 191 bonds cannot be analyzed, because they either have no Reuters Identification
Code (RIC) that matches their ISIN or they do have a RIC but no contributor. For the
remaining 999 bonds, all bid yields from all pricing sources are downloaded. This means
that a number of time series, equal to the number of pricing sources, shows the yield
development of each bond. Most bonds are quoted by more than one pricing source.
5.5 Results
We first present the results of applying the Fama-French bond-market model to the entire
sample and show the extension of this model with portfolio characteristics. Next, the
regression results for models 1 and 2 are given. Finally, the performance of the liquidity
proxies is compared.
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5.5.1 Entire Sample
We first test whether the two-factor Fama-French model can be used to describe the
average excess yield of all bonds in our sample. This test is relevant, because Fama and
French (1993) applied their model to realized returns of U.S. bonds, while we analyze
yields of euro-dominated bonds. We estimate the following model
Yt = α +
2∑
j=1
βjFjt + εt, εt ∼ i.i.d.(0, σ2),
where the excess yield Yt is the average bond yield (calculated over all bonds in the sample)
minus the one year euro swap rate, the slope factor F1t is defined as the 10-year swap rate
minus the 1-year swap rate of the previous day and the credit factor F2t is calculated as
the Lehman Brothers Euro-Aggregate Corporate Bond BBB sub-index minus the 10-year
euro swap rate.
The first row of Table 5.3 shows the R2 and the estimated coefficients along with their
t-values. The R2 value is high and comparable to the values reported by Fama and French
(1993). The estimated slope and credit coefficients have the expected positive sign and
are highly statistically significant. The intercept is not statistically significant, so that
the Fama-French model cannot be rejected for the entire sample.
To test our choice for approximating default-free interest rates with swap rates,
regression model (5.5.1) is estimated again, but with swap rates replaced by government
rates. So, the excess yields and the slope and credit factors are now calculated with
government yields. Our proxy for euro government rates is the Lehman Brothers Euro-
Aggregate Treasury index. The second row of Table 5.3 shows the regression results. Both
the R2 and the t-values of the slope and credit factors have decreased compared to the
model with swap rates. Moreover, the intercept is now significantly different from zero.
Therefore, the Fama-French model should be rejected in case government rates are used
as default-free rates. This empirically confirms our choice for using swap rates as proxy
for default-free interest rates instead of Treasury rates.
5.5.2 Characteristics
As recommended by Gebhardt et al. (2001), we analyze the added value of incorporating
characteristics into the model. We consider two characteristics:
• Rating: rating of the bond’s issuer at May 31, 2000: AAA, AA, A or BBB.
• Maturity: the remaining time-to-maturity of a bond, measured in years.
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Table 5.3: Fama-French regression model results
using the entire sample with either swap rates or
government rates as default-free interest rates (t-values
between parentheses)
Intercept Slope Credit R2
Swap rates 0.0371 0.785 0.173 97.9%
(1.01) (36.5) (6.66)
Government rates 0.419 0.540 0.273 95.0%
(12.4) (31.4) (5.46)
To determine whether a characteristic is important for explaining excess bond yields,
we follow the same procedure as for our liquidity proxies, as described in Section 5.3.2,
except that the null model is now the Fama-French model of the previous section. For
each characteristic i, we create portfolios and estimate the following regression model
Y ipt = α
i
p +
2∑
j=1
βijpFjt + ε
i
pt,
where the assumptions on the disturbances are equal to those in Equation (5.3.2). For the
characteristic rating, we create four portfolios: portfolio 1 contains the AAA-rated bonds,
portfolio 2 the AAs, portfolio 3 the As, and portfolio 4 the BBBs. For the characteristic
maturity, two portfolios are constructed: portfolio 1 consists of the 50% shortest bonds,
and portfolio 2 of the 50% longest bonds.11
The regression results are reported in Table 5.4. For rating, we find that the intercepts
are larger for lower ratings, although the step from AA to A is very small. All Fama-
French factor loadings are significant. The Wald test indicates that the four intercepts are
highly jointly significant. For maturity, the intercepts of the portfolios reveal that short-
maturity bonds have smaller yields than long-maturity bonds, with an average difference
of 38 bps. The null hypothesis that the two intercepts are jointly equal to zero is easily
rejected.
From these results, we conclude that the rating and maturity characteristics are
important determinants of excess yield in the euro corporate bond market. To make
the characteristics operational, we have to transform them to a numerical scale:
11The portfolios are updated every two weeks, just like in Section 5.3.2.
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Table 5.4: Regression results from the Fama-
French model estimated from portfolios based on the
rating and maturity characteristics (t-values between
parentheses). The Wald column shows the test on
the joint significance of the intercepts (p-value between
parentheses).
Intercept Slope Credit Wald R2
Rating
AAA -0.220 0.736 0.0838 946 97.2%
(8.30) (46.8) (4.40) (0.00)
AA 0.120 0.732 0.0310
(5.60) (55.8) (2.04)
A 0.122 0.856 0.295
(4.95) (59.4) (15.8)
BBB 0.453 0.824 0.435
(8.28) (24.4) (10.6)
Maturity
Short -0.135 0.635 0.165 474 98.8%
(3.09) (25.0) (5.36) (0.00)
Long 0.247 0.944 0.138
(13.6) (82.0) (10.6)
• Rating: the letters are mapped as follows: AAA=1, AA=2, A=3 and BBB=4.
Although this linearity assumption is somewhat crude, it is not uncommon in
the literature. Moreover, since our bonds are all investment grade, and the non-
linearities in S&P’s and Moody’s rating scales are especially apparent for speculative
grade ratings, we believe that the linear scale is a reasonable approximation.
• Maturity: this is already a continuous variable, and thus needs no transformation.
The value of characteristic j for the pth proxy-i portfolio on day t, denoted Cijpt in
Section 5.3.2, is calculated analogously to the liquidity variable Lipt below Equation (5.3.2).
For instance, for the characteristic maturity, Cijpt is the average maturity of all quoted
bonds in the pth proxy-i portfolio on day t, in deviation from the average maturity of all
quoted bonds on day t.
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Table 5.5: Portfolio statistics P = 2a
Yieldb Maturityc Ratingd Liquiditye
1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
Issued amount 5.33 5.09 6.47 4.64 2.20 2.10 0.65 0.20
Listed 5.26 5.01 5.68 5.11 2.27 1.66 1.00 0.00
Euro 5.28 5.13 5.94 5.14 2.20 2.08 1.00 0.00
On-the-run 5.44 5.15 6.27 5.38 2.58 2.03 1.00 0.00
Age 5.44 5.16 6.91 5.31 2.42 2.09 0.64 3.80
Missing prices 5.28 5.07 6.09 4.57 2.18 2.10 0.19 0.46
Yield volatility 5.21 5.21 6.11 5.06 2.10 2.20 0.06 0.10
Number of contributors 5.19 5.27 5.58 5.56 2.13 2.19 2.31 0.76
Yield dispersion 5.40 5.14 7.42 4.91 2.18 2.13 0.47 1.50
a Summary statistics of the two constructed portfolios using the nine liquidity indicators,
where Portfolio 1 (respectively 2) contains the bonds that are hypothesized to be most
liquid (respectively most illiquid).
b average portfolio yield
c average time-to-maturity in years
d average credit worthiness, measured on the following scale: AAA=1, AA=2, A=3,
BBB=4
e average value of the liquidity proxy
5.5.3 Summary Statistics and Correlations
For the first regression model, Equation (5.3.2), we create two portfolios for all nine
liquidity proxies. In this section, we show some summary statistics for these 18 portfolios
and the correlation between the proxies.
Table 5.5 contains several statistics, averaged over the full sample period of 602
trading days. We observe that the average yields and average liquidity proxies of
portfolio 1 (containing the hypothesized liquid bonds) and portfolio 2 (illiquid bonds)
are quite different. The yield deviations range from -29 bps (for on-the-run) to 8 bps
(for number of contributors). Except for the latter proxy, we could prematurely conclude
that the liquidity premium is negative, since portfolio 1 has a higher average yield than
portfolio 2. However, it is not correct to fully attribute the yield differences to differences
in liquidity, since the average maturity and the average rating also vary. Therefore, this
table illustrates the necessity of correcting for differences in maturity and rating.
To display the correlation between the proxies, we cannot calculate the “normal”
correlation (i.e. the Pearson correlation), because 5 out of 9 proxies do not change in
value (or only slightly) during the sample period: amount outstanding, listed and euro do
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not change at all; on-the-run alters only at new issuances; age changes only gradually.
What matters for our proxies, is that their values are used to group the bonds into a set of
liquid bonds and a set of illiquid bonds. Therefore, we propose an alternative approach to
display the “correlation” between two proxies. For each proxy i, we create two portfolios
as described in Section 5.3.2. On each day t, we calculate the average value of proxy i
over all bonds in portfolio 1 (and denote it by Li1t) and similarly for all bonds in portfolio
2 (resulting in Li2t). Then, for a second proxy j (= i), we calculate the average value of
proxy j over all bonds in portfolio 1 (denoted by Lij1t) and over all bonds in portfolio 2
(Lij2t). If proxies i and j are both capable of splitting the sample in liquid and illiquid
bonds, Li1t−Li2t and Lij1t−Lij2t should have the same sign. Hence, if we count the number
of days that this is the case, and divide by the total number of days in our sample, we get
a measure of correlation between proxies i and j. This “correlation” statistic ranges from
0% to 100%. If it equals 100%, the proxies always result in the same ordering of portfolios
1 and 2, which may be interpreted as perfect positive correlation. However, if this statistic
is equal to 0%, then the ordering of portfolios 1 and 2 is always reversed, which could
be described as perfect negative correlation. Note that the statistic is not necessarily
symmetric: the “correlation” between i and j is calculated on portfolios constructed with
proxy i, while the “correlation” between j and i uses portfolios constructed with proxy j.
Table 5.6 displays the calculated statistics for all pairs. We observe that the
“correlations” are remarkably high: 23 out of 72 proxy pairs are even equal to 100%,
while another 29 are between 90% and 100%. In fact, only 3 “correlations” are below
50%: (listed, yield volatility) equals 10%, (yield volatility, listed) equals 21%, and (yield
volatility, euro) equals 48%. Since 2 out of 3 involve the proxy listed, for which we do not
find significant results (see Table 5.7 below), these low “correlations” do not worry us.
The vast majority of the “correlations” are substantially above 50%, implying positive
relationships between the proxies.
5.5.4 Model 1
Table 5.7 displays the results of estimating model 1 for all liquidity proxies; recall from
Section 5.3.2 that the Fama-French factors have portfolio-specific coefficients and the
characteristics common coefficients. All Fama-French factor loadings are statistically
significant and have the expected positive sign. The same holds for the coefficients of the
rating and maturity characteristics (with one exception: the rating coefficient for issued
amount is insignificant at a 95% confidence level). All R2-values are around 98%.
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Except for the liquidity proxy listed, all intercept pairs are jointly statistically different
from zero at a 95% significance level, as evidenced by the p-values of the Wald statistics.
This indicates that the remaining eight proxies are indeed able to separate the bonds
in our data set into two mutually exclusive portfolios that have statistically different
yields, after controlling for differences in interest rate and credit risk. Next we look at
the portfolio intercepts themselves. If our hypotheses on the sign of the liquidity effects
are correct, the intercept of portfolio 1 should be smaller than that of portfolio 2 for all
liquidity proxies. We see that this holds for eight out of nine cases; for listed the order is
reversed, but this poses no problem, since the Wald test already indicated that for this
proxy there are no significant liquidity effects.
Another way of looking at the intercepts, is to calculate their differences αi2 − αi1,
which we interpret as the liquidity premium for proxy i. The significance of a premium
is tested with a Wald test with null hypothesis H0: α
i
2 − αi1 = 0; the test statistic is
asymptotically χ2-distributed with 1 degree of freedom. The second to last column of
Table 5.7 shows that the premiums for proxies amount outstanding and yield dispersion
are the largest with 22.9 bps and 22.5 bps, respectively, while the premiums for the other
proxies are between 13.0 and 18.8 bps. All premiums are statistically significant at the
95% confidence level.
5.5.5 Model 2
For model 2, we create four portfolios since it maximizes the power of the test for the
presence of liquidity effects; see Section 5.3.2. Unfortunately, this means we cannot
conduct the test for proxies listed, age, euro and on-the-run since they are all binary
variables (‘listed’ versus ‘not listed’; ‘young’ versus ‘old’; ‘euro’ versus ‘legacy’; ‘on-the-
run’ versus ‘off-the-run’). The summary statistics for the other five proxies are shown in
Table 5.8. Clearly, the differences between the portfolios are now larger than in Table 5.5,
since we have assigned the bonds to four size percentiles instead of two.
The regression results are displayed in Table 5.9.12 The Wald statistic that tests for the
joint significance of the intercept and the coefficient of the liquidity proxy is statistically
significant for all five proxies. So, also using model 2, we find statistical evidence of the
presence of liquidity effects in our data set. The signs of the liquidity coefficients are
positive for four out of five proxies, with number of contributors as only (statistically
insignificant) exception.
12The Fama-French factor loadings and the coefficients for the portfolio characteristic are omitted
from Table 5.9 for space considerations.
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Table 5.9: Results for model 2a
Intercept Liquidity Waldb R2
Issued amount 0.0316 0.427 259 97.9%
(1.32) (15.9) (0.00)
Missing prices 0.0894 0.343 60.8 96.3%
(3.23) (7.57) (0.00)
Yield volatility 0.0522 1.07 18.4 96.7%
(2.30) (3.43) (0.00)
Number of contributors 0.102 -0.0037 16.8 96.2%
(3.99) (0.618) (0.00)
Yield dispersion 0.0855 0.0318 27.5 97.8%
(4.26) (3.01) (0.00)
a Regression results for the Fama-French model augmented with
portfolio characteristics and a liquidity variable (see Equation (5.3.2))
estimated from four portfolios based on one of five liquidity proxies
(t-values between parentheses). The coefficients and t-values of the
Fama-French factors and the characteristics are omitted for space
considerations.
b test on the joint significance of the intercept and the coefficient of the
liquidity variable (p-value between parentheses)
5.5.6 Comparison
Table 5.10 summarizes the results of conducting the pair wise comparisons between the
liquidity proxies, as described in Section 5.3.3. For each proxy i, we count the number of
times it adds power to a model that already contains proxy j. We also count the number
of times a proxy j is subsumed if it is added to the model of proxy i. Looking at the sum
of both counts, we see that proxies yield volatility and number of contributors perform
somewhat better than the other four proxies. Since the differences are small, the test does
not yield a clear winner.
5.6 Summary
In this paper, we used the Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996) methodology to test
whether bond market liquidity is priced based on liquidity proxies: issued amount, listed,
age, missing prices, yield volatility, number of contributors, yield dispersion, euro and
on-the-run. For each liquidity proxy, we constructed mutually exclusive portfolios. The
time series of portfolio yields were subsequently used in two Fama and French (1993)
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Table 5.10: Results of the comparison testsa
Adds power Subsumes Total
Issued amount 3 1 4
Missing prices 1 2 3
Yield volatility 2 3 5
Number of contributors 2 3 5
Yield dispersion 1 2 3
a Results of the pair wise comparisons of five liquidity proxies
(see Equation (5.3.3)), where the table displays the number
of times a proxy adds explanatory power to another proxy
and the number of times a proxy subsumes another proxy.
regression models, augmented with portfolio characteristics as recommended by Gebhardt
et al. (2001), to control for differences in interest rate risk, credit risk, maturity and rating
between the portfolios. We also conducted pair wise comparisons of the liquidity proxies,
as proposed by Goldreich et al. (2002).
The results indicated that the null hypothesis of no liquidity premium should be
rejected for eight out of nine liquidity proxies. The premium between liquid and illiquid
portfolios depended on the liquidity proxy and ranged from 13 to 23 basis points. The
highest premiums were found for the proxies amount outstanding and yield dispersion.
The pairwise comparison tests point out that no proxy stands out from the rest.

Chapter 6
Estimating Commonality in Liquidity1
6.1 Introduction
Traditionally, market microstructure liquidity has focused on the liquidity characteristics
of individual securities. Recently, research attention has broadened to the analysis of
common determinants of individual security liquidity. Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyam
(2000) study commonality in liquidity for New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) listed stocks,
whereas Chordia, Sarkar and Subrahmanyam (2005) analyze common liquidity, return and
volatility patterns in the U.S. Treasury and equity markets. We apply the Chordia et al.
(2005) approach not only to the government bond and the equity markets, but also to
the corporate bond market. Furthermore, we focus on the commonality in liquidity of
euro-denominated security markets, whereas all earlier research concentrates on the U.S.
dollar security markets.
Our goal is to describe and perform statistical tests of commonality in liquidity
between euro security markets as no generally accepted theory is (yet) available. Thus
we analyze the extend that liquidity in different security markets has common factors
and consequently co-move. If these security markets display such co-movements further
research could for example focus on its potential sources.
We examine links between liquidity, return and volatility within and between three
security markets: the corporate bond market, the AAA government bond market and the
equity market. Total return and volatility of the euro-denominated corporate bond market
are proxied by the Lehman Brothers Euro-Aggregate Corporate Bond index, provided by
Lehman Brothers, Inc.2 Liquidity in this market is proxied by the average of the quoted
1This chapter is based on the paper ”Commonality in Liquidity in Euro Security Markets” by Frank
de Jong and Albert Mentink.
2We thank Lehman Brothers, Inc. for the data.
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bid-ask spreads of those bonds in the Lehman Brothers corporate bond index that are
frequently quoted by leading investment banks.
First we test the Granger causality between liquidity, total return and volatility.
Following Chordia et al. (2005) we further implement a vector autoregressive model
also using these three security characteristics. Then we calculate the impulse response
functions based on the estimated vector autoregressive model. Our two liquidity measures
are: the average quoted bid-ask spreads of each of the three markets and the average
total turnover of the equity market. Both models are implemented for our three security
markets, both on a daily and a weekly basis.
We find cross market liquidity between the euro security markets. These links
sometimes exhibit time lags. Further, liquidity, total return and volatility links between
and within euro security markets are sometimes significant. Granger causality tests
confirm these results, although this type of test is very sensitive to the number of time
lags.
The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. First, Section 6.2 gives a brief
review of the literature on commonality in liquidity. Then, in Section 6.3, we describe
our extensive data set of liquidity, total return and volatility of the euro-denominated
security markets. We then start with a preliminary data analysis in Section 6.4. Next,
we perform Granger causality tests and we apply and extend the Chordia et al. (2005)
vector autoregressive model and calculate impulse response functions. Subsequently, we
analyze the results in Section 6.6. Finally Section 6.7 summarizes this chapter.
6.2 Literature
Research on the commonality of liquidity primarily focuses on the U.S. equity markets.
Chordia et al. (2000) implement a market model approach on a sample of 1169 NYSE
stocks for the year 1992. They regress liquidity measures (quoted bid-ask spread, effective
bid-ask spread and quoted depth) of individual stocks on the aggregate, market measures
of liquidity. They find that individual and market liquidity move together. Further, they
report company size and industry components of liquidity. This common component
remains in place, even after controlling for the average dollar size of the individual
transaction, the number of trades in the stock or after accounting for individual volatility,
volume and price.
Hasbrouck and Seppi (2001) first analyze the common factors of equity returns and
order flows of the 30 Dow Jones stocks for the year 1994. They find that both equity
returns and order flows (such as number of trades and dollar volume of trades) exhibit
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common factors. Secondly, they examine commonality in liquidity measures (such as
quoted bid-ask spread, effective bid-ask spread and quoted depth) and they find that
common variation in liquidity is small.
Huberman and Halka (2001) model the time-series properties of liquidity (quantified
by quoted bid-ask spread, ratio of quoted bid-ask spread and price, depth measured in
number of shares and in U.S. dollars) using a sample of 240 NYSE stocks for the year
1996. They find that the variation over time of the four liquidity measures has a common
component. Moreover, this temporal variation is positively correlated with return and
negatively correlated with volatility.
Brockman and Chung (2002) apply the approach of Chordia et al. (2000) to a data
set consisting of 725 companies from the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong (SEHK) for the
period May 1996 to December 1999. SEHK is an order driven market, in contrast to
the NYSE specialist market in Chordia et al. (2000). They find that there exists also
commonality in liquidity in this stock market.
Pascual, Escribano and Tapia (2004) incorporate the interaction of transaction costs
and depth measured in U.S. dollars (defined as the bi-dimensionality of liquidity) using a
sample of 25 NYSE stocks for the year 1996. They find that the bi-dimensionality factors
are superior to bid-ask spreads and market depth in measuring commonality of liquidity.
Recently, Chordia et al. (2005) have estimated a vector autoregressive model for quoted
bid-ask spreads, quoted depth, returns, volatility and order flow. They apply this model
to a sample of NYSE stocks and the U.S. dollar Treasury bond market for the period
June 1991 to December 1998. They find that innovations to the stock and bond market
are significantly correlated. This result implies that commonality in both liquidity and
volatility exists in these security markets. We adopt this approach and adjust it to meet
the requirements of our data set.
Thus, in most empirical literature there is (some) evidence of commonality in liquidity.
This chapter extends the Chordia et al. (2005) approach by adding the corporate bond
market. Moreover, this analysis uses the euro-denominated security markets, instead of
the U.S. dollar security markets.
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6.3 Data
6.3.1 Corporate Bond Market
For the corporate bond market we only focus on bonds that are part of the Lehman
Brothers Euro-Aggregate Corporate Bond index.3 We collect the daily and weekly
excess total return of this index, defined as the return of the indicated index over the
corresponding government benchmark for the period September 2002 to September 2003.
We choose the excess total return instead of the total return in order to focus on the
credit part of the corporate bond return.
Based on the monthly rebalancing frequency of bond indices, the characteristics of all
index bonds are also obtained from Lehman Brothers, Inc. over the same period on a
monthly basis. One of these characteristics is the Lehman Brothers’ index rating (Lehman
Brothers, Inc (1998) describes the procedure to obtain a Lehman Brothers’ rating using
the ratings from the major rating agencies). This allows us to follow the rating dynamics
of all bonds.
Bloomberg L.P. provides a single trading platform for corporate bonds where many
investment banks publish their bid and ask quotes and associated trading sizes on the
same corporate bond at the same time. A bond investor can trade a bond against the
quoted price and size by simply clicking on the desired quote. These bid and ask quotes are
continuously updated. This competition between dealers on the Bloomberg L.P. platform,
the desire of investors to trade with a dealer against the highest bid or the lowest ask
quote and the knowledge by all dealers and investors of quotes of other dealers cause
dealers to adjust their quotes following the quote adjustments of other dealers (even if no
transactions have taken place). The depth of the quotes in this market, defined as the sum
of the quoted amount associated with the bid quote and the quoted amount associated
with the ask quote, equals around two million euro. In case an investor wants to trade
larger amounts, these bid and ask quotes are used as an indication of the price, not as a
tradable quote.
We collect from Bloomberg L.P. bid and ask quotes from Credit Suisse, Deutsche
Bank, Lehman Brothers, Morgan Stanley and Nomura, for the period September 2002
3Bonds have to fulfill the following index criteria before they enter this index: investment grade,
denominated in euro (or one of the legacy currencies), fixed coupon, at least one year to maturity, an
issued amount of at least 300 million euro, not convertible, no floating rate notes, no perpetual notes, no
warrants, no indexed bonds, no structured products, no German Schuldscheine (Lehman Brothers, Inc
(1998)).
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to September 2003, on a daily and weekly basis.4 The selection of these five investment
banks follows from the fact that we have access to their quotes. They adequately represent
the Bloomberg L.P. trading platform as described above. If available, we record the last
bid and ask quotes of the day, London closing. We define the (best) bid-ask spread as the
best (or lowest) ask quote minus the best (or highest) bid quote.5
Negative best bid-ask spreads can occur due to non-synchronous quoting between
banks and differences in quoted depth between banks. A negative bid-ask spread could
imply an arbitrage opportunity. These negative bid-ask spreads are however close to zero
and the quoted depth is limited. Furthermore, this opportunity does not take into account
the trading costs involved for the bond investor. In case we encounter a negative bid-ask
spread, we first calculate the mean bid quote and the mean ask quote and then we remove
the quote (highest bid or lowest ask) that deviates most from its associated mean and
next we recalculate the best bid-ask spread. In this way, we remove the quote outliers.
6.3.2 Government Bond Market
Lehman Brothers, Inc. also provides the total return of the AAA Euro-Treasury Bond
index. This index approximates the total return and volatility of the euro government
bond market. We obtain these data for the same period, September 2002 to September
2003, and with the same frequencies, daily and weekly, as the corporate bond index.
The liquidity in this bond market is measured by the bid and ask quotes of the
cheapest-to-deliver bonds associated with the Bund future.6 We download the daily and
weekly closing quotes, generated by the same five investment banks as above, from the
Bloomberg L.P. trading platform for the period September 2002 to September 2003. We
use the bonds associated with the (ten-year) Bund future as this future is one of the
most liquid bond futures of the Euro-zone bond market. So, with respect to both bond
markets, market return and volatility is measured using bond indices, whereas liquidity
is measured using a (small, frequently quoted) part of the index.
The depth of the Bloomberg L.P. trading platform regarding this government bond is
much larger than that of the corporate bond market and ranges approximately between
4We thank Bloomberg L.P. for the data. Starting September 2002, we obtain enough quotes to make
our analyzes possible. Next to Bloomberg L.P., MarketAxess also offers a credit bonds trading platform
for both investment banks and institutional bond investors. Although there is no detailed publicly
available information about the market share of each company, these two systems are widely recognized
as leading in their field.
5In the appendix we analyze the average characteristics of the frequently quoted versus the not
frequently quoted corporate bonds.
6We thank J.P. Morgan for providing these data.
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50 and 100 million euro. Next to Bloomberg L.P., TradeWeb and MTS Group each also
offer a trading platform for euro government bonds for investment banks and institutional
bond investors.
6.3.3 Equity Market
We apply the Dow Jones Euro StoxxTM 50 equity index as our proxy of the Euro-zone
equity market. This index consists of 50 blue chip companies in the Euro-zone countries.
We download from the StoxxTM web site the index total returns and the index components
for the period September 2002 to September 2003, on a daily and weekly basis.7
We download from Bloomberg L.P. the best bid quotes, the best ask quotes and the
total turnovers of the index components from their primary exchange at their close. The
total turnover is defined as the market value of the traded stocks during a day (single
counted). This measure approximates the daily total depth of a stock in its primary stock
market. Further, we also download the year-end equity market value of these companies
in euro in order to be able to calculate market weighted time series.
6.4 Preliminary Data Analysis
6.4.1 Daily Data
Now we take a closer look at our data. Table 6.1 reports the mean, standard deviation
and median of two liquidity measures, bid-ask spread BAS and total turnover TTO,
and the total returns of the euro corporate bond market CBM, government bond market
GBM and equity market EQM, based on daily observations. The corporate bond bid-ask
spreads have a comparable mean and median. The absolute bid-ask spread is defined
as the best ask quote minus the best bid quote, whereas the relative bid-ask spread is
defined as the absolute best bid-ask spread divided by the best mid-quote. Further, the
corporate bond market mean excess total return is positive. The average rating of these
corporate bonds ranges between A2 and A3 in the sample period. With respect to all
three security markets returns we define the daily volatility VOL as the absolute value of
the daily return (Gallant, Rossi and Tauchen (1992)).
Table 6.2 displays the correlations between the liquidity measures and the total returns
of the three security markets. In general these correlations are low, i.e. lower than
0.20 in absolute value. There are two exceptions to this pattern, first the positive
7We thank Stoxx Ltd. for the data.
Section 6.4 · Preliminary Data Analysis 131
Table 6.1: Summary statistics, 269 days
Mean Standard Median
deviation
Corporate bond market
Bid-ask spread (absolute and market weighted)b 29.03 1.90 28.77
Bid-ask spread (absolute and equally weighted)b 29.63 1.55 29.47
Bid-ask spread (relative and market weighted)a 27.55 1.83 27.29
Bid-ask spread (relative and equally weighted)a 28.16 1.62 27.91
Market total excess returna 0.93 5.21 0.92
Government bond market
Bid-ask spread (absolute)b 2.21 0.83 2.00
Bid-ask spread (relative)a 2.07 0.78 1.88
Market total returna 2.92 24.53 5.43
Equity market
Bid-ask spread (absolute and market weighted)b 6.43 3.17 5.90
Bid-ask spread (absolute and equally weighted)b 6.56 3.14 6.00
Bid-ask spread (relative and market weighted)a 16.93 6.33 16.07
Bid-ask spread (relative and equally weighted)a 18.18 6.04 17.10
Total turnover (market weighted)c 21.81 5.86 21.30
Total turnover (equally weighted)c 17.32 5.03 17.00
Market total returna 0.05 218.80 -10.41
a in basis points
b in euro cents
c in billions of euro
correlation between the corporate bond market total excess return RTNCBM and the
equity market total return RTNEQM of 0.30 and secondly the negative correlation between
the government bond market total return RTNGBM and the equity market total return
RTNEQM of −0.57. The bid-ask spread correlations are close to zero.
The correlations between the equally and market weighted liquidity measures are very
high. The same applies to the correlations between the absolute and relative liquidity
measures. Consequently, changing absolute to relative and/or market weighted to equally
weighted should not really alter our results. In our analyzes we use absolute and market
weighted average liquidity measures (further we omit the description average when we use
the two liquidity measures).
132 Estimating Commonality in Liquidity · Chapter 6
Table 6.2: Correlation matrix, 269 days
BASCBM RTNCBM BASGBM RTNGBM BASEQM TTOEQM RTNEQM
BASCBM 1.00
RTNCBM -0.01 1.00
BASGBM -0.02 0.04 1.00
RTNGBM -0.13 -0.19 -0.09 1.00
BASEQM 0.02 -0.07 -0.06 0.07 1.00
TTOEQM 0.13 0.03 -0.01 -0.16 0.01 1.00
RTNEQM 0.14 0.30 0.14 -0.57 -0.09 0.07 1.00
6.4.2 Weekly Data
We now focus on the weekly frequency instead of the daily frequency. The weekly total
return is calculated for each Friday, the weekly volatility VOL equals the sample standard
deviation of (maximal) five trading days ending on a Friday, the bid-ask spread equals the
average of the bid-ask spreads of (maximal) five trading days, again ending on a Friday
and the total turnover is de sum of the daily total turnover during the whole trading
week, ending on a Friday.
The Figures 6.1-6.3 display the bid-ask spreads of the corporate bond, government
bond and equity markets, with on the horizontal axis the sample period and on the
vertical axis the bid-ak spread in euro cents. The corporate bond bid-ask spread ranges
between 26 and 32 euro cents, whereas the government bond bid-ask spread varies between
only 1.5 and 3.6 euro cents with a spike at the end of November 2002. The equity bid-ask
spread has a maximum 13 of and a minimum of 3 euro cents and a spike at the end of
December 2002. So, the government bond market has the lowest bid-ask spread followed
by the equity market and the corporate bond market.
Table 6.3 displays the mean, standard deviation and median of the two liquidity
measures and the total returns of the three security markets, based on weekly observations.
Table 6.4 reports the correlations between the liquidity measures and the total returns
of the three security markets. Typically these correlations are higher, in absolute value,
than those in Table 6.2, for example the corporate bond market and the equity market
bid-ask spreads are positively correlated, whereas the government bond market and the
equity market bid-ask spreads are negatively correlated.
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Figure 6.1: Average corporate bond market bid-ask spreads, weekly data
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6.4.3 Corporate Bond Market Average Bid-Ask Spreads
In our vector autoregressive model in Section 6.5.2 we analyze the links in liquidity, return
and volatility between and within our three security markets. Before we can make this
type of analysis we want to adjust the corporate bond bid-ask time series. We adjust these
time series because the characteristics of the bonds in the sample changes considerably over
the sample period. For example, corporate bond bid-ask spreads typically widen (narrow)
as the bond maturity becomes longer (shorter). We want to remove such exogenous
factors from the bid-ask spread time series. If we do not correct bid-ask spreads for this
relationship, spread widening might be interpreted as diminishing liquidity, whereas the
true cause is longer bond maturity.
We adjust the corporate bond bid-ask spread with the help of the average bond
characteristics: age, issued amount and maturity. We leave out coupon and rating from
this adjustment because these characteristics are more or less constant during our sample
period. The ordinary least squares regression equation reads:
BASCBMt = α + β1AGEt + β2AMTt + β3MATt + εt, (6.1)
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Figure 6.2: Government bond market bid-ask spreads, weekly data
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with the corporate bond bid-ask spread BASCBMt , the adjustment variables age AGEt (in
years), issued amount AMTt (in billions of euro) and maturity MATt (in years), with the
intercept α, the slopes βi and the regression disturbance εt, i = 1, 2, 3, t = 1, 2, . . . , 269 or
56. Henceforth we use the residuals as the daily or weekly corporate bond bid-ask spread.
We also test the null hypothesis: β1 = β2 = β3 = 0 with the help of a Wald test. This
null hypothesis is rejected at all confidence levels using daily data. The β coefficients are
statistically different from zero at the 2.5% level using weekly data. Thus, the Wald test
indicates that the three adjustment variables are jointly significant.
Table 6.5 displays the results of regression Equation (6.1) for both daily and weekly
data. The intercept is always positive and significant at all confidence levels. The
age coefficient is positive and significant at the 5% confidence level in case of the daily
data. This indicates that bid-ask spreads widen as bonds get older. The issued amount
coefficient does not differ statistically from zero. This may be explained by the fact that
all liquid/frequently quoted corporate bonds have a large issued amount. Further, the
maturity coefficient is positive and significant at the 2.5% level. Finally, the (adjusted)
R2 is always low.
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Figure 6.3: Average equity market bid-ask spreads, weekly data
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6.5 Models
6.5.1 Granger Causality Tests
An instructive way of looking at the links between and within security markets is the
Granger causality test. This test is defined as:
M1t = α0 +
m∑
i=1
αiM1t−i +
m∑
j=1
βjM2t−j + εt (6.2)
where M1t and M2t  {BASCBMt , RTNCBMt , V OLCBMt , BASGBMt , RTNGBMt , V OLGBMt ,
BASEQMt , TTO
EQM
t , RTN
EQM
t , V OL
EQM
t } and M1t = M2t, with m = 1, 2, . . . , 5, t =
1, . . . , n, n = 269 or n = 56 and the white noise disturbance εt (Enders (1995)).
The null hypothesis states that M2t does not Granger cause M1t in Equation (6.2):
H0 : β1 = . . . = βm = 0. For example, we examine whether the bid-ask spread of
corporate bonds (M2t = BAS
CBM
t ) Granger causes the equity returns (M1t = RTN
EQM
t ),
and vice versa. Under the null hypothesis, the test statistic follows a F -distribution with
m numerator degrees of freedom and n− (2 ∗m + 1) denominator degrees of freedom.
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Table 6.3: Summary statistics, 56 weeks
Mean Standard Median
deviation
Corporate bond market
Bid-ask spread (absolute and market weighted)b 29.01 1.21 29.00
Bid-ask spread (absolute and equally weighted)b 29.65 1.10 29.60
Bid-ask spread (relative and market weighted)a 27.52 1.21 27.49
Bid-ask spread (relative and equally weighted)a 28.17 1.24 27.99
Market total excess returna 4.58 14.52 5.99
Government bond market
Bid-ask spread (absolute)b 2.20 0.39 2.11
Bid-ask spread (relative)a 2.07 0.37 2.00
Market total returna 14.22 57.94 22.58
Equity market
Bid-ask spread (absolute and market weighted)b 6.51 2.40 6.26
Bid-ask spread (absolute and equally weighted)b 6.65 2.43 6.40
Bid-ask spread (relative and market weighted)a 17.08 4.40 16.09
Bid-ask spread (relative and equally weighted)a 18.20 4.30 17.49
Total turnover (market weighted)c 1.04 0.23 1.0505
Total turnover (equally weighted)c 0.83 0.19 0.8253
Market total returna -8.79 380.44 35.23
a in basis points
b in euro cents
c in billions of euro
6.5.2 Vector Autoregressive Model
Now we analyze the links in liquidity, return and volatility between and within our
three security markets. Chordia et al. (2005) give examples of these links, such as:
liquidity affects returns, but also return affects liquidity (loss aversion results in (lack of)
trading depending on return). Liquidity between security markets can exhibit leading,
simultaneous and lagging common movements, for example shifting expected returns in
one market at the expense of an other market can cause trading and thus liquidity.
We implement a vector autoregressive (further VAR) model that captures both the
links between and within markets. Our VAR model consists of (3 ∗ 3 + 1) equations,
the quoted bid-ask spread, total return and volatility of each security market and the
equity market total turnover. All time series are stationary according to the augmented
Dickey-Fuller test at all confidence levels. The VAR model reads:
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Table 6.4: Correlation matrix, 56 weeks
BASCBM RTNCBM BASGBM RTNGBM BASEQM TTOEQM RTNEQM
BASCBM 1.00
RTNCBM 0.05 1.00
BASGBM -0.03 0.19 1.00
RTNGBM -0.32 0.00 -0.14 1.00
BASEQM 0.14 -0.27 -0.22 0.08 1.00
TTOEQM 0.24 -0.15 0.09 -0.28 -0.15 1.00
RTNEQM 0.45 0.19 0.26 -0.61 -0.08 -0.01 1.00
Table 6.5: Regression results from Equation (6.1)
269 days 56 weeks
Intercept α 0.1857 (3.46) 0.2194 (3.07)
Age β1 0.0295 (1.73) 0.0158 (0.63)
Issued Amount β2 0.0074 (0.54) 0.0018 (0.11)
Maturity β3 0.0076 (2.53) 0.0070 (2.21)
R2 0.06 0.14
Adjusted R2 0.05 0.09
CBMt = φ1 +
m∑
j=1
θ1jCBMt−j +
m∑
j=1
π1jGBMt−j +
m∑
j=1
τ1jEQMt−j + ε1t (6.3)
GBMt = φ2 +
m∑
j=1
θ2jCBMt−j +
m∑
j=1
π2jGBMt−j +
m∑
j=1
τ2jEQMt−j + ε2t (6.4)
EQMt = φ3 +
m∑
j=1
θ3jCBMt−j +
m∑
j=1
π3jGBMt−j +
m∑
j=1
τ3jEQMt−j + ε3t, (6.5)
with
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CBMt =
⎡
⎢⎣
BASCBMt
RTNCBMt
V OLCBMt
⎤
⎥⎦ (6.6)
GBMt =
⎡
⎢⎣
BASGBMt
RTNGBMt
V OLGBMt
⎤
⎥⎦ (6.7)
EQMt =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
BASEQMt
TTOEQMt
RTNEQMt
V OLEQMt
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ , (6.8)
where the intercepts are the (3×1) column vectors φ1 and φ2 and the (4×1) column
vector φ3, the slopes are (3×1) column vectors θij, πij, τij and the (4×1) column vectors
θ3j, π3j, τ3j, with i = 1, 2, j = 1, . . . ,m. The disturbances are the (3×1) column vectors ε1t
and ε2t and the (4×1) column vector ε3t, with t = 1, 2, . . . , 269 (days) or 56 (weeks). Each
element in these disturbances vectors is a white noise process and they may be correlated.
The VAR model is estimated using ordinary least squares equation by equation. Further,
the number of time lags m is derived by first estimating the VAR model for different values
of m and then selecting m associated with the lowest value of the Akaike information
criterion (Enders (1995) and Verbeek (2000)).
The VAR model and the Granger causality test are related. In order to show this we
take the first of the three equations of Equation (6.3), with τ11j = 0 (the first element of
τ1j) and j = 1, . . . ,m. This gives:
BASCBMt = φ11 +
m∑
j=1
θ11jBAS
CBM
t−j +
m∑
j=1
π11jBAS
GBM
t−j + ε11t (6.9)
with φ11, θ11j and π11j as the first elements of the column vectors φ1, θ1j and π1j. This
equation is comparable to equation (6.2), with M1t = BAS
CBM
t and M2t = BAS
GBM
t .
Section 6.6 · Results 139
Impulse Response Functions
We calculate the impulse response (IR) functions based on the estimated parameters of
our VAR model above. These IR functions follow the reaction of current and future values
of liquidity, return and volatility to a positive one standard deviation shock in one of the
disturbances in Equations (6.3)-(6.8). For example: the ε11,t (the first element of vector
ε1t) increases with one standard deviation and consequently BAS
CBM
t increases with the
same amount as well at t. Furthermore, the values of, for example, other liquidity may
also react depending on the VAR model structure. These disturbances are often correlated
making the IR function interpretation less straightforward. Usually this is solved by a
Cholesky decomposition that generates a diagonal covariance matrix of the disturbances
(Enders (1995) and Verbeek (2000)).
6.6 Results
6.6.1 Granger Causality Tests
Table 6.6 only presents the results of the Granger causality tests where the null hypothesis
of no Granger causality cannot be rejected at the 10% level of significance. The upper
half of the table reports the results associated with the daily data, whereas the lower
half contains the results associated with the weekly data. Thus, there are less significant
Granger causalities using weekly data than using daily data. The column with the header
”1” contains the βm coefficients of Equation (6.2), with m = 1. The ”” sign in the four
columns with the headers 2, 3, 4, 5 indicate that this null hypothesis cannot be rejected
at the same level of confidence for longer time lags m = 2, 3, 4, 5.
In total we calculate 2 ∗ 90 Granger causality tests using Equation (6.2). Looking
at Table 6.6 only few of these Granger causalities are actually statistically significant.
Chordia et al. (2005) also find this result. Using daily data, we find that BASGBM
Granger causes V OLEQM and vice versa. Three links indicate commonality in liquidity:
BASGBM Granger causes BASCBM , BASEQM Granger causes BASCBM and BASEQM
Granger causes BASGBM . Using weekly data, we also find commonality in liquidity:
BASCBM Granger causes BASEQM and BASCBM Granger causes TTOEQM .
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Table 6.6: Results from the Granger causality test in
Equation (6.2), with the number of time lags m and the
indication of the 10% level of significance ””.
m
1 2 3 4 5
Daily data
BASGBM BASCBM +   
BASGBM RTNEQM +
BASGBM V OLEQM +
RTNGBM RTNCBM +   
V OLGBM RTNGBM −   
V OLGBM RTNEQM +  
BASEQM BASCBM +
BASEQM BASGBM −
BASEQM RTNEQM +
RTNEQM Granger causes BASCBM + 
RTNEQM TTOEQM −
V OLEQM BASGBM −
V OLEQM RTNCBM +    
V OLEQM V OLGBM −
BASCBM V OLCBM + 
BASCBM V OLEQM +    
RTNCBM BASEQM −
RTNCBM TTOEQM − 
V OLCBM RTNCBM − 
Weekly data
V OLGBM BASEQM +  
V OLGBM V OLEQM +
BASCBM BASEQM +    
BASCBM Granger causes TTOEQM −
RTNCBM BASGBM +
RTNCBM RTNEQM +  
V OLCBM V OLEQM +    
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6.6.2 Vector Autoregressive Model
Impulse Response Functions, Daily Data
We calculate three series of IR functions with respect to shocks in the bid-ask spreads.
Each figure displays the IR functions and their 95% confidence bands, with on the
horizontal axis the number of days, starting with the impulse day, and on the vertical axis
the change in the liquidity measures, total returns or volatilities of each security market.
The units of the liquidity measures on the vertical axis correspond to those that are used
for the absolute and market weighted liquidity measures in Table 6.1 and volatility is
measured in the same units as return, with one exception: TTO is measured in millions.
The number of time lags in this model equals one, m = 1.
Figure 6.4 reports the reaction of liquidity, return and volatility to the shock in the
government bond bid-ask spread BASGBMt at day t = 1. The top left graph shows the
positive one standard deviation shock of BASGBMt of approximately 1 euro cent. The
effects of the shock on its future values vanish after only one day. Both the equity market
bid-ask spread BASEQMt and the corporate bond market bid-ask spread BAS
CBM
t show
a small negative reaction of −0.4 euro cent at t = 2 and −0.1 euro cent at day t = 1.
The total turnover of the equity market does not show any reaction. Thus, there is some
commonality in liquidity between euro security markets, sometimes with a time lag of one
day. Chordia et al. (2005) also find some commonality in liquidity for U.S. dollar security
markets.
The government bond return RTNGBMt is negative at day t = 1: −2 basis points
(further bps), whereas the equity market return RTNEQMt and the corporate bond market
return RTNCBMt give a positive response of around 30 bps at t = 1 and 0.4 bps at t = 2.
Finally, the government bond market volatility V OLGBMt and the equity market volatility
V OLEQMt show a small increase at day t = 2. In contrast, the corporate bond volatility
V OLCBMt decreases at the impulse day. Looking at all IR functions this shock and its
reactions all vanish completely after five days.
The Figures 6.5 and 6.6 can be interpreted in the same way as we interpret Figure
6.4. Figure 6.5 reports the effects of the one standard deviation shock of around 3 euro
cents to BASEQMt . BAS
GBM
t and BAS
CBM
t display a negative reaction at day t = 2 and
day t = 1 respectively. TTOEQMt remains unchanged. So, again there is some evidence of
commonality in liquidity. Total return and volatility react immediately and/or with a lag
of one day. Figure 6.6 displays the effects of the one standard deviation shock of around
2 euro cents to BASCBMt . The bid-ask spreads of the other two security markets also
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Figure 6.4: IR functions to a one standard deviation shock in BASGBMt , daily data
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increase with a time lag of one day and commonality in liquidity seems again to exist.
Return and volatility also respond, again often with one time lag.
Impulse Response Functions, Weekly Data
We now repeat the IR functions analyzes of shocks to the bid-ask spreads using weekly
data instead of daily data. The Figures 6.7-6.9 display these IR functions with on the
horizontal axis the number of weeks, starting with the impulse week, and once more on the
vertical axis the change in the liquidity measures, returns or volatilities of each security
market. The units of the liquidity measures correspond to the absolute and market
weighted liquidity measures in Table 6.3, with the exception of TTO that is measured in
millions of euro. Again, the number of time lags equals one.
These figures also demonstrate (some) commonality in liquidity as a bid-ask spread
shock impacts the other two bid-ask spreads. These reactions sometimes have a time lag.
Further, total turnover, return and volatility also respond to these bid-ask spread shocks
at the impulse week or one week later most of the time. All these IR functions show
convergence after approximately ten weeks. In general, these IR functions do not exhibit
exactly the same patterns as the IR functions based on daily data.
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Figure 6.5: IR functions to a one standard deviation shock in BASEQMt , daily data
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Sensitivity Analysis
In all IR function analyzes we follow the ordering according to the most developed security
market to the less developed security market: government bond market (BASGBMt
RTNGBMt V OL
GBM
t ), equity market (BAS
EQM
t TTO
EQM
t RTN
EQM
t V OL
EQM
t ) and
corporate bond market ( BASCBMt RTN
CBM
t V OL
CBM
t ). Changing this ordering could
alter the results in Subsection 6.6.2.
The upper half of Table 6.7 reports the correlations between the disturbances in
Equations (6.3)-(6.8). Using daily data, these correlations are very low, i.e. they are
lower than 0.20 in absolute value, with only four exceptions. Therefore, the IR functions
should not be very sensitive to alterations in the ordering of liquidity, return and volatility
in the three security markets. Using weekly data, as displayed at the bottom half of Table
6.7, shows however that the correlations between the VAR model disturbances are high.
So, altering the ordering could alter our results.
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Figure 6.6: IR functions to a one standard deviation shock in BASCBMt , daily data
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6.7 Summary
Recently, market microstructure research has broadened to the analysis of commonality
in liquidity in U.S. dollar equity and Treasury markets. We extend this line of research
to the corporate bond, government bond and equity markets. Moreover, we analyze the
euro-denominated security markets instead of the U.S. dollar security markets. We apply
the Chordia et al. (2005) VAR approach and run impulse response functions and we also
implement Granger causality tests. These statistical tests are implemented using both
daily and weekly data for the period September 2002 to September 2003.
We find that commonality in liquidity between the three euro security markets indeed
exists, sometimes with a time lag of one day or week. Furthermore, links between liquidity
and total returns and volatility within and between euro security markets can also be
significant. Granger causality tests support these results, although this type of test is
very sensitive to the number of time lags. Both the VAR model and impulse response
functions and the Granger causality tests results depend however on the data frequency.
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Figure 6.7: IR functions to a one standard deviation shock in BASGBMt , weekly data
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Figure 6.8: IR functions to a one standard deviation shock in BASEQMt , weekly data
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Figure 6.9: IR functions to a one standard deviation shock in BASCBMt , weekly data
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Appendix
6.A Quoted versus Not Quoted Corporate Bonds
Here we analyze the average characteristics of the frequently quoted versus the not
frequently quoted corporate bonds as this chapter introduces a new corporate bond data
set.
We define a frequently quoted bond as a bond that is quoted at least 15 times by a
bank and by at least three (out of five) banks in total in a given month. So, a bond must
be quoted at least 3 ∗ 15 times by three banks during a month before it is marked as a
frequently quoted bond for that month. Following the monthly index rebalancing we select
the one-month period. We find that only a very small percentage of the euro corporate
bonds is actually frequently quoted on Bloomberg L.P. according to our definition.8 The
monthly average total number of bonds in the Lehman Brothers Corporate Bond index
equals 1273, whereas the monthly average number of frequently quoted bonds equals only
113. Thus only about 9% of the index bonds is quoted frequently. The same situation
applies to the U.S. dollar corporate bond market as observed by Gehr and Martell (1992).
We compare the characteristics of the frequently quoted bonds versus the characteris-
tics of not frequently quoted bonds. To make this comparison possible, we first split the
entire euro corporate bond market into a frequently quoted (FQ) and a not frequently
quoted (NFQ) part (the remaining part of the market). Then, we compare the average
of frequently quoted bonds characteristics xiFQ t, with the corresponding average of not
frequently quoted bonds characteristics xiNFQ t, with t  {September 2002, October 2002,
. . . , August 2003, September 2003} and i  {age9 (in years), coupon (in euro), issued
amount (in billions of euro), maturity (in years), rating10 and equity market value (in
billions of euro)}. We test the null hypothesis (Madsen and Moeschberger (1986)):
8The number of frequently quoted bonds does not depend on this minimum amount of 15 quotes.
Typically, a bond is quoted by a bank at all trading days during a month or not at all. The number of
quoting banks however does have a large impact on the number of quoted bonds. Increasing the minimum
number of three banks to four banks reduces the number of liquid bonds significantly.
9Age is defined as the time elapsed since issuance.
10Following Lehman Brothers, Inc (1998) we convert the index ratings as follows: AAA=1, AA1=2,
. . . , BAA2, BAA3=10. Thus a higher number implies a lower rating.
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H i0t : x
i
FQ t = x
i
NFQ t, (6.A.1)
using the test statistic:
Cit =
√√√√√√√√√
( ∑
j{FQ, NFQ}
nijt(x
i
jt − xit)2
)
( ∑
j{FQ, NFQ}
nijt∑
k=1
(xijtk − xijt)2
)
/N it − 2
, (6.A.2)
with the entire market of both frequently quoted and not frequently quoted bonds
associated with characteristic i in month t N it , the number of frequently quoted
bonds associated with characteristic i in month t niFQ t, the number of not frequently
quoted bonds associated with characteristic i in month t niNFQ t, the market average of
characteristic i in month t xit and characteristic i of a bond k (frequently quoted or not
frequently quoted) in month t xijtk. Under H
i
0t, this test statistic follows a F -distribution
with 1 numerator degree of freedom and N it − 2 denominator degrees of freedom.
Table 6.8 reports the monthly and total period average value of age, coupon, issued
amount, maturity, rating and number of all frequently quoted and not frequently quoted
bonds and the average value of the equity market value and the number of listed frequently
quoted and listed not frequently quoted bonds for the period September 2002 to September
2003. The equity market value is only available for bonds issued by listed companies.
Consequently, we differentiate between the number of all bonds and the number of bonds
issued by listed companies.
This table shows that the average age of frequently quoted bonds is always lower
than its not frequently quoted counterpart, at all confidence levels. In most months,
this difference equals approximately two years. So, the frequently quoted bonds are
younger than their not frequently quoted counterpart. This follows from the fact that
most corporate bonds quickly end up in institutional buy-and-hold portfolios after their
issuance and therefore disappear from the corporate bond market (see also Chapter 5).
The monthly and the total period average coupon of the frequently quoted bonds are
significantly higher than the monthly and total period average coupon of not frequently
quoted bonds at the 5% confidence level and at all levels respectively. The average
higher coupon coincides with the longer average maturity and the average lower rating of
frequently quoted versus not frequently quoted bonds.
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The average issued amount of frequently quoted bonds is larger than that of not
frequently quoted bonds all the time, at all confidence levels. This difference is roughly
one billion euro. Issued amount is often used as an indirect liquidity characteristic (in
contrast to the direct liquidity measure bid-ask spread), where higher issued amounts
indicate higher liquidity. This is in line with the results in this table (see also Chapter 5).
The average maturity of frequently quoted bonds is always longer than the average
maturity of not frequently quoted bonds and statistically significant at the 10% level
for the period March 2003 to September 2003. The average rating of frequently quoted
bonds is significantly lower than that of not frequently quoted bonds for all months at all
significance levels. The number of frequently quoted bonds remains very low compared
to the number of not frequently quoted bonds, although the number increases in time.
The average equity market value of the issuers of the frequently quoted bonds is larger
than that of the issuers of not frequently quoted bonds. This difference is statistically
significant for the months March 2003 to September 2003 and for the total period at the
5% level of significance and at all significance levels respectively.
Thus the characteristics of the frequently quoted part of the euro denominated
corporate bond market do not correspond to those of the corporate bond index. In general,
the frequently quoted part has a lower average age, higher coupon, larger issued amount,
longer maturity, lower rating and higher equity market value than its not frequently quoted
counterpart.
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Chapter 7
Summary
In this thesis, we started in Chapter 2 with a description of the Dutch government and
corporate bond markets. Subsequently, we implemented and analyzed some empirical
models of corporate bonds, particularly euro corporate bonds, where Part I (Chapters 3
and 4) concentrated on credit risk and Part II (Chapters 5 and 6) focused on liquidity
risk of corporate bonds.
Chapter 2 discussed the changes of the small market for Dutch bonds after the
introduction of the euro on January 1, 1999. After this event, the Dutch government had
to find ways to improve the liquidity of sovereign debt as national monetary policy and
currency differences between euro-zone countries disappeared. The euro also influenced
Dutch corporate bond issuers, who have become part of a growing euro-denominated
corporate bond market. In this newly established bond market, a company’s home country
has become less important than it’s rating and sector. The investor base of both Dutch
government bonds and corporate bonds has become more internationally oriented as well.
So, it is clear that both issuers and investors have been affected by the introduction of
the euro. One common ground for issuers and investors are the OTC bond markets.
Also, there have been changes to the Dutch financial supervision regime, since Dutch
supervision has moved from a largely sector-oriented regime, to one that is more cross-
sectional based. Finally, rating agencies also have an impact through their assessment of
Dutch government debt and corporate bonds.
Chapter 3 empirically compared several pricing methods for rating-triggered step-
up coupon bonds. European telecom companies have issued these bonds in order to
compensate bond investors for losses in the event of rating downgrades. If this rating
deteriorates and hits a predefined level, the step-up coupon is triggered and the coupon
increases with a predefined number of basis points. Risk-neutral transition probabilities
were applied using the Jarrow et al. (1997) (JLT) framework to value these rating-triggered
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step-up bonds. For comparison purposes, Chapter 3 also valued step-up bonds using
historical probabilities and plain vanilla bonds comparable to step-up bonds save for the
step-up feature. We found that the market seems to value telecom step-up bonds, bearing
coupons that make a single step-up after the rating hits the trigger level, according to the
JLT model. Furthermore, the market appears to value step-up bonds, bearing coupons
that step up every time a rating hits a trigger level, as plain vanilla bonds. Market
premiums of the step-up feature are much more volatile than the JLT and historical
premiums. As expected, the JLT model in all cases approximates the market premiums
better than the historical valuation method. Finally, most step-up bonds offer protection
in the form of lower price volatility. However, step-up bonds do not offer superior returns
to an investor in case of rating downgrades or negative outlooks.
Chapter 4 demonstrated that minimizing credit portfolio Conditional Value-at-Risk
using the CreditMetrics model generates portfolios that are less risky than a fully
diversified portfolio. At the same time, the expected return remains at least the same.
CreditMetrics simulates credit bond portfolio distributions and calculates credit bond
portfolio risks. We found that a portfolio manager should be careful in carrying out
the trades as suggested by the ”optimal” portfolio. Only one or two bonds dominate
optimal portfolios. Even when transaction costs are introduced this remains the case.
Moreover, the composition of such an optimal portfolio is very sensitive to small changes
in the expected forward price of its main constituents. However, portfolio optimization
can be used in combination with some common sense restrictions, such as maximum
bond holdings and categorization of bonds using their main characteristics, to produce
portfolios that have both a lower risk and higher return than a fully diversified portfolio.
We also improved the portfolio by replacing the dominant bond in the optimal portfolio
by similar bonds.
Chapter 5 tested whether bond market liquidity is priced using liquidity proxies:
issued amount, listed, age, missing prices, yield volatility, number of contributors, yield
dispersion, euro and on-the-run. For each liquidity proxy, we constructed mutually
exclusive portfolios. The time series of portfolio yields were subsequently used in two Fama
and French (1993) regression models, augmented with additional portfolio characteristics
to control for differences in interest rate risk, credit risk, maturity and rating between
the portfolios. We also conducted pair wise comparisons of the liquidity proxies. We
found that the null hypothesis of no liquidity premium should be rejected for eight out of
nine liquidity proxies. The premium between liquid and illiquid portfolios depends on the
liquidity proxy and ranges from 13 to 23 basis points. The highest premiums are found
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for the proxies amount outstanding and yield dispersion. The pair wise comparison tests
point out that no proxy stands out from the rest.
Chapter 6 analyzed the commonality in liquidity, return and volatility of the euro-
denominated corporate bond, government bond and equity markets. We first applied the
Chordia et al. (2003) VAR approach using both daily and weekly frequency. Based on our
VAR model we ran impulse response functions and we found that commonality in liquidity
between euro security markets indeed exists. Furthermore, links between liquidity and
returns and volatility within and between euro security markets can also be strong. We
further found that Granger causality tests support these results. As we introduced a
new corporate bond data set we next compared the average characteristics of frequently
quoted and not frequently quoted corporate bonds. We found that the frequently quoted
part has a lower average age, higher coupon, larger issued amount, longer maturity, lower
rating and higher issuer equity market value than its not frequently quoted counterpart
for the total period: September 2002 to September 2003.
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(Summary in Dutch)
Inleiding
De afgelopen jaren is de belangstelling van zowel wetenschap als praktijk voor bedrijfs-
obligaties toegenomen. Hieraan liggen uiteenlopende redenen ten grondslag. Een
belangrijke reden was de invoering van de girale euro op 1 januari 1999. Die voegde
elf afzonderlijke obligatiemarkten samen en cree¨erde daarmee e´e´n grote obligatiemarkt
met e´e´n gemeenschappelijk munt. De in euro luidende markt voor bedrijfsobligaties
is sindsdien sterk gegroeid en heeft zich ontwikkeld tot een volwassen markt. Een
andere reden voor de toegenomen belangstelling voor bedrijfsobligaties waren de grote
boekhoudschandalen van bedrijven als Enron en WorldCom. Zij leidden tot hun
ondergang. Dit proefschrift gaat dan ook in op een aantal aspecten van bedrijfsobligaties.
De bovengenoemde belangstelling resulteerde in een reeks nieuwe, vooral theoretische,
modellen met betrekking tot het kredietrisico van bedrijfsobligaties. Meer recent is er ook
aandacht gekomen voor modellering van het liquiditeitsrisico van bedrijfsobligaties. Een
belangrijke reden hiervoor is dat rente en kredietwaardigheid - de gebruikelijke factoren
om bedrijfsobligaties te modelleren - de prijzen van dit type obligaties niet volledig konden
verklaren.
Dit proefschrift geeft eerst de ontwikkelingen van de Nederlandse obligatiemarkt na
de introductie van de euro weer. Dan volgt empirisch onderzoek naar kredietrisico van
bedrijfsobligaties (Deel I), respectievelijk liquiditeitsrisico van die obligaties (Deel II).
Voorafgaand aan de samenvattingen van de hoofdstukken worden veelgebruikte termen
gedefinieerd.
Definities
Een (standaard)obligatie is een ”verhandelbaar bewijs van deelneming in een geldlening,
met een vaste nominale waarde waarover een, meestal vaste, rente wordt betaald. Na
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verloop van de looptijd wordt de geldlening afgelost”(bron: Autoriteit Financie¨le Markten,
URL: http://www.afm.nl/). Een bedrijfsobligatie is een obligatie die is uitgegeven door
een bedrijf.
Het kredietrisico van een obligatie is de kans dat beleggers verlies lijden op hun
obligaties ”door het niet nakomen van verplichtingen [van het uitgevend bedrijf (of
emittent)] ten aanzien van rente en aflossing, bijvoorbeeld als gevolg van faillisse-
ment”(bron: bijlage bij het jaarverslag 1998 van De Nederlandsche Bank). Dit
kredietrisico wordt vaak uitgedrukt aan de hand van een rating. De rating van een
emittent geeft de huidige inschatting door een ratingbureau van de financie¨le capaciteit (of
kredietwaardigheid) om te voldoen aan zijn financie¨le verplichtingen (bron: Standard &
Poor’s, URL: http://www.standardandpoors.com/, vertaald uit het Engels door Albert
Mentink (verder AM)). Twee belangrijke ratingbureaus zijn Moody’s Investors Service
en Standard & Poor’s. Als compensatie voor het kredietrisico ontvangt een belegger in
bedrijfsobligaties een hoger verwacht rendement dan op vergelijkbare obligaties zonder
dit risico, bijvoorbeeld Nederlandse Staatsobligaties. Het verschil in verwacht rendement
tussen beide typen van obligaties wordt (yield) spread genoemd. In het algemeen geldt:
hoe groter de (yield) spread hoe groter het kredietrisico.
Een obligatieportefeuille is een verzameling van twee of meer obligaties. Van een
(obligatie)portefeuille kunnen de risicomaatstaven Value-at-Risk en Conditional Value-
at-Risk worden berekend. Value-at-Risk is gedefinieerd als ”het, op basis van een
statistisch model berekende, mogelijk verlies op de [obligatieportefeuille] ten gevolg van
verandering in de marktprijzen van (e´e´n of meer van) [de obligaties in de portefeuille].
Dit mogelijke verlies is zodanig berekend dat werkelijke verliezen daar met een kans van
bijvoorbeeld 99% onder blijven. Hierbij wordt aangenomen dat de samenstelling van de
[obligatieportefeuille] gedurende bijvoorbeeld [e´e´n jaar] onveranderd blijft”(bron: bijlage
bij het jaarverslag 1998 van De Nederlandsche Bank). Conditional Value-at-Risk is, bij
een gegeven kans, gelijk aan de verwachte waarde van de portefeuilleverliezen groter dan
de Value-at-Risk over een bepaalde horizon, bijvoorbeeld e´e´n jaar (bron: Rockafellar, R.
en S. Uryasev (2000), ‘Optimization of Conditional Value-at-Risk’, The Journal of Risk
2(3), 21-41, vertaald uit het Engels door AM).
Een obligatie is liquide als deze een (bijna) volledig substituut is voor kasgeld.
Een obligatiemarkt is liquide als obligaties snel, in grote hoeveelheden, tegen lage
transactiekosten en zonder grote marktprijseffecten kunnen worden verhandeld (bron:
Maltz, A. (2003), ‘Liquidity risk: Current research and practice’, RiskMetrics Journal
4(1), 35-72, vertaald uit het Engels door AM). Gaat dit niet op dan is een obligatie
illiquide. Een directe maatstaf voor de liquiditeit van een obligatie is de hoogte van
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transactiekosten: de bied-laat spread. Deze spread is gedefinieerd als het verschil tussen
de bied- en laatprijs. De biedprijs is ”de prijs die ’de markt’ wil betalen voor de aankoop
van een bepaalde obligatie”; de laatprijs is ”de prijs die ’de markt’ wil ontvangen voor de
verkoop van een bepaalde obligatie”(bron: EuroNext, URL: http://www.euronext.com/).
In de regel is de bied-laat spread positief. Een grote (kleine) bied-laat spread duidt op
een lage (hoge) liquiditeit. Beleggers zijn gebaat bij grote liquiditeit, omdat zij dan tegen
lage transactiekosten kunnen handelen.
De Nederlandse obligatiemarkt
In dit hoofdstuk stellen wij de vraag aan de orde welke invloed de invoering van de girale
euro op 1 januari 1999 heeft gehad op de Nederlandse obligatiemarkt. Op de nieuwe,
grotere in euro luidende obligatiemarkt vielen valutaverschillen weg. Mede hierdoor
moest de Nederlandse Staat manieren zoeken om zich positief te onderscheiden van
andere deelnemende landen. Zij vergrootte daarom de liquiditeit van haar obligaties
met als doel voor beleggers aantrekkelijk te blijven. Voor de Nederlandse uitgevers van
bedrijfsobligaties gold vanaf dat moment dat land van herkomst minder belangrijk was
dan rating en sector. Zowel de Nederlandse Staats- als bedrijfsobligaties moesten dus
door de komst van de euro internationaal meer concurrerend worden. Tevens werd het
aandeel van buitenlandse beleggers in beide typen obligaties groter.
Om de toegenomen internationalisering van financie¨le markten het hoofd te kunnen
bieden, fuseerde de Amsterdamse beurs op 22 september 2000 met een aantal andere
Europese beurzen tot Euronext. Daarnaast bleven vraag en aanbod van obligaties bij
elkaar komen op de veel grotere Over-the-Counter (OTC) obligatiemarkt. Een markt
waar obligaties tussen koper en verkoper worden verhandeld zonder tussenkomst van een
beurs.
Het toezicht op de Nederlandse obligatiemarkt veranderde eveneens; de sectorbenader-
ing maakte plaats voor een cross sectie (sector overschrijdende) benadering. Tenslotte
hebben de internationale ratingbureaus met hun beoordelingen meer dan voorheen greep
op de Nederlandse obligatiemarkt gekregen.
Wij concluderen dat de invoering van de euro de markt van Nederlandse obligaties
voor vele betrokken partijen ingrijpend heeft veranderd.
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Kredietrisico
De waardering van step-up obligaties
In dit hoofdstuk toetsen wij empirisch welke waarderingsmethode het beste de marktprijs
van step-up obligaties benadert. Vooral Europese telecommunicatiebedrijven hebben step-
up obligaties uitgegeven ter financiering van de UMTS licenties. Het doel van step-up
obligaties is beleggers te compenseren voor prijsdalingen als gevolg van verslechtering
van de kredietwaardigheid van een telecommunicatiebedrijf. Bij dit obligatietype neemt
de hoogte van de coupon toe met een van tevoren vastgesteld aantal basispunten (e´e´n
basispunt is gelijk aan 1/100 procent) bij een verlaging van de rating tot een van tevoren
vastgesteld niveau. Bij een enkelvoudige step-up obligatie kan de coupon slechts e´e´nmaal
worden verhoogd; bij een meervoudige step-up obligatie kan de coupon meermalen worden
verhoogd.
Wij onderzoeken de theoretische waarde van step-up obligaties aan de hand van het
Jarrow-Lando-Turnbull (verder JLT) model uit 1997. Ook wordt dit soort obligaties
gewaardeerd met behulp van een historisch model. Dit model maakt gebruik van
kansen gebaseerd op ratingveranderingen in het verleden. Bovendien worden theoretische
waarden van de step-up obligaties berekend alsof het standaardobligaties zijn. Daarnaast
vergelijken wij de prijsfluctuaties van de step-up obligaties met die van vergelijkbare
standaardobligaties. Tenslotte analyseren wij het effect van een (kans op een) rat-
ingverlaging op het rendement van enerzijds step-up obligaties en anderzijds vergelijkbare
standaardobligaties.
Wij concluderen dat het JLT-model voor de obligaties met een enkelvoudige step-
up een waardering oplevert die de marktprijzen het beste benadert. De obligaties met
meervoudige step-ups daarentegen worden door de markt als een standaardobligatie
geprijsd. Verder blijkt dat de marktprijzen van de step-up eigenschap meer fluctueren
dan op grond van de waarderingen volgens het JLT-model of het historische model
te verwachten is. De step-up eigenschap is gelijk aan de step-up marktprijs minus
de waardering van de vergelijkbare standaardobligatie. Het JLT-model benadert de
marktprijs van de step-up eigenschap altijd beter dan het historische model. Ook
blijkt dat de prijzen van de meeste step-up obligaties minder fluctueren dan die van
vergelijkbare standaardobligaties. Met andere woorden: de meeste step-up obligaties
bieden bescherming door middel van lagere prijsfluctuaties. Tenslotte genereren step-
up obligaties geen hoger rendement bij (een kans op) ratingverlaging ten opzichte van
vergelijkbare standaardobligaties.
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De optimalisatie van portefeuilles met bedrijfsobligaties
In dit hoofdstuk onderzoeken wij de vraag of optimale bedrijfsobligatieportefeuilles in
de praktijk een verbetering vormen ten opzichte van de startportefeuille. Optimale
portefeuilles zijn portefeuilles met een lager (of tenminste hetzelfde) risico dan de
startportefeuille en met tenminste hetzelfde (of hoger) rendement.
Wij onderzoeken de kenmerken van dergelijke optimale portefeuilles. Het CreditMet-
rics model simuleert hiertoe eerst een verdeling van een bedrijfsobligatieportefeuille en
berekent vervolgens portefeuillerisico’s, zoals Value-at-Risk. Daarna worden optimale
bedrijfsobligatieportefeuilles berekend met behulp van de gesimuleerde verdeling en
optimalisatietechnieken.
Wij concluderen dat een portefeuillemanager de transacties in de startportefeuille om
tot een optimale portefeuille te komen niet zonder meer dient op te volgen. Optimale
portefeuilles bestaan namelijk uit slechts e´e´n of twee dominante obligaties. Daarbij komt
dat deze portefeuilles zeer gevoelig zijn voor wijzigingen in de verwachte prijs van deze
dominante obligaties, hoe klein deze ook zijn. De optimalisatie wordt praktisch meer
bruikbaar na toevoeging van enkele voor de hand liggende randvoorwaarden. Hierbij kan
worden gedacht aan een maximum gewicht van individuele obligaties en categorisering
van obligaties aan de hand van obligatiekarakteristieken, bijvoorbeeld rating. Wij hebben
tenslotte optimale portefeuilles verder gediversifieerd door de dominante obligaties deels
te vervangen door andere met vergelijkbare karakteristieken.
Liquiditeitsrisico
De meting van liquiditeit van bedrijfsobligaties
In dit hoofdstuk gaan wij in op de meting van de liquiditeit van bedrijfsobligaties. Het is
van belang te weten in hoeverre liquiditeit het verwachte rendement van bedrijfsobligaties
be¨ınvloedt. In het algemeen geldt dat portefeuilles bestaande uit illiquide obligaties een
hoger verwacht rendement genereren dan portefeuilles van vergelijkbare liquide obligaties.
De vergoeding voor illiquiditeit is hier gedefinieerd als de yield spread tussen beide
portefeuilles.
Wij onderzoeken illiquiditeit door gebruik te maken van negen indirecte liquiditeitscri-
teria. Om tot een juiste vergelijking te komen tussen liquide en illiquide portefeuilles
hebben wij eerst de portefeuillerendementen gecorrigeerd voor andere obligatiekarakter-
istieken die, evenals liquiditeit, ook het verwachte rendement van bedrijfsobligatieporte-
feuilles bepalen. Voorbeelden hiervan zijn: resterende looptijd en rating. Om te
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bepalen welk criterium het beste liquiditeit meet, hebben wij daarna vijf van de negen
liquiditeitscriteria paarsgewijs vergeleken en de uitkomsten ervan naast elkaar gezet.
Wij concluderen dat de yield spread tussen liquide en illiquide portefeuilles uiteen
kan lopen van 13 tot 23 basispunten. Daarbij blijkt dat met behulp van acht van de
negen liquiditeitscriteria dit verwachte rendementsverschil kan worden ge¨ıdentificeerd.
De criteria totale hoofdsom en spreiding tussen de (door banken) afgegeven verwachte
rendementen laten het grootste liquiditeitsverschil tussen beide obligatieportefeuilles zien.
Uit de paarsgewijze vergelijking blijkt dat geen van de vijf criteria krachtiger is dan de
ander.
De schatting van liquiditeit in effectenmarkten
In dit hoofdstuk schatten wij hoe liquiditeit van in euro luidende bedrijfsobligatie-
, staatsobligatie- en aandelenmarkten op elkaar reageren. Hiertoe kwantificeren wij
liquiditeit in elk van deze markten met behulp van de gemiddelde bied-laat spread.
Verder maken wij een vergelijking tussen de gemiddelde obligatiekarakteristieken van de
bedrijfsobligatiemarkt die enerzijds bestaat uit liquide obligaties en anderzijds bestaat uit
illiquide obligaties.
Wij maken eerst gebruik van het model van Chordia, Sarkar en Subrahmanyam
(2003) en de Granger causaliteitstesten om te bepalen in hoeverre de gemiddelde bied-
laat spreads op elkaar reageren. Vervolgens toetsen wij of de gemiddelden van de
obligatiekarakteristieken van het liquide en illiquide deel van de bedrijfsobligatiemarkt
aan elkaar gelijk zijn.
Wij concluderen dat de gemiddelde bied-laat spreads in de drie onderzochte in euro
luidende financie¨le markten op elkaar reageren, zij het soms met vertraging. Verder vinden
wij dat het liquide deel van de bedrijfsobligatiemarkt gemiddeld een kortere looptijd sinds
uitgifte, hogere coupon, grotere totale hoofdsom, langere resterende looptijd, lagere rating
en hogere aandelenmarktwaarde van de emittent heeft dan het illiquide deel.
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